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ABSTRACT
The possibility of transplanting h u m a n body parts from one person to another, and the
increasing and varied use for such parts in medical experimentation, means that human
body parts can now reasonably be described as medical resources. Like many medical

resources, body parts suitable for transplantation or experimentation are in short supply
Unlike other medical resources, however, such parts are significant for another reason:
namely, because they had previously been functional parts of a person's body. Although

the relevant policies require a person's consent before her body parts are used in either
these ways, in practice such consent is not always sought, or may be overridden by what
are believed to be more important considerations. One reason for this may be a lack of

certainty about the nature of a person's claim to determine what happens to any of her bo

parts removed for therapeutic reasons or all of them after her death. This lack of certai
I contend, is a result of a more fundamental uncertainty about whether a person has any
interest in what happens to her body parts in either of these circumstances. The task of

thesis is to determine whether there is such an interest, its nature and significance, an
what, if any, implications it has for the various medical uses of human body parts.

iii

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Excised human body parts and extracted bodily substances are no longer simply

surgical waste but potential medical resources, since they can be used for a variet

diagnostic, therapeutic and experimental purposes. They are, however, in virtue o
being from the bodies of persons, unlike other medical resources. The primary

significance of intact body parts, then, is not as potential medical resources, but

as part of the functioning bodies of particular persons. Further, even after bein

excised, a body part may still be significant to the person from whose body it wa
removed.

The significance of a body part to the person from whose body it has been removed
has been recognised in some contexts. In Moore v. Regents of the University of

California, hereafter the Moore case, the Californian Court of Appeals argued tha
when a patient had a body part removed during a medical procedure, that person

' ... must have the ultimate power to control what becomes of his or her tissues'
a similar vein, the various policies for procuring parts from cadavers for

transplantation, and the corresponding legislation or regulations, give '... paramo

authority to individuals to control postmortem organ removal and transfer from the

bodies'. So, at least in some relevant areas of public policy, it is recognised tha

1

In chapter two, I specifically identify those body parts and substances m y discussion and
arguments will be concerned with. For convenience, though, throughout the thesis the phrase
'human body parts', and related phrases, will include bodily substances as well as solid organs.

2 Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 1988, 249 Cai Rptr. 494 (Court of Appeals),
p. 508.
3 D. A. Peters, 'Protecting Autonomy in Organ Procurement Procedures: Some Overlooked
Issues', Milbank Quarterly, vol. 64, no. 2, 1986, p. 243.
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person from whose body a part is to be, or has been, removed should have the
primary role in determining what happens to it.

However,-whilst in theory there is such recognition, in practice someone else may
actually determine what happens to that part. The escalating demand for human body

parts for medical purposes has resulted in increased uncertainty about who has clai

to such parts, what those claims are, and how they can be accommodated whilst still

obtaining an adequate supply of such parts. This uncertainty is, I contend, a resul
some fundamental questions about the relationship between persons and their body
parts remaining unanswered—usually because they have not been asked.

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the nature and significance of a person'

interest in and claims to her body parts, and, further, to determine how best to pr
and promote such interests and claims. Two instances of procuring human body parts

for medical purposes illustrate many of the fundamental issues concerning a person'

interests in and claims to her body parts: first, the use in recent forms of medica
experimentation of parts removed for therapeutic reasons, and, second, the use of

parts from cadavers for transplantation. In addition, some of these issues also ar
relation to destroying human body parts that have been removed for therapeutic

reasons. These are the main examples in relation to the treatment of human body par
I focus on in this thesis. I undertake a closer examination of the various issues

by such treatment, and conclude that at least some of the present uncertainty in r
to the use of excised human body parts or parts from cadavers would be resolved if
were recognised that a person owns her body parts.

3

In chapter two I identify and discuss some discrepancies between the relevant policies

and procurement practices. First, the relevant discrepancies in relation to the use in
medical experimentation of human body parts removed for therapeutic reasons are
clearly illustrated by the circumstances that gave rise to, and the subsequent

deliberations in, the Moore case. Second, with regard to using parts from cadavers for
transplantation, discrepancies seem to arise from a tension between the requirements

current policies and either the wishes of the deceased person's relatives, or (to a le
extent) the needs of potential organ recipients.

It should not be automatically assumed, though, that the procurement policies are
sound and that these discrepancies result from a failure to implement them correctly.

There has been only superficial justification of these policies, and so it is not exac
clear why a person should be consulted before an excised part of her body is used for
experimentation, or why a deceased person's prior consent is required before her body
parts are used for transplantation. The argument given in chapters three through six
seeks to clarify the basis for, and strength of, a person's claim to determine what
happens to her body parts in these circumstances.

Chapters three and four identify and discuss specific interests a person may have in
body part. In chapter three, I investigate whether a person would have an interest in

what happens to a part of her body removed for therapeutic reasons, what the basis for
such an interest would be, and whether it would be morally significant. In chapter
four. I determine whether, and to what extent, a person would be concerned about
what happens to her body parts after her death. Further, given that other people may
have significant interests in how parts from a cadaver may be treated or used, I seek
determine the significance of a deceased person's prior interest, and what (if any)
implications there are of a person having such an interest.

4

Having argued a person m a y have a morally significant interest in what happens to a
part of her body removed for therapeutic reasons, or some or all her body parts after
her death, I conclude chapters three and four by suggesting that, in both these
circumstances, a person has certain prerogatives in relation to her body parts.

In chapters five and six, I continue by arguing the best way of ensuring recognition of
these prerogatives is to recognise that a person owns her body parts.

In chapter five, I provide a conceptual defence of a person's owning her body parts,

arguing that it is possible (contrary to some suggestions) for a person to exercise ma
property rights or incidents of ownership over her body parts. In order to strengthen
this defence, I argue that the various determinations a person will typically make if
chooses to exercise her prerogatives over her body parts can plausibly be described as
that person exercising various property rights over her body parts.

In chapter six, after investigating and dismissing other suggestions about how to

ensure recognition of a person's prerogatives in relation to her body parts, I argue it
should be recognised that a person owns her body parts. This is because, in western
democratic societies, ownership is the main institution for determining who has access
to and control of particular things. Further, when a person owns an object, she is

usually recognised as having the strongest claim to it. This, I contend, is the type of
claim a person needs to have in relation to her body parts in order to best ensure
recognition of the prerogatives she has over them.

In chapter seven, I evaluate an important (potential) objection to my proposal. This
objection is a specific version of the 'commodification objection', which argues that

5
some things, simply because of the type of things they are, should not be sold. Such

an objection is relevant to my proposal because typically (although not necessaril

person is morally and legally permitted to sell something she owns. So if (as I argu
a person were recognised as the owner of her body parts then she would be permitted
to sell them, but, according to the proponents of this objection, human body parts
should not be treated as commodities. I provide a two-pronged response to this
objection. As it is currently formulated, the objection does not undermine my
proposal, since it is not clear why human body parts should not be sold. Further,
even if a more plausible version of the commodification objection were given, my
proposal could accommodate such concerns, since the sense in which a person owned

her body parts could be restricted so that she was not permitted to sell them. Eithe
way, I conclude this objection does not undermine my argument.

Before commencing on this argument in detail, I need to issue some caveats. I am not

concerned in this thesis with whether it is in general morally acceptable to use hum

body parts for medical purposes. Neither will I argue for the superiority of a part

policy to regulate the procurement of human body parts for these purposes. A further
limitation of my discussion relates to the body parts the following arguments and
subsequent conclusions pertain to. Although specific details will be given in the
following chapters, it is worth mentioning here that, unless stated otherwise, the

following discussion and arguments do not pertain to reproductive tissues. Ownership

of, or even having property rights in, one's reproductive tissues raises the probl
issue of when does a person (and this is perhaps more uncertain for females and
males) stop owning such tissues—when it becomes an embryo, a fetus, a neonate, and
so on. Nevertheless, since people do seem to exercise property rights over their

4

This, and related, issues are discussed by S. Dodds, Property and Persons: Arguments for
Property Rights in the Liberal Tradition, PhD thesis, La Trobe University, 1993, pp. 77-81.
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gametes, for example, by donating or selling them, it would be worth investigating the
implications of my arguments and conclusions for these practices at some later time.

If I am right, and the best way of ensuring recognition of a person's prerogatives

concerning her body parts is to recognise that she owns them, then this may provide a
least part of the rationale needed for the various policies for procuring human body
parts to be used. This in turn will make it clearer what is required by way of
consultation with, and obtaining consent from, the person from whose body the
part(s) are to be removed. More importantly, establishing whether a person has a
morally significant interest in what happens to her body parts after being removed
from her body, or after her death, will serve to clarify the nature and significance
the relationship between a person and her body parts.

CHAPTER T W O
THE

CURRENT STATUS OF, A N D

USES FOR, H U M A N B O D Y P A R T S

The best known source of human body parts for medical purposes is cadavers, but it
also possible, and sometimes necessary, for one or more of a person's body parts to
be removed while that person remains alive and in good health. The removal and use
of h u m a n body parts are, however, subject to various constraints. Whilst some of
these are practical, cultural or social, others are required by current policies regulating
the procurement and use of h u m a n body parts, and so have legislative authority.
There are, though, discrepancies between what is required by these policies and what
happens in practice when parts are removed from either the bodies of living persons or
cadavers.

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, to provide some background informati
necessary for the forthcoming argument, and, second, to motivate that argument. In
the first section, I discuss various general constraints on the removal and use of human
body parts. In the second and third sections, I describe the various medical uses of,
policies for, and practices relating to the procurement of body parts, first from living
persons, and second from cadavers. In both cases, I attempt to identify reasons for
the discrepancies between the relevant policies and what happens in practice.

SECTION I: GENERAL CONSTRAINTS ON REMOVING AND USING

H U M A N BODY PARTS

As mentioned above, there are various general constraints on removing and using
human body parts, and these provide a framework for determining the acceptability of
7
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any proposed use for such parts, including medical ones. Whilst some of these

constraints may be moral, or have a moral aspect to them, for the purposes of this

discussion they should be distinguished from any moral constraints that arise if i
established a person has a significant interest in what happens to any of her body

removed for therapeutic reasons or all of them after her death. One of the central
of this thesis is to identify any of the second type of constraints on the removal
of human body parts. My purpose in identifying and describing some of these more
general constraints is, then, to set some broad parameters for the argument I give
following chapters.

i. General Constraints on Removing Human Body Parts

Whilst there are constraints on removing human body parts from both living persons

and cadavers, those relating to the former are more significant, since the removal
particular body parts may impair or even kill a person. It is possible, though, for

of a person's body to be removed as a preventive measure, or because they are need
for diagnostic procedures, or one of a number of other possible therapeutic uses.
Some parts may also be removed and used for the therapeutic benefit of someone
else.

The general constraints on removing body parts from living persons relate to the na

and function of a particular part. Theoretically, any of a person's body parts can

removed whilst she is alive, but, in practice, very few can be removed and that pe

remain alive, continue to be in good health and be able to perform the various acti
necessary for a worthwhile life. The effect of removing a particular body part is

1

Specific examples of each of these medical reasons for removing a person's body parts will be
given in the following section.

9

contingent on whether the part is vital or non-vital, regenerative or non-regenerative.

A person cannot have any of her vital body parts removed and remain alive unless, i

the short term, she has access to an artificial mechanism to perform that part's fu
or, in the long term, she has received a replacement body part of that type via

transplantation. For this reason, unless a vital part were diseased or had ceased t
function, a person would be legally and morally prohibited from having such parts
removed whilst she was alive.

The same is not true of some bodily substances, such as blood and sperm, since thes

substances regenerate. Part of a person's liver or some of her bone marrow can also
be removed, since what remains will regenerate. Typically, a person's non-vital,

non-regenerative body parts will only be removed if they are diseased, or present s

other threat to her health, and in such cases only the diseased or impaired section
removed. There is, though, one exception: it is possible for a person to have a
functional kidney removed and continue living without being seriously debilitated.

There are at least three general constraints on removing any of a living person's n

vital or regenerative body parts. First, the removal of solid organs as well as oth
body parts, for example bone marrow and ova, necessitates a person's undergoing,
and so taking the risks of, surgery or other invasive procedures. Second, after
having a non-vital body part removed, a person could be impaired in some way or be

more vulnerable to certain health problems. For this reason, unless such parts were

2

At least two thirds of the liver has to be left in a person's body for it to regenerate.

3 Though problems would arise if the person's other kidney failed or became diseased. A person
could also have a cornea removed and continue to function adequately, although their eyesight
would be impaired.
4 In order for ova to be removed a woman has to undergo a laparoscopy which, whilst not strictly
surgery (since no major incision is made), is still invasive.
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diseased, a person would be prevented from having them removed, since she would
probably become dependent on, and so a burden to, other people or society. A
comparable constraint on removing some regenerative body parts, notably blood, is

that a person can only relinquish a certain amount of such parts within a given tim

period and remain healthy. Third, a person would be disfigured if, for example, som
of her teeth were removed. Whilst disfigurement may not seem as significant as

physical harm, the possibility of a person's being psychologically or socially harm
would seem sufficient to prevent removal of particular body parts.

There is only one general constraint on removing parts from cadavers—namely, the
parts are suitable for the proposed purpose. Human body parts begin to deteriorate
shortly after a person stops breathing, and so become unsuitable for many of their

possible uses. So if it proposed that parts from a cadaver be used in some way, the
have to be removed shortly after the person has died. Other reasons why parts from

cadavers may not be suitable for particular uses include the age the person dies, t
condition of the part, and whether the part meets certain physiological criteria.

There are also constraints on using excised human body parts. Although one of my
main concernsis to identify any moral constraints on using such parts which would

arise if a person had a morally significant interests in what happens to any of her

parts removed for therapeutic reasons or all of them after her death, these other t

constraints assist further in establishing a general framework for determining whet
particular uses for human body parts are acceptable. Again some of these more
general constraints on using human body parts may have a moral aspect to them.

11
ii. General Constraints on using Human Body Parts

There are at least three general constraints which partially determine the accepta
using excised human body parts in particular ways. First, and perhaps most

importantly, human body parts must be treated in accord with public health standa

which primarily are concerned with storage and disposal of such parts. Second, it

must be practical to use a body part for the proposed purpose, for example, it wo

be impractical to transfuse with O" blood a person whose blood type was A . Third

the acceptability of treating human body parts in particular ways may change over

time, for example earlier this century the transplantation of body parts would ha
probably been an abhorrent, as well as a fictional, idea.

There are also cultural constraints. The disposal of cadavers and perhaps parts

thereof, and the associated ceremonies, vary significantly between different cultur

For example, the practices and ceremonies of Australian Aboriginal culture concern

the disposal of bodies also includes body parts. For this reason, Aboriginal peop

object to their ancestors' body parts being exhibited in museums, and, further, h

gone to great lengths to retrieve such parts for reburial. The policies for procu

body parts for transplantation also vary between societies, and even between grou

within the same society, and may be partially determined by religious beliefs, an
other cultural or social norms. For example, Singapore has legislation governing

procurement of body parts which provides different policies for the Muslim and no

5

After being shot in Western Australia in 1833, an aboriginal leader's head was severed and sent to
London, where it remained on display at the Liverpool Royal Institute until 1964 w h e n it was
buried in a public grave. In 1995, members of the Noongar Aboriginal tribe requested the head
be returned to Australia so it could be buried in accord with aboriginal custom, but British
authorities refused on the basis that a similar request from the parents of a stillborn child, the
body of which was buried in the same public grave as the head, had been rejected. G. Duncan,
'Britain refuses to return Aboriginal hero's head', Sydney Morning Herald, 30 August 1995, p. 8.
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Muslim populations.6 Finally, the significance of particular body parts m a y vary. In

many societies, the heart is considered to be the most important body part, although
part's having primary status seems to be associated with what is believed to be the
function of a particular body part. In ancient Greece, for example, the brain had
primary status because it was believed to be the centre of human intelligence.7

There are also what could loosely be described as social constraints on using human

body parts. In relation to determining the acceptability of a particular use for hum
body parts the relevant consideration would be whether the proposed use would
offend other people. The type of offence caused by a particular use of human body
parts may, however, be difficult to determine. Some women, for example, choose to

bury their child's afterbirth in their gardens. Whilst some neighbours may find this

offensive, it does not become morally dubious until the afterbirth is buried on, or

to, a property line. Alternatively, if the afterbirth was not buried but rather spr
a garden bed it may be considered offensive because the neighbours would be more
directly exposed to it. Clearly, a person's putting her child's afterbirth in the
neighbour's garden or on their front doorstep would constitute a moral offense.

Finally, there is an overarching moral principle encompassing most, if not all, of t
specific moral concerns relating to the use of human body parts; namely, that such

parts should be treated with respect and dignity. Both this general principle and th

specific concerns will be discussed in detail in later chapters. It is worth mentio

6

7

B. Teo, 'Organs for Transplantation: The Singapore Experience', Hastings Center Report, vol.
21, no. 6, 1991, pp. 10-13.

C Singer & A. Wasserstein, 'Anatomy and Physiology', in The Oxford Classical Dictionary, ed.
N. H a m m o n d & H. Scullard, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 58-61. A notable
exception was Aristotle w h o attached little importance to the brain, believing its only function
to be to cool the blood.
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here, though, that w h e n this principle is invoked, it is usually implicit that such parts
should be treated with respect and dignity because they are human body parts. A

comparison of the treatment of human body parts with animal body parts supports thi
claim, the obvious difference being the widespread practice of eating animal body
parts, compared with the general condemnation of cannibalism.

Human body parts are typically used for one of the medical purposes to be identifie
Q

below, but m a y also be used for forensic and cosmetic purposes.

These different

types of what could loosely be described as medical or scientific uses of excised

human body parts are generally agreed to be both socially and morally acceptable, a

so are within the various constraints discussed above. As already indicated, I will
primarily be concerned with two specific medical uses of human body parts
throughout the thesis, and these will be discussed further in the following two
sections.

SECTION II: USES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES REGARDING HUMAN
BODY PARTS FROM LIVING PERSONS

Despite the various constraints on a person's body parts being removed whilst she i
still alive, it is possible, and sometimes necessary, for her to have a body part,
parts, removed. Below, I give several specific examples of why a person would need

8

Cosmetic uses for h u m a n body parts include the use of hair to m a k e wigs, the use of skin or fat
cells from one part of the body to modify (usually enhance) another part, and the use of cells
from the h u m a n placenta to develop cosmetic creams. Forensic uses for h u m a n body parts
include identification techniques using blood or other bodily substances. A semi-medical use of
h u m a n body parts is the identification of genetic predispositions for debilitating conditions which
m a y have implications for various aspects of a person's life, such as employment or the ability
to get insurance. Unless explicitly stated, I will not be concerned with these uses of h u m a n body
parts in the rest of the thesis. For a description of the medical and non-medical uses of human
body parts, see B. Dickens, 'The Control of Living Body Materials', University of Toronto Law
Journal, vol. 26, 1977, pp. 150-163.
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to have a body part removed, and, where relevant, explain h o w it would be used. I

then discuss the Australian policies for regulating the removal and subsequent us
human body parts from living persons. I conclude with a discussion of the actual
practice in relation to the procurement of body parts for experimental purposes,
focusing in particular on the Moore Case, a US legal case which resulted from a
person's excised body part being used for medical experimentation without his
consent. This recent case demonstrates the inadequacies of the current policies
regulating the procurement of body parts for experimentation and, more

fundamentally, the need to resolve the nature and significance of the relationship
between a person and excised parts of her body.

i. Medical Uses of Body Parts from Living Persons

Just as a person may have a body part removed for therapeutic or non-therapeutic

reasons, the medical purposes for which such parts could be used can also be divid
into therapeutic and non-therapeutic. The therapeutic uses includes diagnosis,
treatment and post-treatment monitoring. A body part could also be used for the
therapeutic benefit of someone other than the person from whose body it has been

removed. Non-therapeutic uses for excised human body parts include experimental or
educational uses.

First, there are a number of ways a person's excised body part could be used for h
own therapeutic benefit. Any human body part has potential diagnostic value,

9

There is no comparable Australian case. However, the implication of the Moore case for
Australian policy have been discussed. See, for example, D. Mortimer, 'Proprietary Rights in
Body Parts: The Relevance oi Moore's Case in Australia', Monash University Law Review, vol.
16, no. 2, 1993, pp. 217-255; and R. S. Magnusson, 'The Recognition of Proprietary Rights in
H u m a n Tissue in C o m m o n L a w Jurisdiction', Melbourne University Law Review, vol. 18,
1992, pp. 601-629.
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although typically only regenerative bodily substances, such as blood or saliva, are

used. Where particular body parts, such as organs, are diseased or there is a fore

substance, such as cancerous tissue, a biopsy could be performed whereby a section
of the diseased body part or foreign substance is removed and analysed. Finally
(although it only occurs in one set of circumstances) one person's body parts can
used to diagnose possible diseases or other medical conditions in another human
entity. Prenatal screening procedures involve using parts of the pregnant woman's
placenta to diagnose genetic or congenital defects of the foetus.

Further, if it is predicted that part of a person's body may become diseased or ha
some other adverse affect, she may have it removed as a preventive measure. Some
women, for example, who have a significant family history of breast cancer may
choose to have a mastectomy in order to decrease the probability of getting that
disease. More often, if a body part has become diseased or is already having an
adverse effect, it will simple be removed. There are circumstances, though, where

person's excised body part can itself be used for her therapeutic benefit. For exa
somatic gene therapy roughly involves some of a person's tissue being removed,

treated with a virus that will destroy or alter the affected gene, and then transp

back into the person's body. The virus then spreads through the person's body thus
eliminating the defective gene.

Second, another important medical use of human body parts is for the therapeutic

benefit of someone other than the person from whose body the part has been removed

the best known example being transplantation. This involves a body part, typically
solid organ, being removed from one person's body and placed in another person's

body whose own body part of that type has failed, or soon will fail. When the dono

is still alive, the organ recipient will be designated and will usually be a close

16

member. Further, the donation will only be permitted after it has been determined

there is minimum risk to the donor and the requirements of physiological compatibilit
have been met. A kidney is the only whole non-vital, non-regenerative body part a

person is legally and morally permitted to relinquish for this purpose, since it is a
paired solid organ (a person can continue living and remain in good health with only
one kidney). Corneas are also paired solid organs but ' ... they are not ordinarily

considered appropriate material for non-therapeutic removal'. It is possible for part
of a person's liver to be transplanted into the body of another person's body, since

only will what remains of the liver in the person's body regenerate, but so will the
that is transplanted. Similarly, one person's blood can be transfused into another

person's body, but, again, the donor and recipient must be physiologically compatible

Other examples of one person's body parts or substances being of therapeutic value to
someone else are gametes donated to infertile couples, foetal tissue used to treat
Parkinson's disease, and placental material to treat burns.

Third, human body parts are increasingly being used in medical experimentation. One
of the more recent developments in this area is the development of cell-lines which
' ... are derived from primary cultures and are capable of continuous and indefinite
growth', distinguishing them from normal human cells which have a limited life
span. Cell-lines can be used for a variety of therapeutic purposes including testing
drug toxicities, providing a permanent supply of proteins and genetic material, and
12

manufacturing large quantities of naturally occurring products.

Other experimental

uses of human body parts include analysing diseased body parts to determine the cause

10

Dickens, 'The Control of Living Body Materials', p. 154.

11 J. Lavoie, 'Ownership of Human Tissue: Life After Moore v. Regents of the Unive
California', Virginia Law Review, vol. 75, 1989, p. 1367.
12

Lavoie, p. 1368.
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and progress of a disease, determining the effect of various substances on a body part

with a view to developing new therapeutic products, and the testing of such product
and other forms of treatment on body parts.

There is, then, the potential for some interrelation between the various medical u
human body parts. For example, diagnostic or therapeutic uses may lead to
experimentation, which may lead to the development of new therapeutic techniques.

Finally, excised human body parts, particularly those diseased or malformed in some
way, may be used in medical education, involving some form of manipulation or
dissection.

Unless explicitly stated, the following discussion and arguments do not apply to a

of living organ donation, since the use of the particular body parts will be deter
prior to its removal. Rather, in relation to living persons, I will focus on the

experimental use of those body parts removed for therapeutic reasons, since in thes
circumstances it is not clear who may determine what happens to such parts. As
discussed below, the policies for procuring excised body parts for experimental
purposes require the consent from the person from whose body the part has been

removed. However, there are reasons for suspecting that such consent is not always,
or even usually, sought.

13

Arguments relating to the experimental use of h u m a n body parts also apply to the educational
use of such parts since w h e n h u m a n body parts are used in either of these ways they are either
preserved, dissected or manipulated.

18
ii. Current Policies for Procuring Human Body Parts from Living Persons

Each Australian State and Territory has its own Act regulating the procurement of
human body parts for medical purposes, based on model legislation drafted by the
Australian Law Reform Commission. In their report, the Commission distinguishes

between live and cadaver donors. The recommendations relating to cadaver donations
will be discussed below; with respect to live donors, the Commission further
distinguished between the removal and use of regenerative and non-regenerative
tissue.

The Commission recognised a person's regenerative tissue could be used "... for

transplant or other therapeutic purposes or for medical or scientific purposes exp
approved of by the legislation', but the only use of a person's non-regenerative

excised tissue discussed by the Commission was transplantation. As discussed above

a non-regenerative part of a person's body removed because it was diseased could b
used for experimental purposes. The Commission recommended that a person of

sound mind and over the age of 18 should give her consent in writing to any propos

use of her body parts before they were removed, and that she had the power to revo
her consent up till the time the part was removed. Further, in relation to non-

regenerative tissue it was specified that'... in order to provide a 'cooling off p
removal of non-regenerative body parts [for transplantation purposes] should be
forbidden until 14 hours have elapsed from consent'.

14 Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Human Tissue Transplants, Report No. 7,
AGPS, Canberra, 1977, pp. 119-139.
15 ALRC, p. 50.
16 ALRC, p. 50.
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The Commission's recommendations relating to the removal and use of body parts
from living persons were adopted in the NSW Human Tissue Act (1983), which was

concerned with ' ... the donation of tissue by living persons, the removal of tiss

from deceased persons, the conduct of post-mortem examination of deceased persons,
17

and certain other matters'.

Though, there are some minor difference between

individual State and Territory Acts, and significant differences with the comparab

legislation in other countries, I shall use this Act in this and the following se
example of the relevant Australian policies.

Following the Commission's recommendation, Section 7(b) of the NSW Human
Tissue Act states that a person's consent is required if regenerative tissue from

body is to be used "... for other therapeutic purposes [than donation] or for medi
purposes or scientific purposes'. In line with the scope of the Commission's

deliberations, the Act does not address the possibility of using non-regenerative

parts, that have been removed because they are diseased, in medical experimentatio

Requiring a person's consent before the removal and, in some cases, the subsequent

use of her body parts is consistent with the widespread practice of obtaining a p
consent when she is a patient. In neither the Commission's report nor the NSW Act
an explanation given why this consent is required. It may be, however, this

requirement has a similar basis to requiring a person's consent before she undergo

medical treatment, namely that it displays respect for the patient's autonomy. If

the case, though, an explanation is needed of how consulting a person about the us
a part of her body that has been removed respects her autonomy.

17

Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW), No. 16, p. 1.

18 Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW), No. 16, p. 6.

20

Various provisions of the National Health and Medical Research Council's
(NHMRC) statement on Human Experimentation (1992) are concerned with
ensuring that the autonomy of a person participating in any form of medical
experimentation is respected. Of particular interest is the following provision:

conduct of research, the investigator must at all times respect the personality, r
20

wishes, beliefs, consent and freedom of the individual subject.'

It rs questionable

whether that person becomes an experimental subject just by consenting to her exc
part of her body being used in an experiment. Moreover, if it is assumed a person

longer has an interest in a part of her body removed for therapeutic reasons, then
may not occur to the researcher that a person's beliefs, values and so on need to

taken into consideration. As will be described below, and discussed in more detai
the following chapter, there is evidence which undermines such an assumption, and

therefore reasons for consulting a person about the use of a part removed from her
body out of respect for her autonomy.

The relevant provision of the NSW Human Tissue Act requires that a person's fully

informed consent be obtained before any of her body parts are used for transplant
or experimentation. Some indication why such consent is required may be given by
the provision of the NHMRCs statement of Human Experimentation cited above.
Although it may not be immediately obvious how this provision relates to the
experimental use of human body parts, once it is acknowledged that all body parts
used in this way are from the bodies of particular persons then its relevance may

19

The N H M R C is Australia's main Commonwealth body for regulating and funding medical
research.

20 NHMRC Statement on Experimentation and Supplementary Notes, AGPS, Canberra, 198
p.2.
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clearer. Further, if it can be established that a person retains a morally significant

interest in an excised part of her body, then such an interest may justify both th
requirement of consent by the relevant Acts and the NHMRC's provision requiring

that a person and significant aspects of her life be respected when she is partici

in a medical experiment. In the following chapter I argue a person may have such a
interest in a part of her body removed for therapeutic reasons.

The importance of obtaining a person's consent to the use of her excised body part
perhaps clearest when she has a non-regenerative body part removed for non-

therapeutic reasons—that is to donate it for transplantation—since that person wil

giving up a functioning part of her body. Yet there may be other reasons for obtai

such consent in relation to the use of excised body parts (both regenerative and n
regenerative), which, although not suitable for transplantation, could be used in
experimentation. There is evidence, though, that it may be assumed a person would

not be concerned about what happens to such a part, and so the person's consent fo
its subsequent use may not be sought. Such assumptions are evident in the Moore
case.

iii. Current Practices when Procuring Body Parts from Living Persons—The Moore
Case as an Example

During the course of his treatment for hairy cell leukemia, John Moore was referre
Dr David Golde at the University of California (UCLA) who recommended the
removal of his enlarged spleen. Moore gave his "... consent to the operation, but

there is no indication he consented to arrangements about the disposal or use of h

spleen'.21 It is unclear when Golde became interested in Moore's spleen for researc

22

purposes—prior to the surgery or after M o o r e m a d e an unexpected recovery—but at
some stage he became aware that Moore's cells were unusual, perhaps even unique,

and, further, might be of scientific and commercial value. Of particular interest

T-lymphocyte cell (a type of white blood cell) containing lymphokines (proteins w
have a role in orchestrating a complete and efficient immune response, and so may
useful in treating diseases which attack the immune system such as HIV/AIDS and
some cancers). In Moore's body the cell was malignant and so over-produced, which

made '... the genetic material responsible for producing the lymphokines easier to
identify than it would be in other people's cells'.

After the removal of his spleen in 1976, Golde requested Moore return to the UCLA

medical centre for post-operative treatment, which included taking blood and tiss
samples. Moore made twelve such visits over the next seven years. On the second

last visit, Moore requested the samples be taken at his local hospital in Seattle

he could no longer afford the travel and associated expenses. Golde then offered t

pay his expenses for that and a subsequent trip. During the court proceedings it w
revealed these samples were needed for Golde's research and not for Moore's
therapeutic benefit, as Moore claimed he had been led to believe.

Golde's research resulted in the development of a cell line that'... would contin
reproduce these lymphokines indefinitely'. In January 1983, Golde applied for a

patent for the cell-line, which he called the Mo-cell line, on behalf of the Unive

California, listing himself and his research assistant Shirley Quan as the invent

21

Mortimer, 'Proprietary Rights in Body Parts: The Relevance of Moore's Case in Australia', p.
218.

22 Mortimer, p. 218.
23 Mortimer, p. 218.
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this time, Golde asked M o o r e to sign a consent form indicating he understood
' ... that information from research on his blood and bone might not benefit him

directly [and that] he voluntarily granted to the University of California any a

rights [he and his] heirs may have in any cell line or any other potential produ
might be developed from [his] blood or bone marrow'. Moore signed this form in
April 1983, but later claimed in court he was not aware of ' ... the defendant's
research and commercial interests, and that if he had known, he would not have
consented'.

In September 1983, Moore was asked to sign another consent form identical to the
previous one. This time he gave permission for blood and other tissue samples to

removed from his body, but did not relinquish his rights to any cell-line or oth
products resulting from any research. When Golde suggested Moore had mis-signed
the form and requested he sign another one correctly, Moore sought legal advice.
lawyers reviewed Golde's scientific articles from 1978 onwards, which described
development of the 'Mo-cell line' from the spleen of a patient with 'hairy-cell'

leukemia, and also learnt of Golde's patent-application. A law suit was initiated
1984, with Moore as plaintiff, and Golde, Quan, the Regents of the University of

California, the Genetics Institute and a pharmaceutical company Sandoz as defend

The main cause of action Moore brought against the defendants was the conversion
his property. A valid claim under the tort of conversion is proven by showing

someone uses or deals with another person's property in a way not authorised by t

24

L. Daniels, 'Commercialisation of H u m a n Tissues: Has Biotechnology Created the Need for an
Expanded Scope of Informed Consent?', Californian Western Law Review, vol. 27, 1989, p.
215.
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Daniels, p. 215.
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person.

Specifically, M o o r e claimed he only consented to the removal of his spleen,

blood and tissue as part of the treatment for leukemia, and not to their use in the
development of the cell-line. Moore also brought twelve other causes of actions: lack
of informed consent, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and deceit, unjust enrichment,

quasi-contract bad faith, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealin

intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent misrepresentation, intentional
interference with prospective advantageous economic relationships, slander of title,
accounting, and declaratory relief. The Superior Court of California agreed with the
defendant's argument that the claim of conversion incorporated these other causes of
27

action, and only ruled on that claim.

It found M o o r e did not have a valid claim for

conversion of his property concerning the use of his spleen and other body parts in th
development of the Mo-cell line.

After investigating some definitions of, and arguments as to what constitutes,
property, the Californian Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court's ruling in
Moore on the basis that they:

... have been cited to no legal authority, public policy, nor
universally known fact in biological science concerning the
particular tissues referred to in this pleading ... which compels a
conclusion that this plaintiff cannot have sufficient legal interest in
28

his o w n bodily tissues amounting to personal property.

26 For a discussion of the relevance of the tort of conversion to the manipulation of human tissue,
see R. Hardiman, 'Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognising Property Rights in the
Commercial Value of Human Tissue', UCLA Law Review, vol. 34, 1986, pp. 248-252.

27 Moore v. Regents of the University of California et al, 1985, CA. Superior Court, Lo
Angeles County.

28 Moore v. Regents of the University of California et al, 1988, 249 Cai. Rptr. 494, C
Appeals, 1988, p. 503.
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Since the question of the basis for a person's owning or having property rights in her
body parts are two of the central issues in m y thesis, it is worth briefly describing the
Court of Appeal's rationale for recognising that a person has s o m e property rights over
tissue from her body.

Reflecting previous recognition by US courts that a person has a right to determine
29

what is done with her o w n body in a medical context, the Court of Appeal argued
that:

[a] patient must have the ultimate power to control what becomes of
his or her tissues. T o hold otherwise would open the door to a
massive invasion of h u m a n privacy and dignity in the n a m e of
medical progress.

A subsequent criticism of the Court of Appeal's judgement relevant here is that it
31

' ... lacks a firm conceptual basis for its decision on the property issue',

since

nowhere in the ruling w a s a connection m a d e between property, property rights or
proprietary interests, and the notion of control. T h e Court ruled M o o r e did have a
valid cause of action for conversion and remanded the case back to the Superior Court
for a ruling on this and the other causes of action which had not been considered. The

29

Perhaps the most famous of these cases is Schloendoerff vs Society of New York Hospital,
(1914) cited in T. L. Beauchamp & F. C. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Oxfor
University Press, N e w York, 1989, p. 114.
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Moore v. Regents of the University of California et ai, 1988, p. 508.

31 Mortimer, 'Proprietary Rights in Body Parts: The Relevance of Moore's Case in Aust
220.
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defendants appealed the Court of Appeals' decision to the Supreme Court of
California.

The Supreme Court upheld the Superior Court's decision that Moore did not have a

claim for conversion of property in relation to his spleen and other body parts, th

overturning the Court of Appeal's ruling. Four of the reasons the Supreme Court gav

for rejecting Moore's claim of conversion are worth mentioning here. First, the Cou
argued there was no precedent for recognising a person had the necessary property

rights in a part of his body required for him to bring a valid claim of conversion.

Second, and related, is that the restrictions the Californian Health and Safety Cod

places on a patient's ability to deal with his body parts or tissues would ' ... el
33

so m a n y rights ordinarily attached to property'.

The Court argued this meant Moore

(legally) could not have the necessary rights over his spleen, blood or other tissu
after they had been removed from his body to claim conversion of his property.

Third, under patent law, biologically engineered living organisms can be patented b

naturally occurring organisms cannot. The court argued that since the cell-line was

'factually and legally distinct from the cells taken from Moore's body', it, rather

Moore's cells, were the subject of the patent, and further Moore had no claim to th
cell-line. Fourth, the Supreme Court '... rejected Moore's claim to a "proprietary

interest" in all products that might ever be developed from his cells or the patent

32

The Supreme Court argued that the rulings in the cases referred to by the Court of Appeal were
based on privacy rather than property. See Mortimer, 'Proprietary rights in Body Parts: The
Relevance of Moore's Case in Australia', p. 223.

33 Mortimer, p. 224.
34 Moore v. Regents of the University of California et al., 1990, 793, P 2d 479 (Supreme Court),
p. 491. It has been suggested that these restrictions on the rights a person has in relation to her
body rights does not necessarily remove those rights. See Mortimer, pp. 224-225.
35 Moore v. Regents of the University of California et ai, 1990, p. 492.
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line ... [since] ... allowing patients property rights in tissues would ... result in
reduced research activity due to greater administrative duties'.36

In contrast to the previous court rulings, the Supreme Court considered the other
causes of actions brought by Moore and found he had valid grounds for claiming a

breach of fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent against Golde, and so awarded

him compensation. On the basis that'... the law already recognises that a reasonabl
patient would want to know whether a physician has an economic interest that might

affect the physician's professional judgement',37 the Court argued that by failing t
disclose all the relevant information—in particular his research interests and the
possible economic gains—Golde had breach his fiduciary duty. Specifically, Moore

was not in a position to make a decision, and so consent, in a fully informed manne

Whilst this does not necessarily invalidate Moore's consent, he did later claim tha

he been given all the relevant information, he would have made a different decision

This part of the Supreme Court's ruling will be discussed in detail in chapter six.
worth noting here, though, that it is based on previous US court rulings which

recognised that obtaining a patient's fully informed consent is an important part o
respecting and promoting a patient's autonomy.

The Supreme Court's ruling has been criticised in a number of ways. These include

the failure to explain clearly why cells and tissue cannot be the property of the p

from whose body they have been removed, particularly when researchers can claim the

parts and any subsequent products as their property, as Golde and his collaborators
did; whether the biological information cited in the judgement was accurate, since

36

H. R. Bergman, 'Case Comment: Moore v. Regents of the University of California', America
Journal of Law and Medicine, vol. 18, no. 1/2, 1992, p. 132.

37 Moore v. Regents of the University of California et al, 1990, p. 483.
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'[t]he cell-line could not exist without Moore's primary cells';

and whether the

current doctrine of informed consent is sufficient to deal with the issues raised i
39

case.

As the circumstances resulting in the Moore case demonstrate, the relevant personne

may assume a person no longer has an interest in such parts and so would not care

whether they were used for experimental purposes. Related to this is another possib

assumption: that if such parts can be used in some way, particularly in ways that

benefit other people, then they should be. The Moore case, then, provides a detai

example of the failure to obtain a person's consent before his body parts are use

experimental purposes. Further, this case, and subsequent analysis of it, provide
motivation for part of the argument I will be developing in subsequent chapters—
specifically that concerning a person's relationship to and interests in a part of
body removed for therapeutic reasons.

SECTION III: USES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES REGARDING HUMAN

BODY PARTS FROM CADAVERS

Although it is possible for body parts removed from living persons to be used for
medical purposes, very few types of body parts are available from that source. A

greater variety of body parts are available from cadavers, but, as discussed abov

there are also constraints on their removal and use. Examples of the uses of cadave

and parts thereof, will be given below, followed by a discussion of the Australia
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This criticism was made by one of the dissenting judges. For detailed criticisms of different
aspects the Supreme Court's judgment in Moore see D. Mortimer, 'Proprietary Rights in Body
Parts: The Relevance of Moore's Case in Australia', p. 225.
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policies regulating the procurement of h u m a n body parts from this source. Finally, I

identify what seems to be the main cause of discrepancies between the relevant pol
and what happens in practice when procuring body parts from cadavers.

i. Medical Uses of Body Parts from Cadavers

Perhaps the best known medical use of parts from cadavers is transplantation, and

most body parts used in this way are from this source. Although the procedure is th
same as in living organ donation, there is an important difference. In most cases,

donor will have been declared brain-dead, the criteria for which are often incorpo
in organ procurement policies, or less frequently his heart would have ceased to

function. It is possible to transplant all major human organs, with the exception o
brain, as well as many other body parts, for example, skin, bones and bone marrow,
but the time between removing the parts from a cadaver and transplanting them must
be kept to a minimum since once a body part begins to deteriorate it is unsuitable
transplantation. Usually a number of body parts will be removed from a cadaver and
the different parts will be transplanted into different recipients.

Cadavers, or parts thereof, may also be used in medical education or experimentatio
Perhaps the main educative use of cadavers is practicing dissection and surgery
techniques, after which the individual body parts may be preserved for further

examination in the course of medical education. Parts from cadavers could be used f

a similar range of medical experiments as parts removed from living bodies, althoug

for some experiments the time constraint may be particularly important. These other

medical uses for cadavers are, at least in theory, governed by the same policies wh
govern the procurement of parts from cadavers for transplantation.

30

Finally, cadavers and parts thereof are used in autopsies. This procedure, which

determines the cause of death, is performed in specific circumstances: when the pe

has died in criminal or suspicious circumstances; when the person dies within twen
four hours of surgery or when there is some reason to suspect malpractice, or the

cause of death is unknown. If the circumstances of a person's death require that an

autopsy be performed then neither the prior permission of the (now) deceased person

nor the permission of the deceased person's relatives is required. Rather, all tha

necessary is that the designated official deem the circumstances of a person's deat
makes an autopsy necessary. Since there is no uncertainty in relation to who
determines this use of parts from cadavers, autopsies will be excluded from
subsequent discussion.

ii. Current Policies for Procuring Human Body Parts from Cadavers

In addition to discussing the procurement and use of body parts from living persons
the Australian Law Reform Commission's report into Human Tissue Transplants also
discussed, and made recommendations for regulating, the removal and use of parts

from cadavers for medical purposes. The Commission identified '[t]he principal iss
for lawmaking on cadaver tissue donation is whether the community had a sufficient

interest or 'right' in dead bodies to support a claim to human tissues which can b

for the public benefit and, if so, in what circumstances and with what restrictions
The Commission also evaluated the significance of the wishes of the relatives
compared with any prior wishes of the deceased person. Whilst acknowledging the
deceased person may have herself wanted her relatives involved in decisions
concerning the use of her body parts after her death, the Commission recommended

that the donor's prior wishes be considered paramount and that '[n]o person (except

40

A L R C , Human Tissue Transplants, p. 64.
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for the coroner in a case falling within his jurisdiction) should have the p o w e r to
overrule the decision'. The Commission made the following recommendation in
relation to the procurement of parts from cadavers:

[w]here a person dies in hospital or his body is brought to the
hospital, the hospital itself, by a designated officer, should have the
power to authorise removal of tissue for transplant ... after first
making enquires for the existence of consent and objection by the
deceased, or, if none exists or can be ascertained, objections by the
relatives.

Finally, the Commission established an order of priority between the relatives for
consultation regarding the procurement of body parts from a deceased person.

Although not directly relevant to the issues under discussion in this thesis, 'braindeath' is one of the more problematic aspects of the organ procurement procedure.
The criteria for brain-death that have become generally accepted were originally
proposed by a Committee from the Harvard Medical School. Whilst acknowledging
the general acceptance of the concept of brain death, the Australian Law Reform
Commission recommended that in any legislation regulating the removal of human
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A L R C , p. 65.
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43 'A Definition of Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard M
School to Examine the Definition of Death', Journal of the American Medical Association, vol.
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tissue from cadavers ' ... detailed criteria [for brain-death] should not be

included ... [but rather] ... [flexibility to allow adoption of criteria to accord w

the best current profession standard is preferable to verbose legislation'.45 Rather,
Commission recommended that 'a person has died where there has occurred (a)

irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain of the person; or (b) irreversi
cessation of circulation of blood in the body of the person'.46

Finally, the Commission sought to determine which of the two organ procurement

policies operating in different parts of the world at the time of their deliberations
voluntary donation or presumed consent—would be most suited to Australia. Under a
voluntary donation procurement policy (also known as opting-in or contracting-in),

parts from a cadaver can be used for transplantation only with the prior consent of t
person whose body it had been. There are various mechanisms for recording a

person's consent: including some form of central registry for potential organ donors
provision in a person's will, carrying an organ donor card or an indication on her
driver's license. The alternative policy is presumed consent (also known as optingout or contracting out). Under this policy, parts from cadavers are removed for
transplantation purposes unless the person whose body it was had lodged an objection
during her lifetime to this occurring. There are a similar range of mechanisms for
recording an objection as there is for giving consent under the voluntary donation
policy. The Commission seemed to combine aspects of both policies in its
recommendation that'... public interest and the respect for individual autonomy will

45

A L R C , p. 63.

46 ALRC, p. 63.

47 These last two mechanisms are the most common in Australia, although neither are specifie
the legislation.
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be adequately served if the deceased indicates consent or non-objection in his lifetime
_£

or if the relatives indicate at death that they do not object to the tissue removal'.

Most of the Commission's conclusions in relation to the removal and use of parts from
cadavers are reflected in the relevant provisions of the NSW Human Tissue Act,
specifically sections 23 and 24. A person's prior and unrevoked consent is required
before any of her parts can be removed after her death and used for transplantation

purposes. Further, if this consent has been given, this is sufficient for the remova

the body parts by a designated officer. Only if there is uncertainty as to how a pers

wanted her body parts treated after her death is there a requirement to consult with
deceased person's relatives. Finally, section 33 of the Act adopts verbatim the
Commission's recommended criteria for the point of death.

There is, however, a significant difference between the provisions of the NSW Human
Tissue Act and the Commission's recommendations. The Act regulates the
procurement of body parts from cadavers for transplantation purposes solely by a
voluntary donation policy, whereas (as mentioned above) the Commission seemed to
recommend a combination of both voluntary donation and presumed consent. A

voluntary donation policy gives a person an active, and so perhaps a more significant

role in determining what happens to her body parts after her death, since it require
explicit consent before any parts from her body can be used for transplantation

purposes. However, at best, only a general rationale has been given for this role and

is not entirely clear why a person's prior consent is required before any of her body
parts are removed and used for transplantation purposes after her death. This, I

contend, may in part be because of uncertainty about the nature and significance of a
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person's claim to determine what happens to her body parts after her death. Further,
this uncertainty has resulted in practices contravening these policies.

iii. Current Practices when Procuring Body Parts from Cadavers

The practices that seems contrary to policies for removing parts from cadavers do not
necessarily ignore the relevant prior directives of the deceased person. Rather, they

enhance the role of the deceased person's relatives by routinely consulting them about
the use of that person's body parts, and not just when the policies require such
consultation. The main reason for this consultation with the deceased person's

relatives, or other people closely associated with that person, is that, in the absenc

signed documentation (such as an organ donor card or drivers licenses) this is perhaps

the best way of finding out how that person wanted her body and it parts treated after
her death. Further, such consultation would be one way of ensuring the person had

not revoked her decision to make her body parts available for transplantation prior to
her death. In light of such considerations ' ... the decedent may be viewed as the
49

donor and the family as the instrument of that donation'.

In addition, surveys

indicate a general perception that the involvement of the relatives provides a
'... protective buffer or barriers between the untrustworthy system and the potential
source of organs'. There are problems, however, with this enhanced role for the
deceased person's relatives.

The rationale for asking the deceased person's relatives before removing that person'
body parts and using them for transplantation—that the relatives would know if the

49 J. F. Childress, 'Ethical Criteria for Procuring and Distributing Organs for Transplantation',
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, vol. 14, no. 1, 1989, p. 93.
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person wanted her body parts to be treated in that w a y — a s s u m e s she would have told
them. There is, however, evidence to the contrary, for example, '[djespite the fact
93% of Americans have heard or read about transplants no more than 30% have
discussed donating their organs with their families'.

There is also conflicting evidence as to what relatives would decide when asked
whether they would object to a deceased person's organ's being used for

transplantation purposes. The results of one telephone survey indicates ' ... over 9
per-cent would quite likely donate kins' organs if they knew that their relative's
52

donation'.

Other evidence suggests that, in practice, the deceased person's relatives

are reluctant to consent to the removal of a deceased person's body parts to be use
transplantation purposes, perhaps even when that person had already consented.

In particular, throughout the United States during the 1980's organ procurement
legislation was amended to incorporate a proposal addressing the shortage of organs
available for transplantation. It was assumed that one reason for the shortage was

the relatives' permission to retrieve body parts from potential donors was not being
sought. These amendments made it mandatory for medical personnel to ' ... ask
families of brain-dead potential donors about the possibility of organ removal from
these individuals before disconnecting them from respirators and issuing death
certificates'. This revised policy, known as required request, was expected to

51

P. Lee, 'The Organ Supply Dilemma: Acute Responses to a Chronic Dilemma', Columbia
Journal of Law and Social Problems, vol. 20, 1986, pp. 368-369.

52 J. Prottas & H. L. Batten, 'The Willingness to Give: The Public and the Supply o
Transplantable Organs', Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, vol. 16, no. 1, 1991
p. 123.

53 D. A. Peters, 'Protecting Autonomy in Organ Procurement Procedures: Some Overloo
Issues', Milbank Quarterly, vol. 64, no. 2, 1986, p. 251.
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increase the supply of organs since it was assumed, on the basis of survey data such
as the one mentioned above, that most people supported organ donation and further
would donate their relatives' body parts for this purpose. Preliminary data from a
survey of twenty-two hospitals that had implemented required request policies show
that ' [t]he families of most eligible donors are asked to donate, but many of the
families refused'.

It has been suggested that the voluntary donation policy has inadvertently given ris

the practice of consulting and adhering to the wishes of the deceased person's relat
even when they are in conflict with the deceased person's prior wishes, because
'[procurement personnel approach surviving families of declared donors in the same
way they approach families of potential donors who have not signed donor cards '.

This may give the relatives ' ... the impression that they have final legal authorit
control and transfer body parts from dead relatives, even when the latter have
expressly authorised this in writing before death'. This impression may have been
strengthened by the adoption of the required request amendment, described above,
since it' ... lends increased authority to the view that surviving families do have
57

legal power' to override the deceased person's prior directrves.

Various aspects of the organ procurement procedure indicate why it is thought
necessary to consult the deceased person's relatives prior to the removal of that

person's body parts, and more significantly why the relatives' wishes usually prevail

54 B. A. Virnig & A. Caplan, 'Required Request: What Difference Has it Made?', Transplantation
Proceedings, vol. 24, no. 5, 1992, p. 2158.
55 D. A. Peters, p. 249.
56 Peters, p. 250.
57 Peters, p, 251 (author's emphasis).
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even if they conflict with the prior directives of the person from whose body the parts
are to be removed. As mentioned above, for human body parts to be suitable for

transplantation, they must be removed before they begin to deteriorate, and so ideally

the parts should be removed when a person's heart is still beating even though she has
been declared brain-dead. As a consequence, the most suitable body parts for
transplantation are from formerly healthy people who have been declared brain-dead,
usually as result of car accidents. This means the relatives of potential donors are
usually distressed at the time when the body parts need to be removed. Further, they
may have difficulty comprehending the concept of 'brain death', since the brain-dead

person is still breathing, the body is still warm, and so the relatives may believe s

just sleeping and will soon wake up. For these reasons, consultation with the relative

may be a result of the desire to avoid exacerbating their distress. Given this rationa

it is easy to see why in any conflict the wishes of the relatives, rather than the pri
directives of a deceased person, determines whether the body parts are used for
58

transplantation.

Fear of further distressing the deceased person's relatives could be a reason for not

consulting them about the removal of that person's body parts for transplantation aft

her death, particularly if it was clear the person had wanted her body parts to be use
in this way. Given their distressed state, it has been suggested that it may be more
sensitive to simply inform the relatives the deceased person had given permission for

her body parts to be used for transplantation after her death, and in such circumstanc
59

that it is routine procedure for organ retrieval to occur.

This is because w h e n a

58 It has been suggested that not wanting to add to the distress of the relatives often means that
nothing is done about retrieving the organs, even if the deceased person had given prior
permission. See A. Caplan, 'Organ Procurement: Its Not In The Cards', Hastings Center Report,
vol. 14, no. 5, 1984, pp. 9-12.
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person is in a distressed state it m a y be easier for them to agree with a routine
procedure rather than make a decision.

There is, however, a reluctance to minimise the role of the deceased person's relatives,

despite the fact that doing so would be to strictly adhere to the relevant policies. F
it has been argued that such an approach would not accord the relatives appropriate

respect and fails to be sensitive to their distress. Second, the removal of body parts

may be perceived as a form of violation and failure to respect the corpse. Certainly t
actual removal of body parts involves cutting into the corpse which causes scaring,
and there may be the perception that the cadaver is nothing but a source of spare
parts. Finally, it has been suggested that such procedures are coercive since the

retrieval of the deceased person's body parts is presented as a/a/r accompli, or, even
worse, the relatives are told that this is what will, and perhaps even should, be how
their deceased relative's body will be treated.

The practices contravening the relevant policies regulating the procurement of body
parts differ depending on whether the parts have been removed for therapeutic reasons

or from a cadaver. In the latter case, the directives of the person from whose body th
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This suggestion has been made in the literature, and includes the provision that the relatives be
given the opportunity to object. It is though, often unclear whether such an objection would
prevent the retrieval of the body parts. See A. J. Matas, J. Arras, J Muskyen, V. Tellis & F. J.
Veith, 'A Proposal for Cadaver Organ: Routine Removal with Right of Informed Refusal',
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, vol. 10 no. 2, 1985, pp. 231-244.

60 See for example A. M. Sadler & B. L. Sadler, 'A Community of Givers, Not Takers', Hastings
Center Report, vol. 14, no. 5, 1984, p. 8; A. Caplan, 'Organ Transplants: The Costs of
Success', Hastings Center Report, vol. 13, 1983, p. 26; and M . A. Sommerville, '"Procurement
vs. Donation" Access to Tissues and Organs for Transplantation: Should "Contracting Out"
Legislation B e Adopted?', Transplantation Proceedings, vol. 17, no. 6, Suppl 4, 1985, p. 61.
61 If the relatives viewed the procurement of parts from a cadaver as a form of violation, or as
failing to accord the corpse appropriate respect, then removing the deceased person's body parts
without their permission would further exacerbate the relative's distress. Under such
circumstances the relatives m a y pursue some form of litigation to seek compensation, and fear of
such litigation m a y be a further reason for seeking their permission.

39

parts are to be removed m a y be overruled or ignored by what is seen as a more morally

significant concern, that of not wanting to exacerbate the distress of the deceased

person's relatives. In the former, the consent of the person who is having a part o
body removed may not be sought because it is assumed the person from whose body

the part has been removed no longer has an interest in it or how it may be used. Ju

because these practices are at odds with the relevant policies does not necessarily

there is something wrong with them—the policies themselves may be at fault. What is

needed, then, is an explanation why the person from whose body the part is to be, o
has been, removed should have a role in determining what happens to that part.

CONCLUSION

The use of human body parts in medicine for therapeutic and experimentation raises
new and perplexing issues. One of the more important is who determines whether and

how such parts are to be used. In the current climate of respect for, and promotion
a patient's or experimental subject's autonomy it would seem the person from whose
body a part is to be, or has been, removed would have a strong claim to determine

what happens to that part. I have suggested above that the policies for procuring b

parts for various purposes give a primary role to the person from whose body a part
to be, or has been, removed. Despite this some practices have developed where

someone other than the person from whose body the part is to be removed determining

what happens to that part. It is my contention that such practices result uncertain

about the nature of the relationship between a person and her body parts. Specifica

it is unclear exactly what claims or rights a person has in relation to her body pa
even whether she will be at all concerned about what happens to that part.

Establishing the exact nature of this relationship will clarify what sort of rights

claims a person may have in relation to a part, including her role in determining w
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happens to her body parts in these circumstances. This is m y task in the following
two chapters.

CHAPTER THREE
A PERSON'S INTERESTS AND PREROGATIVES
CONCERNING HER EXCISED BODY PARTS

Whilst excised human body parts are potential medical resources, this may not be th
only consideration in determining how such parts are to be used. The focus of this

chapter is the possibility and implications of a person's having an interest in a
her body removed for therapeutic reasons. In the first section, I investigate the
for and content of such an interest, and determine whether it would be included
amongst a person's significant interests. In the second section, I argue that, in
to such an interest being significant for that person, it may also be significant
that warrants acknowledgement and respect from other people.

SECTION I: A PERSON'S INTEREST IN HER BODY PARTS

My primary concern is whether a person has an interest in any excised parts of her

body. However, if a person had an interest in her body parts whilst still part of h

body, then this may provide the basis for any interest she may have in one of her b

parts after it has been removed. Prior to determining whether a person has either o
these interests and investigating why and how they would be significant, it is
important to clarify my use of 'interest' in this and the next chapter.

1

Unless otherwise indicated in this chapter, it will be implicit in phrases such as 'excised body
parts' or 'body parts after they have been removed' that the reason the part was removed was it
was diseased or defective.
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i.

The Type of 'Interest' a Person May Have in Her Body Parts

The sense in which I use 'interest' is not perhaps the most common one, that of perso

Y being interested in object X. A person could have this type of interest in a variet

things, including current political affairs, the latest movies, stamp collecting, diff

sporting activities, or eighteenth-century French literature and so on. When a person

is interested in something, be it an object, issue or whatever, she will typically no
deeply affected by what happens to it. When a person is deeply affected, it follows

that, in addition to being interested in an object, a person has an interest in, in t
sense of having a stake, in that object.

Joel Feinberg characterises an interest in the sense of having a stake as follows: '[

person has an interest in Y when he has a stake in Y, that is, when he stands to gain
lose depending on the condition or outcome of Y'. Examples of such interests are

career choices, lifestyle changes and company investments. Further, interests in this

sense are not limited to the object of the interest, but also may be concerned with t
circumstances relating to that object. For example, when a person has this type of
interest in a company, that interest would extend to, or perhaps even be primarily

about, the success or failure of that company. Another concern of those who have this
type of interest is how the object of a particular interest is treated.

The central aspect of this type of interest is the notion of having a stake. When a

person has a stake in something, its success or failure has a significant affect on h

well-being. Some of the more obvious things in which a person has a stake are health,
education and employment. Feinberg describes such interests as welfare interests,

2

J. Feinberg, 'Harm and Self Interests', in Law, Morality and Society: Essay in Honour of
H L. A. Hart, ed. P. M . S. Hacker & J. Raz, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, p. 285.
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which concern '... the continuance for a foreseeable interval of one's o w n life, and

the interest in one's own physical health and vigour'. A person's welfare interests ar
contrasted with her ulterior interests, which concern ' ... a person's ultimate goals
and aspirations'.4 Both welfare and ulterior interests are distinguishable from a

person's passing interests, which whilst intense will usually be insignificant. Such a

interest would be a person's desire for a particular type of food when she already has
sufficient food to meet her needs. Generally, the fulfilment of a person's welfare

interests is necessary before the person's ulterior interests can be met. For this rea

the fulfilment of a person's welfare interests may seem more important than fulfilment

of any of her ulterior interests. This is not to say that a person's ulterior interests
which Feinberg suggests are integral to a person's having a complete and fulfilling
life, are unimportant, since, while a person's welfare interests are the ' ... basic

requisite of a man's well-being ... [they are] ... by no means the whole of that wellbeing itself.

The fulfilment of an interest, in the sense of having a stake, will favourably affect

interest-bearer and so be to her advantage, whereas the thwarting of an interest of th

type will be to the interest-bearer's detriment and she will be adversely affected. Wh

constitutes an interest being fulfilled or thwarted depends on the particular interest
There may be a number of different ways an interest could be fulfilled or thwarted.

3

J . Feinberg, Harm to Others, The Moral Limits of Criminal Law, Vol I, Oxford University
Press, N e w York, 1984, p. 37. A s well as concerns directly to do with a person's health, such as
the integrity and normal functioning of one's body, Feinberg includes other concerns which m a y
appear to be only indirectly related to a person's health, such as the maintenance of social
relations and ability to engage in social intercourse.

4 Feinberg, p. 37.
5

Feinberg, p. 37.
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Alternatively, there m a y only be one set of conditions required for the fulfilment of a

specific interest, and unless these conditions are met that interest will be thwarted

Feinberg seems to assume that if a person has an interest in the sense of having a

stake, then it is a reasonable and even an appropriate interest for him to have. It i
however, possible for a person to believe he has a stake in something that turns out
be none of his business. He may even be favourably or adversely affected by the
fulfilment or thwarting of that interest, and if the interest is thwarted, may feel
aggrieved enough to take some remedial action. Suppose one of my neighbours

believes the study of bioethics encourages abortion and euthanasia, and since he is a

staunch member of the Right to Life Association, strongly believes it is his duty to
the world of anything leading to such practices. So he plans to burn my book

collection. Despite the strength of my neighbour's beliefs, few would disagree I have

a right to my books and, further, a right my neighbour not burn them. It is, in short
none of my neighbour's business what I read even if he considers himself, and
perhaps society in general, to be adversely affected.

Another more significant problem is that two or more people may have a morally
legitimate interest, in the sense of having a stake, in the same object. These would

usually, although not necessarily, be competing interests. For example, if two people
have a stake in the success of a business venture, both people's interest have been
fulfilled when the venture succeeds. Where two or more people have competing

interests, each person may have an equal claim to having their interest fulfilled. I

more likely, though, that one person's interest will outweigh those of others by giv

that person a stronger claim, in some sense, to having his interest fulfilled. Whilst
what constitutes a 'stronger claim' is mainly determined by the relevant interests,

general consideration may be how the fulfilment of a particular interest would affect
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other aspects of the interest-bearer's life, for example, his ability to keep his job, feed
his family or pursue other goals. It is also possible for the same person to have

conflicting interests in relation to a particular object. Such conflicts may be easy
resolve if one interest is obviously more significance that the other, but if the

competing interests are of similar intensity or concern objects of similar importanc
may not be clear which should be the determining interest. In the following

discussion, I adopt Feinberg's characterisation of an interest in the sense of havin

stake, and attempt to show how these difficulties can be met in relation to the inte
different persons may have in excised human body parts.

ii. A Person's Interest in Her Body Parts when Still Part Of Her Body

Although few would disagree that a person's interest in her body parts is significant
different reasons may be given for this significance. When in situ, a person's

individual body parts are part of a functioning whole and so their significance may b
derivative from the significance that person places on her whole body. Any

significance a person places on her body would, in turn, be contingent on her view of
the relationship between herself and her body. Broadly speaking, there are two

possibilities: either a person is her body, or, alternatively, a person's body in som
sense belongs to her. Those who advocate this second view emphasise the importance
of a person's having sovereignty over her body. Although, in some contexts
'sovereignty' incorporates, and may even be synonymous with, ownership, this is not
so when it is argued a person's has sovereignty over her body. As I argue in a later

chapter, the concept of ownership seems intentionally omitted from discussions of the

6

See, for example, C. S. Campbell, 'Body, Self and the Property Paradigm', Hastings Center
Report, vol. 21, no. 5, 1992, pp. 34-42; and T. H. Murray, 'On the Human Body as Property:
The Meaning of Embodiment, Markets and the Meaning of Strangers', Journal of Law Reform,
vol. 204, 1987, pp. 1055-1088.
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nature of a person's relationship to or her control over her body or its parts in favour

of her having exclusive control over her body and, by extension, its parts. This, th

is what 'sovereignty' seems to entail concerning the relationship between a person a
her body.

Whatever description of the relationship between a person and her body is endorsed,

there is no denying there is such a relationship, and, moreover, that it is an intim
one. For any person a particular body is ' ... amongst the conditions for being ...
[that] ... very person,' and so \t\he body is always some-body, somebody's body,
8

9

some body in particular'. M o r e than this, h u m a n persons are necessarily embodied,
'... meaning not merely that we have bodies but that we are bodies'. This does not

mean that all there is to a person is her body, but rather that having a body is one
aspect, albeit an essential one, of being a person.

Whilst embodiment has been the topic of much philosophical discourse from varying

perspectives,11 its use here is purely descriptive. I am not suggesting that all ther
a person is her body, and neither am I endorsing any form of dualism. On the
relationship between a person's body and her mind, I remain agnostic except to say
that it is indisputable that human persons need bodies. Through her body, a person

7

R. Harre, Physical Being, Blackwell, Oxford, 1994, p. 19.

8 L. Kass, 'Thinking about the Body', Hastings Center Report, vol. 15, no. 1, 1985, pp. 22-23
(author's emphasis).
9 Computers and higher primates are sometimes described as 'persons' or the characteristics of
being a person are attributed to them.
10 G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge University Press, New York,
1988, p. 113.

11 Included amongst these perspectives are metaphysics, epistemology and more recently feminist
philosophy, ethics and the philosophy of mind.
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interacts with other people, expresses her ideas or beliefs, and act accordingly. In
many instances, then, a person's body is an instrument, and so the value that a

person places on it will partly be instrumental. In some instances, though, a person

body may be the central focus of her beliefs or ideas. For example, some religio

beliefs require a person to treat her body in certain ways, and so, in those particu

contexts, a person may place intrinsic value on her body. More generally, once t

essential nature of a body is acknowledged, then the value a person places on he
body would, at least in part, be intrinsic.

A person's interest in her body parts when in situ, is because they constitute part

functioning whole body upon which she is dependent for her existence and through
which she operates the world. Further, a person would have an interest, perhaps

more significant one, in the various parts of her body remaining intact as a who

body. This is because for a body to function properly, each of the various individu
13

body parts need to be intact and functioning.

For this reason, a person's interest in

her body parts when they are still part of her body is an interest in the sense of

a stake since '[w]hatever goals or values we have are tied up with the fate of o

bodies'. Further, with the exception of diseased or defective body parts, a pers

will usually be favourably affected if her body parts remain intact as part of a wh
and adversely affected if any of her body parts are removed. More than this,

maintaining bodily integrity fulfils the requirements of being what John Rawls h

12

This is true even in the case of severely physically disabled people, such as the British
cosmologist Stephen Hawkins. A n y mechanical devices are adapted so as to maximise the
limited use such people have of their body.

13 An exception may be the appendix, but even though this body part's function is no longer
necessary, its routine removal is usually avoided because of the risks of surgery.
14 Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, p. 113.
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defined as a. primary good—that

is something '... every rational m a n is presumed to

want'. 15

The importance most people would place on bodily integrity can be demonstrated by a
variation of the 'survival lottery' proposed by John Harris to alleviate the chronic
shortage of organs available for transplantation. T h e original version of this proposal
w a s that:

... everyone should be given a sort of lottery number. Wherever
doctors have two or more patients w h o could be saved by transplants,
and no suitable organs c o m e to hand through 'natural' deaths, they
could ask a central computer to supply a suitable donor.

The

computer will then pick a number of a suitable donor at random and
he will be killed so the lives of two or more others m a y be saved.

Harris amended his proposal so that participants in the lottery were limited to people
with a terminal illness but had one or m o r e healthy organs. Even with this a m e n d m e n t
the 'survival lottery' proposal is generally considered abhorrent, since it involves
killing one person in order to save two or m o r e other lives.

Consider, as a variation of Harris' proposal, a lottery for redistributing non-vital or
non-regenerative body parts from healthy people to those in need of transplants or
transfusions. Whilst this second lottery would not necessarily result in the death of the
'donors' it is still problematic. Like Harris' proposal, such a lottery gives other people

15

J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971, p. 62.

16 J. Harris, 'The Survival Lottery', Philosophy, vol. 50, 1975, pp. 81-87. An extended
this paper is in J. Harris, Violence and Responsibility, Routledge Kegan & Paul, London, 198
pp. 66-84. All references are to this reprinted version.
17

Harris, p. 69.
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a claim to a person's body parts. Whilst it m a y , as Harris suggests, be a matter of

luck that one person's body parts remain functional whilst another's fail (although i

some instances the failure could result from a person's lifestyle), we are not inclin

think a healthy person with fully functioning body parts has to surrender any of them
even those she could do without, to save other people whose own body parts have
failed. Rather, she has a prior and stronger claim to her body parts, and this is
precisely in virtue of them being part of her body.

The importance most people would place on bodily integrity is not solely because of
their interest in remaining healthy. It is also to protect them from proposals such
variation on the 'survival lottery' described above. That is, once it is recognised
person has a fundamental, and the strongest, claim to her body parts when they are

still part of her body, then the removal of such parts will be contingent on her havi

given her consent. At least part of the reason why a person would continue to have an

interest in part of her body removed for therapeutic reasons is because it had been p
of the functioning body through which she operates in the world. It is, however,

precisely because such parts are no longer a part of her body that any interest a per
may have in such parts will be of a different kind.

iii. A Person's Interest in a Part of Her Body Removed for Therapeutic Reasons

If a person's interests in her body parts derived solely from because of their funct
and their remaining intact as part of her whole body, then once a part had been
removed for therapeutic reasons she would no longer have an interest in it. Further,
particular body part may impair a person's body's functioning and, by extension, her

capacity to act, and so she would have an interest in having it removed. Nevertheless

she may continue to have an interest in her excised body parts, particularly given th
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increase of possible uses for such parts. This is not to say a person will be concerned
about what happens to every excised part of her body. Most people assume that after
being cut, their hair or fingernails will be disposed of. There may be exceptions,

however, where a person wants certain things to happen to, or not to happen to, even
these body parts. For example, a person may want to keep his hair after it has been
cut, or ensure that it not be used to make a wig.

A number of factors determine whether, and to what extent, a person has an interest

part of her body after it has been removed. First, as argued above, a person's inter

in her body parts whilst in situ, relates, partially, to their function. So there ma
correlation between a person's interest in one of her excised body parts and its
previous function as part of her body. Solid vital organs are generally considered
more important than non-vital, non-regenerative organs which in turn are considered
more important than regenerative body parts. Within each of these groups there may

be a further graduations of significance due to specific concerns such as uniquenes

blood type, or the prior loss of one of a non-regenerative paired solid organ such a
kidney or cornea. Although it is unlikely a person would have more than one or two

body parts removed at any one time, or indeed over a period of time, she may be more

concerned what happens to, for example, a diseased part of a vital organs, than some
of her blood, more of which would regenerate.

Second, the reason a person had a body part removed may influence any interest she

has in it. If the part was diseased then the person may not care what happens to it,

may even take the understandable view she is well rid of it. Alternatively, a person
may specify she wants a diseased part of her body treated in a particular way. A
further consideration could be whether and what type of value a part removed from a
person's body for therapeutic reasons could have to other people. Moore, for
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example, claimed that had he known of Golde's proposed research, he would not have
given his consent. More generally, the possibility of using a person's excised body

parts for experiments may influence the types of interests she has in it, particula
when, as in the Moore case, there may be some remuneration.

Third, if a person continues to identify with an excised part of her body, then her

interest in it may be particularly significant. One explanation of what identifying

an excised body part would entail is that a person may still regards the excised pa
being 'hers' in some sense. However, such a view may seem inconsistent with what I

argued would be a person's primary interest in her body parts, that is as functionin
parts of her body. Further, once part of a person's body had been removed at least
one of the senses in which it was her body part, perhaps the most important sense,

would no longer obtain. That is, even though a person would differentiate parts of h
body, such as her arm, leg and so on, she would also think of the various parts as
being part of something larger, namely her whole body. So when a part of a person's

body has been removed, it presents the novel situation of one of a person's body par
no longer being part of her body.

A person may continue to regard an excised part of her body as having particular

significance because of its previous status as part Of her body. This, I suggest, m
that a person would differentiate between excised parts of her body and other human
body parts. Suppose a person whose arm had been amputated asked to see the arm
before it was incinerated. She is taken into a room where there are a variety of
different body parts waiting to be incinerated. Among them are several amputated

arms. Once her own arm is identified, the person will have a different reaction to h

arm than she would to the other arms. One reason for this difference may be that she
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had previously done certain things with that particular arm, had certain experiences (as
it were), and so she associates those experiences with her now excised arm, as well

feeling the loss of the capacity to have those experiences. Compare this to a person
reaction to being shown a close friend's amputated arm. In addition to being

sympathetic to her friend, a person's reaction in one sense may be similar to the on

she would have to her own amputated arm, particularly if that friend has, for exampl

been her tennis partner. That is, a person may feel some loss of her own, if some of
the activities she had shared with her friend were no longer possible.

A person's reaction to, and subsequent interest in, her own excised body part will,
however, be different in kind to that she may have to a friend's body part. If such

interest was derived solely from the loss of capacities, then it would differ only i

degree from the kind of interest she would have if her regular tennis partner's loses
arm. However, because a person's own arm had previously been part of her body and

had only ever been part of her body it will remain uniquely identifiable as hers. Fo

this reason a person may continue to consider a part of her body significant even af
it has been removed and no longer has any instrumental value for that person.

Examining some of the objections a person may have to her excised body parts being

treated in particular ways may assist further in explaining how a person may continu

to identify such parts. It would be tedious and not particularly useful to attempt s

division of those ways of treating human body parts that are acceptable and those th

are not. A more successful strategy is to identify the underlying reasons why a pers

18 The same could also be true of internal organs, although they would be more difficult, if not
impossible, for the person to identify by herself.
19 An exception would be if a person had a part that had previously been transplanted removed.
Whilst a person would probably value a transplanted organ particularly highly, if a transplanted
organ later failed a person m a y not place as m u c h value on it after it is removed as she would her
o w n body parts.
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m a y want, or not want, a part of her body removed for therapeutic reasons to be
treated in a particular way, and then determine whether such reasons are morally
significant and why.

Some objections may just seem to the result of squeamishness—for example, a person

objecting to an excised part of her body being preserved for scientific reasons be
she did not want other people to look at it. This type of objection may seem
insignificant, and so would probably be ignored or overridden in light of more
important considerations. In some instances, however, squeamishness may indicate a

person has more significant reason for not wanting an excised part of her body to b
treated in a particular way. If, for example, a person knew her body part would be
processed for petfood, she would have a stronger reaction than just the general
abhorrence most people would have to that use of human body parts. She would have
a more specific concern, namely, that her body parts should not be treated in that

She may even draw the conclusion that this practice is indicative of the (low) valu
placed on her by other people. Thus, the treatment of a person's excised body part
may influence, and perhaps even change, a person's perception of herself, or even
other people's perceptions of her.

It is possible a person may object to a part of her body being treated in a way ge

agreed to be acceptable. Typically, if a person instructs that part of her body re
2D

for therapeutic reasons be destroyed,

it would be incinerated. There m a y be

circumstances, though, where a person would not want her body part to be disposed
of in this way. In Browning v. Norton Children Hospital the plaintiff, who had a

phobia about fire, sought damages for nervous shock after finding out his amputated

20

In m a n y instances this is considered implicit in a person's consent to undergo surgery.
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leg had been incinerated.21 It is not necessary that a phobia or s o m e other type of fear

determine how a person wants her body parts to be treated—it may simply be a matte

of preference. That is, just as a person may prefer being buried rather than cremated
person may have a preference concerning the manner of disposal for a part of her
body.

A person's preference about how a part of her body should be disposed of may be
determined by her deeply held convictions, such as religious beliefs. Alternatively,

person's concerns about the treatment of a part of her body removed for therapeuti

reasons may be based on significant cultural practices, such as those of Australia

Aboriginal people discussed in the previous chapter. Whilst I have not the space here

to explore the relationship between a person's deeply held beliefs and her behaviour,
suggest that where certain behaviour is prescribed by religious or cultural beliefs,

a person acts accordingly, this indicates the person holds those particular belief
deeply. Further, if a person were forced to act in contravention of those beliefs

may be deeply distressed, and perhaps inconsolable. Consider, for example, a perso

being forced to eat food which, according to his religious beliefs, he is forbidden t

eat. Such a person may believe he had been defiled, and so have to undergo some so

of cleansing ritual before he could participate in any religious ceremonies. A person
may be similarly affected if a part of her body was treated in a way that conflicted

her deeply held religious or moral conviction. Moreover, the distress may be great

than some other conflicts of that type, since the person may not be able to rectify t
situation.

21

Browning v. Norton Children Hospital, 197'4, cited in B. Dickens, 'The Control of Living Body
Materials', University of Toronto Law Journal, vol. 27, 1977, pp. 148-149. The reason damages
were not awarded in this U S legal case was due to the plaintiffs delay of four weeks before
giving instructions for the disposal of the body part, rather than anything to do with the
instructions themselves. It was argued that this delay indicated that the issue could not have been
very important to the plaintiff.
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In sum, a person's interest in a part of her body removed for therapeutic reasons is an
interest in the sense of having a stake. This is because fulfilling or thwarting this
interest, and the correlative favourable or adverse affects, depends on the way the

body part is treated, for example by affecting a person's self-perception, the way she
is perceived by others, or by contravening her deeply held beliefs or values. If a
person's instructions concerning what should happen to her body part are adhered to,

then the person's interest in how that part is treated, has been fulfilled and this wi

have a favourable affect on that person. What these affects will be is contingent on t
reason(s) why a person wants her body part treated in a particular way. For example,

if it was simply a matter of preference, she may have a passing satisfaction if her bo
part is treated accordingly, whereas if a person's beliefs or values dictated how she
wanted that part treated, then she may have a deeper sense of contentment. The

converse is also true: the extent to which a person would be adversely affected if her
excised body part was treated in a way she objected to, depends on the depth of the
reasons for her objections.

As mentioned above, it is possible for two people to have conflicting interests in the

same object, although both interests need not be legitimate. For example, if a person'
concerns about the treatment of human body parts are influenced by deeply held

convictions, she may believe that all human body parts should be treated in a particu
way, not just those from her body. This I suggest would be an instance of a person's
believing he has legitimate concerns about something that is actually none of his
business. That is, a person cannot reasonably expect other people to treat their body

parts according to beliefs which they do not share. It would be different if the perso

had public health concerns about how someone else intended to treat her body parts. In
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that case, the possible effect on other people (who presumably also have health
concerns) would legitimate such concerns.

Another person's interest in a body part removed for therapeutic reasons may be both

reasonable and of similar significance to that of the person from whose body the part
was removed. For example, if a researcher required specific types of body parts for

his research program to continue, he would have an interest in body parts of that typ

It is also possible for the same person to have conflicting interests in relation to
treatment of an excised part of her body. For example, a person's religious beliefs
may dictate that the part not be used for medical experimentation, but the part may
unusual properties making it particularly suitable for experiments which could have
implications for a disease her relative is suffering from. The resolution of such
conflicts will be discussed at the end of the next section.

Thomas Murray argues '[tjhere is something very special about human organs and
tissues, even when removed from the body. We do retain moral interests in them, so
22

that at the very least they are not misused or treated in an undignified manner'.
Elsewhere he elaborates, saying a human ' ... organ, however diseased and distant
now, was once a part of a particular human individual... [and this] .... means that
23

individual has s o m e stake in it being treated respectfully'.

Whilst I agree with

Murray's sentiments, he does not indicate why the interest a person has in her body
parts may be significant. In this section I argued a person may continue to have an

interest in a part of her body removed for therapeutic reasons. Specifically, she may

22

T. H. Murray, [Testimony to] The Use of Human Biological Materials in the Development of
Biomedical Products, Hearings before the Subcommittee of Investigations and Oversight of the
House Committee on Science and Technology, 99th Congress (1st Sess.), 1985, p. 219.

23

Murray, p. 213.
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be concerned that it should be treated in accord with her belief and values. In the next
section I establish that such a concern makes a person's interest in her body parts
morally significant.

SECTION II: SELF-DETERMINATION, DIGNITY AND HUMAN BODY PARTS

If there were no further uses for human body parts, the views or preferences of the
person from whose body a part has been removed would be a reasonable criterion for
determining how that part should be treated. However, there are other possible uses
for such parts, and it might be that the relevant interests of other people who may
benefit from such uses outweigh those of the person from whose body a part has been
removed. It is not sufficient, then, simply to demonstrate a person continues to have

an interest in an excised part of her body for that interest to determine how that p

treated. It also needs to be established that such interests are significant in a wa
merits acknowledgement and respect from other people. I argue in this section that a
person's interest in what happens to an excised part of her body may be of such

significance, and, further, that respecting such interests may be part of respecting a
person's autonomy.

i. Self-determination, Bodies and Excised Body Parts

One possible justification for requiring a person's consent to a proposed use for a

removed from her body is that it is consistent with the general principle of respectin
and promoting a person's autonomy. An important aspect of such respect is the
recognition of a person's right to determine what happens to her body, a right
particularly important in medical contexts. This provides a reasonable starting place

for investigating whether respecting a person's interest in part of her body removed
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therapeutic reasons is also part of respecting her autonomy. In his essay On Liberty,

Mill recognises both a person's capacity and right to be self-determining in relation
his body, arguing that '[o]ver himself, over his body and mind, the individual is
sovereign'. Mill qualifies this by saying it is permissible for a person to act so as
benefit others, and, conversely, impermissible for a person to act so as to harm
others—thus there are limits to a person's liberty. After specifying the aspects of a
person's life where liberty is relevant, Mill concludes that each person ' ... is the
proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual'.25

Whilst Mill's principle of negative liberty, and discussion of liberty in general, is
without its critics, it provides a plausible account why a person should have control

over her body. The specific aspect of Mill's account of individual liberty relevant h
97

is that as long as a person has the necessary capacities, and her actions do not harm
other people, what a person does with, or allows others to do with or to her body, is
98

for that person to determine.

-

This idea has legal recognition; for example in his

ruling on Scholendoerff vs Society of New York Hospital, Justice Cardozo's states

24

J. S. Mill, O n Liberty', in Utilitarianism, ed. M . Warnock, Fontana Press, Glasglow, 1975,
p. 135.

25 Mill, p. 138 (author's emphasis).
26 See, for example, I. Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1969, pp. 118-172; R. Young, Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative
and Positive Liberty, Croom Helm, Sydney, 1986.

27 There are people who cannot act autonomously, including infants, the senile and the comatosed.
There are other groups such as the mentally ill and intellectually disabled w h o may have limited
autonomy, or m a y be autonomous in some circumstances but not others. For the purposes of
this chapter, m y discussion will be limited to those w h o have the capacity to be autonomous.
28 The famous exception for Mill is a person's selling herself into slavery, which Mill argues
should not be allowed since it violates a person's future liberty. See Mill, 'On Liberty',
pp. 235-237. For critiques of this argument see J. Feinberg, Harm to Self, The Moral Limits of
Criminal Law, Vol. Ill, Oxford University Press, N e w York, 1986, pp. 68-80; and J. Hodson,
'Mill Paternalism and Slavery', Analysis, vol. 41, 1981, pp. 60-62.
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'[e]very h u m a n being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his body'. Whilst Cardozo's statement is often cited in
discussions advocating respect for a patient's autonomy, it is important to
acknowledge there are particular impediments to a person's determining what happens
to her body in medical contexts, whether as a patient or an experimental subject.

When a person becomes a patient she is necessarily reliant on the physician to give h
the relevant information to enable her to determine what happens to her body. This

places the patient in a subordinate position to the physician in respect of knowledge

and skills, thus making her potentially vulnerable. The patient's vulnerability may b
increased further depending on the nature of the procedure. If the patient is taking
medication or receiving some type of physical treatment, her capacity to be selfdetermining may only be slightly impaired, and, moreover, she could regain this
capacity by deciding not to take the drugs or to discontinue the treatment.
Alternatively, if a patient has surgery, her capacity to be self-determining will be
severely diminished, because she will be unconscious. In such cases it is clear why

obtaining a person's informed consent is so important, although this is not to detrac
from its importance where a person's capacity to be autonomous may only be slightly
impaired.

When participating in medical experiments there are different impediments to a
person's being self-determining. In such situations a person may be asked to consent
to certain things being done to her, but not be told exactly or even generally what
things are. This may be because in some experiments only a limited amount of

information can be given to the subjects without ruining the experiment. Alternative

29

Schloendoerff vs Society of New York Hospital, (1914) cited in T. L. Beauchamp & F. C.
Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Oxford University Press, N e w York, 1989, p. 114.
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the researchers an experimental subject has contact with m a y not themselves k n o w
everything about the experiment. For example, in international drug trials, those

administering the drug are not necessarily the principal researchers, and so may not

aware of all its direct or side effects, or whether an individual participant is giv
trial drug or a placebo. So whilst the experimental subject's capacity for selfdetermination may not appear diminished to the same extent as a patient undergoing

surgery, the information provided to the experimental subject concerning what will b
done to her during the course of the experiment may be less detailed than the
information the patient receives. Thus, for some experimental protocols, it may be

misleading to say the consent an experimental subject gives is fully informed. This,
however, does not necessarily make such experiments unethical; such a determination

would be contingent on how and to what extent the experiment would be jeopardised if

the necessary information was given (so that the person's fully informed consent cou
be obtained), how important the experiment was, and other such factors.

Both the physician and medical experimenter have a duty to obtain a patient's or
experimental subject's informed consent before carrying out any therapeutic or

experimental procedures. A broad definition of informed consent appropriate for this
discussion is the '... autonomous authorisation of a medical intervention or
30

involvement in research by individual persons'.

The usual justification for requiring

a person's fully informed consent before anything is done to her body is because of
her body's instrumental importance. In some instances, though, a person may have

specific beliefs or values that determine how she would prefer her body to be treate
For example, a person may not consent to certain types of treatment which would be

30 T. L. Beauchamp & F. C. Childress, p. 76 (authors' emphasis). It has been argued this is only
one of at least two senses of informed consent. The other relates to the institutional rules and
need not concern us here.
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contrary to her religious beliefs. For example, Jehovah's Witnesses refuse blood
transfusions even as a life-saving procedure. A person's preference for natural

remedies rather than drugs or interventionist treatment may reflect her values relati
the environment or her body. Where a person's beliefs determine how she wants her
body to be treated, then this may indicate she may have other reasons for valuing it
than because of its instrumental value. More than this, as suggested in the previous
section, the integral nature of a person's body would make it intrinsically valuable
that person.

Many definitions of autonomy incorporate the idea of a person's being selfdetermining For example, according to Mill, the autonomous person ' ... chooses
31

his plan for himself.'

Robert Y o u n g gives a more detailed explanation of self-

determination when he says an '[ajutonomous person's capacities, beliefs and values
will be identifiable as integral to him and be the source from which his actions
32

spring'.

Elsewhere, Y o u n g explains that, in practice, this means '[i]n a fulfilled

life, the individual's largely inherited skills and capacities will be developed in w
33

that sit well with that individual's interests, values and taste'.

This suggests a

person's beliefs and values are not independent from other aspects of her life, but
rather are central to them.

According to Ronald Dworkin '[p]eople think it important not just that their life con
a variety of the right experiences, achievements and connections but that it have a
structure that expresses a coherent choice amongst these—for some, that it displays a

31

Mill,'On Liberty', p. 187.

32 Young, Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty, p. 1.
33 Young, p. 14.
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steady self-defining commitment to a vision of character or achievement that the life as

a whole ... illustrates and expresses.' Whilst such integrity does not define a life's
character—rather, this is done by a person's specific beliefs, values, achievements,
and so on—it is still important. This is because it demonstrates that once a person's

life has been "... established as one kind of life ... it should go on being that kind
35

life'.

Implicit in Dworkin's discussion is that a person m a y want to ensure

consistency between significant aspects of her life, and I contend that ensuring such
consistency is one way in which a person exercises self-determination.

There are various contexts in which a person may act to ensure consistency between

significant aspects of her life. If, for example, a person were a pacifist then she wo
probably become a conscientious objector if conscription was introduced. Also, an
advocate of freedom of speech would probably protest against a specific instance of
censorship, such as a book's being banned or a film's audience being restricted.
Finally, a person with strong religious beliefs may refuse to undertake an occupation
requiring her to act in contravention of those beliefs. Alternatively, a person may
sometimes choose to act in ways that are inconsistent with significant aspect of her
life. Such inconsistency could be viewed as aberrant, or could indicate a major shift
a person's beliefs or values, and in some instances may result in changes to many,
perhaps even all, aspects of a person's life. One way of interpreting such change may

be that this person was seeking to make other significant aspects of her life consist
with that aspect that has changed or shifted so dramatically.

34

R. Dworkin, Life's Dominion, Harper Collins, London, 1993, p. 205.

35 Dworkin, p. 206.
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It is m y contention that a person's wanting her excised body parts to be treated in
accord with her beliefs and values is an instance of a person's seeking to achieve
consistency between various significant aspects of her life. Sharon Perley has a

similar view, arguing that a person has a 'dignitary interest'—that is, an interest t
relates to the maintenance of a person's dignity—in her body parts. Prior to
discussing Perley's argument in detail, however, a short digression is required to
discuss the notion of dignity and its relation to self-determination.

ii. Dignity, Self-determination and Body Parts

Various writers have discussed the concept of dignity in relation to a person's
37

38

39

humanity, individuality, or identity.

It has been suggested that where a person's

dignity is not protected, or respected, she is no longer an individual. Further, for
most people an affront to their dignity, as Dworkin succinctly puts it, is '... not a
matter of indifference, but something bad for them'. Perhaps the most common
explanation given in moral philosophy of a person's having dignity is that she has

value or worth, typically taken to be intrinsic value or worth, simply in virtue of b
a person.

36

S. Perley, 'From Control Over One's Body to Control Over One's Body Parts', New York
University Law Review, vol. 67, 1992, pp. 335-365.

37 I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. M. Gregor, Cambridge University Press,
1991 (1797), pp. 230-231.

38 E. J. Bloustein, 'Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Pross
York University Law Review, 39, 1964, p. 962.
39 Perley, p. 356.
40 Bloustein, p. 971.
41 R. Dworkin, 'The Right to Die', New York Review, January 31 1991, p. 16.
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B y failing to be self-determining in the majority of, or in particularly important,

aspects of her life, a person fails to maintain her dignity. That is, by not making he
own choices or determining her own beliefs and actions, but instead following the
dictates of others, she fails to be 'her own person'. This in turn would amount to a

person's failure to maintain her uniqueness, in virtue of which she has intrinsic valu
and hence, dignity. Conversely, when a person does exercise self-determination—that
is she chooses her beliefs, actions and values, and further seeks to establish

consistency between these and other significant aspects of her life—then this maintai
and promotes her dignity.

One reason often given why a person should be respected is because she has dignity,
that is, intrinsic value or worth. Such respect may be exhibited in a number of ways.

Of particular interest here is that things closely associated with that person, and in
which she may have a dignitary interest, should also be treated with respect.
Examples of such things would be representations of the person such as photographs,
the outcome or results of her projects, and other things identifiable as being that
person's. Perhaps the best way of explaining why things closely associated with a
person should be treated with respect is to briefly describe some of the ways
mistreating such things would be an affront to her dignity.

One indicator that the deliberate destruction of representations of a person may
constitute an affront to that person's dignity, is that burning effigies of political
is regarded as an extreme form of protest. A similar type of occurs if something a

person has created is intentionally destroyed, such as burning a book she had written.

42

See, for example, Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, p. 255; Dworkin, Life's Dominion, p. 205;
and for the connection between a person being autonomous and deserving respect specifically in
relation to the body, see G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, p. 113.
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A person's dignity m a y also be affronted if the results or outcome of one of her
projects is used for an unintended, perhaps abhofrent purpose, such as a person's
discovery of the cure for a particular disease being used to develop biological
weapons. In all these instances, something closely associated with that person is
treated in a way she would not approve of, in some way contrary to her beliefs or
values, or in a way which denigrates her achievements. Further, it is because such

things are closely associated with a person that mis-treating them not only negative
affects that particular thing, but may also have an adverse affect on the person by
affronting her dignity.

Returning to excised human body parts, I want to suggest that the interest a person
may have in a part of her body removed for therapeutic reasons may fulfil the
requirements of being a dignitary interest, and so warrant the appropriate
acknowledgment and respect from other people. As discussed in the previous section,

the basis for such an interest is that the part had previously been part of her body,
so was certainly closely associated with her. This association is not necessarily
extinguished by a person's body part being removed, since she may continue to

identify that part as in some sense still being hers. Further, she may be concerned t

it be treated in accord with her beliefs and values. It is just such concerns that wo

make the interest a person had in a part of her body that had been removed a dignitar
interest.

Perley argues that a person's interests in her body parts ' ... extend beyond the
physical integrity of the body itself to the values an individual holds', and so

'[although the excised body part is no longer a part of the individual, she retains a

43

Perley, p. 349.
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interest in k n o w i n g that it will not be used in a w a y that is contrary to her personal
beliefs'.44 Perley draws the following analogy between a legally protected dignitary
interest, a person's interest in the exclusive right to her o w n identity, and the interest a
person has in part of her body removed for therapeutic reasons:

Just as an individual retains an interest in knowing that her name or
likeness will not be used for purposes with which she disagrees, she
also retains an interest in knowing that her excised body parts will
not be used in a manner offensive to her personal beliefs. Moreover
an individual whose consent to the use of her body parts has not
been solicited feels the same violation as an individual whose name
45

or likeness has been used without her consent.

According to Perley, a person's dignitary interest in her body parts has already been
legally recognised in several ways. First, a person's permission is required before any
of her body parts can be removed for transplantation, whether the parts are removed
whilst the person is alive or after she has died. Whilst such consent is required
partially because of a person's right to bodily integrity, Perley suggests it is also a
recognition of ' ... a person's dignitary interest in controlling what happens to her
body parts'.

Second, the court's have ruled that ' ... a person's expressed wishes

as to the disposal of her parts are entitled to respectful consideration and should be
carried out to the fullest extent possible'.

Perley argues that these and other forms of

recognition of a person's dignitary interest in her body and its parts—the main aspect
being a person's having a right to control what happens to her body parts—lays the

44

Perley, p. 349.

45 Perley, p. 351.
46 Perley, p. 353.
47

Perley, p. 355. A person's interest in the treatment of her body parts after her death is the
subject of the next chapter.
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foundations for similar recognition of a person's interest in a part of her body removed
for therapeutic reasons. Perley argues that the grounds for recognising and protecting
such interests is ' ... that a person's individuality—the values, morals and beliefs
48

which shape her unique personal identity', are worthy of protection.

Whilst endorsing Perley's position, further clarification is needed why a person
determining what happens to her body parts is an act of self-determination, and how it
relates to her dignity. She argues that ' ... the right to self-determination must be
interpreted as embracing not only an individual interest in her bodily integrity, but
49

her dignity'.

A s argued above, part of what it means for a person to have dignity is

for her to be self-determining and part of what this means is that the determinations
makes in relation to events in her life reflect her goals, values and beliefs. So, in
practice, a person's having a dignitary interest in her body parts means she may want
an excised part to be treated in a way that is consistent with her beliefs and values.
Given that a person may have such an interests in an excised part of her body, it is
important that such an interest be promoted and protected. Below I suggest the best
way of ensuring that this happens.

iii. A Person's Prerogative to Determine what Happens to Her Body Parts

Throughout this chapter, I have suggested the main manifestation of a person's interes
in an excised part of her body may be her concern about how that part should be
treated. Such concerns or preferences are morally significant because they may be
influenced by her beliefs or values. The simplest way to ensure such parts are treated

48

Perley, p. 356.

49 Perley, p. 356.
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so as to reflect the values and beliefs of the person from whose body they have been

removed is for that person to determine how that part is treated. As pointed out earli
there may be some parts of a person's body that, once removed, a person would not
be concerned about. For this reason, I am not advocating that a person has a positive
duty to determine what happens to an excised part of her body, but rather that they
have a prerogative to do so. She may well choose not to exercise this prerogative, but
where she does, as long as it is socially and culturally acceptable way of treating
excised human body parts, then that is how that part should be treated.

Even a person's weak or seemingly incidental preferences concerning the treatment of

an excised part of her body may warrant consideration against other possible interests
on the basis that a particular body part was once part of a particular person's body.
Judgements as to when such interests should be considered significant are partially
contingent on the particular interests or what, if any, competing interests or claims
there are, and so need to be made on a case by case basis. Nevertheless, any interests

a person may have in an excised part of her body are potentially significant, in virtue
of the particular body part having been from her body.

Earlier in this chapter I briefly described some conflicts of interests that could occ
concerning how excised human body parts are to be treated. One such conflict was
between of the preferences the person from whose body a part has been removed and a
researcher's interests in that part.

As Perley has pointed out '... at least some people, if given the choice, would not
consent to the use of their excised body parts for research purposes'. For example,

50

Perley, p. 345.
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Moore claimed he would not have agreed to the use of his spleen in the development of

a cell-line (although he did not explain the basis for his objection). There could be a
variety of reasons for a person's withholding such consent. As mentioned above,
some religious doctrines prescribe specific treatment of bodies and by extension body
parts, which would rule out using an excised part of the body from a person holding

those beliefs for experimental purposes. Alternatively, the research may be contrary to
a person's deeply held conviction, such as a pacifist not wanting her body part to be
used in the development of chemical weapons.

In some circumstances the researcher's interest may seem to outweigh the particular
interest of the person from whose body a part has been removed. For example, if the
research was important and only a particular body part were suitable, the preferences
of the person, whilst still being considered important, could be justifiably be
overridden. This, however, should only occur after a person has been consulted about
the research, had its importance explained to her, and her reasons for objecting duly
considered. It is worth remembering, though, that overriding the person's interest
would amount to a violation of her autonomy. So, one question that would need to be
addressed in resolving these types of conflicts is: would the researcher's autonomy be
violated in the same way, or to the same extent, if his interests were overridden? If

such a restriction does not violate the researcher's autonomy, then, I contend, it woul
not override the person's refusal to consent.

The other possible conflict mentioned above occurs between two of a person's own
interests concerning how a part of her body removed for therapeutic reasons should be
treated. Conflicts of this type may not be so easily resolved. Suppose, for example,
that a person's religious or cultural beliefs required a body part be destroyed in a

particular way, whilst cells from that body part could be used to develop a product tha
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could possibly assist in the treatment of a disease she and other family members were
suffering from. Conflicts of this type would require the person to weigh the

significance of each of her interests, in this case how important her religious belief
were, and what she thought the consequences of not adhering to them would be, as

against the possibility and probabilities of relieving her relatives suffering. The mo
important point is, however, that it would be up to the person herself to resolve any
such conflict and decide how she would exercise her prerogative in relation to her
body parts.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I identified one reason for supposing there is a relationship of some
significance between a person and her body parts. This relationship exists even when
particular body parts are no longer functioning as part of her whole body.
Specifically, a person may continue identify with an excised part of her body. This
interest may be morally significant, and so it should be recognised a person has a
prerogative to determine what happens to any of her body parts removed for
therapeutic reasons. Further, in all but some exceptional cases, if a person exercises
this prerogative then that is how her body part should be treated. In the following
chapter, I argue a person may also have an interest in, and so has the associated
prerogative to determine, what happens to some or all of her body parts after her
death.

CHAPTER FOUR
A PERSON'S INTEREST AND PREROGATIVES CONCERNING

THE TREATMENT OF HER BODY PARTS AFTER DEATH

In the previous chapter I argued a person's continuing to identify with a part of her
body removed for therapeutic reasons indicated there may be a morally significant
relationship between a person and her body parts. Another indicator of such a
relationship would be a person's concerns about what happens to her body parts after
she dies. If a person had such concerns, she may give directives as to how her body
parts should be treated after her death. Alternatively, if a person gave no such
directives, this could indicate she did not care what happens to her body parts,
although this should not simply be assumed.

In chapter two, I described the two policies for procuring body parts from cadavers fo

transplantation currently operating in different parts of the world. Both policies gav
primary role to the person from whose body the parts will be removed, but, at best,
only a superficial explanation was given why a person should have this role.
Alternative procurement policies have been proposed which aim to maximise the

number of body parts available for transplantation. These alternative policies are oft

dismissed because they do not give due consideration to the prior wishes of the person
from whose body the parts will be removed. Whilst I am sympathetic to such
concerns, it needs to be made clear why saving lives should be a secondary
consideration to ensuring that a person had agreed to her body part being used for
transplantation after her death.

In this chapter I investigate the significance and implications of a person's having a

interest in what happens to her body parts after death. In the first section, I determ
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the basis for, and content, of such an interest, arguing that it m a y be both significant to
the interest-bearer and morally significant. I then describe, evaluate and finally
dismiss two proposals for modifying the current organ procurement policies, both of

which ignore such interests in favour of the needs and interests of persons still living
In section two I argue that, because such interests may be morally significant,
respecting a person's interest in what happens to her body parts after her death, and
adhering to any directives resulting from that interest, is a specific, albeit unusual,
instance of acting in accord with the principle of respect for persons.

SECTION I: ARE PARTS FROM CADAVERS SIMPLY RESOURCES FOR

THE LIVING?

I have argued that any directives a person may give concerning the treatment of a part
of her body removed for therapeutic reasons should be respected and adhered to
because they may reflect her beliefs and values Further, she may be adversely affected
if her excised body part were treated in some other way. Whilst a person's interest in
what happens to her body parts after her death may also be influenced by her beliefs
and values, a person will not be adversely affected if, after her death, her body and
parts are not treated in accord with any prior directives she had given as a result of
having that interest. For this reason, a different explanation is needed why a person's
interest in the treatment of her body parts after her death may be significant.

i. A Person's Interest in What Happens to Her Body Parts after Her Death

A person's interest in how her body parts will be treated after her death is, I suggest,
an example of an interest a person may have in events that will occur after her death.
More familiar examples of such interests are how a person's property will be
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distributed, whether her nearly completed book will be published, or h o w she will be
remembered. Moreover there are '... some interests of humans beings that can only
be fulfilled after they die', such as h o w their body parts will be treated.

To determine whether a person has an interest of any significance in what happens to

her body parts after her death it may be useful to first determine whether a person h
such an interest in her whole body parts. When a person dies, something of a
dilemma is posed by the remaining body which is '... the mortal remains of a unique
human being'. On the one hand, the person no longer exists, except indirectly via
other people's memories, representations such as photographs or, perhaps, even
through the results of his endeavours, such as a book he had written. On the other

hand, the corpse remains '...as still uniquely related to the original person ... [an

in some way ... most strongly "his", far more strongly than, for example, his clothes
or letters'. Since a person knows that after his death a body will remain that is
strongly representative of him and his life, it is understandable why he may have an
interest in, and so give directives concerning, how that body should be treated.

a. Disposing of Bodies

Cadavers are usually disposed of, and so a person may be concerned about, and give

directives concerning the manner of disposal for her body. Such directives are not th
only considerations when disposing of cadavers, since ' ... failure to remove a

1

R. Belliotti, 'Do Dead H u m a n Beings Have Rights?', The Personalist, 1979, p. 203.

2 E. W. Keyserlingk, 'Human Dignity and Donor Altruism- Are they Compatible with Efficiency
in Cadaveric H u m a n Organ Procurement'", Transplantation Proceedings, vol. 22, no. 3, 1990,
p. 1005.
3 P. M. Quay, 'Utilising the Bodies of the Dead', Saint Louis University Law Review, vol. 28,
1984, p. 902.
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cadaver from h u m a n proximity can injure the physical and psychic health of the entire
community'.4 So some directives a person may give regarding the disposal of her
body—for example that it be publicly displayed—should not and would not be
adhered to. A further reason for disposing of corpses in particular ways or in
designated areas is to separate deceased from living persons. Whilst such separation

may partially be for public health reasons, there seems to be a psychological and/or
spiritual aspect to the disposal of cadavers.

More specific considerations concerning the disposal of cadavers are determined by the

' ... cultural structures or context that form much of the life of the deceased'.5 I
many instances the relevant 'cultural structures' are the former person's religious
beliefs. Many religions prescribe particular ceremonies and even specify the manner
of disposal for cadavers. These ceremonies are in part to benefit those still living,
specifically to give those who knew the person an opportunity to show respect and
grieve for their loss. At the same time, though, '[r]eligious beliefs embodied in

funeral practices are amongst those most characteristic and closest to the heart of eve
religion'. So if a person had held particular religious beliefs and adhered to the

prescribed practices, then it is reasonable to assume she would have wanted her body

disposed of in accord with those beliefs. Further, the manner of disposing of a body

4

Quay, p. 901.

5 Quay, p. 907.
6 In Lott v. State and Tumminelli v. State , 32 Misc. 2d 296,255 N.Y.S. 2d 434 (1962), the
relatives of two deceased persons were awarded damages for mental suffering after each person was
buried according to the other person's religious ceremony.
7 Quay, p. 908.
8 Even when a person had not closely followed the practices of their nominal religion during their
life they are usually buried according to the ceremonies of that religion. This m a y be because of
the lack of comparable secular ceremonies.
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in a particular w a y m a y be due to some further, deeper, beliefs of that religion, such as

the need for the body to be appropriately prepared for re-incarnation or an after-life.
most western societies a person's right that her body be disposed of in accordance
with her religious beliefs is protected as part of her right to freedom of religion.

A person's only concern may be that her body should be treated with respect and
dignity after her death, and this would be achieved by adhering to the various general
obligations and prohibitions relating to the treatment of cadavers. Alternatively, she
may have some specific non-religious reasons for wanting her body disposed of in a
particular way. Someone with a fear of fire may prefer to be buried, whereas someone
else may find the prospect of her body slowly decaying or being consumed by worms
disturbing, and so prefer cremation. Other preferences may not relate to a particular
method of disposal, but rather reflect a person's other concerns. For example, a
person may prefer cremation because she wants her body to cease being recognisable
as her body as soon as possible after her death or because she believes cemeteries take
up valuable living space. Alternatively, a person may prefer her cadaver to be buried
because her spouse's cadaver had been.

b. Designated Donations and Other Directives Concerning Body Parts

Just as a person's beliefs and convictions may influence the way a person wants her
body disposed of, they may also determine how a person wants her body parts treated
after her death. Since under current policies it is supererogatory for a person to make

her body parts available for transplantation after her death, her consenting to this us

of her body parts may reflect her altruistic tendencies or her belief it is important to
assist those in need. Alternatively, such a donation may be made out of a sense of
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gratitude if, for example, she had, or k n e w someone w h o had, undergone a successful
transplant.

It has been argued that '[individuals have a right to designate the recipient of their
organs', and some US jurisdictions have legislated to protect such a right by
amending the relevant Act. Designated donations are made in response to an
immediate need, and so, for example, could occur if a person was close to death but
his kidney remained unaffected and healthy, and was physiologically compatible with
a relative or close friend who needed a kidney transplant. More likely, though, such
donation may be made in response to a public appeal on behalf of a specific donor.10

Whilst designated donations on the basis of family ties m a y be acceptable, just as acts
of living organ donation between family members are acceptable, such donations
resulting from public appeals have been criticised because such a practice is
' ... person-specific and thereby abandons the general ethical framework' for

allocating organs. My interest in designated donation relates to the permissibility of
person's putting conditions or restrictions on the donation of her body parts after
death. It could be argued that not permitting a person to give specific instructions

9

F. Rosner, J. B. Henry, J. R. W o l p o w et al., 'Ethical and Social Issues in Organ Procurement
for Transplantation', New York State Journal of Medicine, vol. 93, no. 1, 1993, p. 33.

10 This occurred in 1982 when Charles Fiske made an appeal of behalf of his 9 month old daughter.
A day later the parents of a child killed in a road accident donated their child's liver specifically to
Fiske's daughter. See F. Chapman, 'The Life-and-Death Question of an Organ Market', Fortune,
June 11, 1984, p. 82.
11 E. Kluge, 'Designated Organ Donation: Private Choice in Social Context', Hastings Center
Report, vol. 19, no. 5, 1989, p. 11. For a survey of the policies for allocating body parts for
transplantation see J. F. Childress, 'Ethical Criteria for Procuring and Distributing Organs for
Transplantation', Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, vol. 14, no. 1, 1989, pp. 87-113;
G. J. Annas 'The Prostitute, the Playboy and the Poet: Rationing Schemes for Organ
Transplantation', American Journal of Public Health, vol. 75, no. 2, 1985, pp. 187-189;
R. A. Rettig, 'The Politics of Organ Transplantation: A Parable of Our Time', Journal of
Health Politics, Policy and Law, vol. 14, no. 1, 1989, pp. 191-227.

77

this type is inconsistent with the current policies requiring that a person's consent.
One response to such an argument may be that designated donations would be unfair

to those potential recipients who are not designated, either because none of their fam

are willing to donate their body parts or because they could not afford to make a publi
appeal. This raises the further question of what part of the procedure is morally
dubious—responding to the appeal or making the appeal in the first place. However,

if a person does have a significant interest in what happens to her body parts after he
death, then allowing designated donation may give her more flexibility to reflect that
interest in any directives she gives.

Other directives a person may give as a result of her interest in how her body parts wi
be treated after her death may be influenced by her beliefs and values. She may, for

example, specifically donate her body and its parts for experimentation, thus reflectin
her interest in and respect for science. Further, because of her values and beliefs, a
person may put limitations on which body parts and/or how they can be used after her
death. For example, a person may not want particular body parts, for example her
eyes, to be transplanted. A person may also wish to place limitations on the type of
experiments that her body parts could be used for. If she was, for example, concerned

about some particular illness or disease, she may specify that her body parts be used i
research relating to its prevention.

c. The Basis for a Person's Directives Concerning Her Body Parts

The other side of the coin to a person's having interests in events that will occur aft
her death is that those events may in some way relate to that person. Specifically,

there are some events at the end of a person's life, or even after her death, that in s
sense completes that person's life. This is because the '... final tally book on a
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person's life is not closed until s o m e time after his death'.12

A w a r d s or

commendations may be made after a person's death; her outstanding projects, such as
business ventures or unpublished manuscripts, may be completed; or her prior

directives relating to events that can happen after her death be carried out. Whilst s
of these 'posthumous events' may just tie up the 'loose ends' of a person's life, the
more significant ones may in some sense complete it.

Perhaps the most significant event that completes a person's life is his death, or more
precisely the manner of his death. Richard Dworkin argues that in seeking to
determine the appropriate treatment for someone who has become permanently
unconscious, '[w]e worry about the effect of his life's last stage with the character
his life as a whole'. In order to prevent the manner of his death being inconsistent
with his life when considered as a whole, a person may make a living will. These
documents typically contain instructions about the medical treatment a person should
receive if he can no longer participate in treatment decisions. Such directives may
reflect a person's deeply held beliefs and convictions, and represent an attempt to

ensure the manner of his death is consistent with other significant aspects of his life

Disregarding a person's directives concerning events happening at the end of his life
after his death may ' ... damage ... [the person's life when] ... considered as a
whole'. Although this observation was made in relation to a person's existing in a
vegetative state, a similar type of damage may result from events occurring after a
person's death. For example, if a malicious falsehood were spread and believed about

12

J. Feinberg, Harm to Other. The Moral Limits of Criminal Law, Vol I, Oxford University Press,
N e w York, 1988, p. 83.

13 R. Dworkin, Life's Dominion, Harper Collins, London, 1993, p. 199.
14 R. Dworkin, 'The Right to Die', New York Review, January 31, 1991, p. 16.
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a person w h o had led a morally exemplary life then there would, at the very least, be
an inconsistency between the way that person had lived her life and what was thought
about how she had lived her life. Disregarding a person's prior directives concerning
how her body parts should be treated after her death may not seem as damaging as

malicious lies being told after a person's death. But given that the person has died, i
is difficult to see why the second but not the first would be wrong. The person (being
dead) cannot be harmed (although as will be discussed in the next section some believe
this is possible), and so both would constitute equal violations of the deceased
person's prior beliefs and values. More generally, if the way a person wanted her
body parts treated after her death was influenced by her beliefs and values, then this
would be an event that in some sense completes a person's life, and so would be
significant.

The first step in ensuring that, after her death, a person's body parts are treated in

accord with her prior directives is to recognise a person has a right to determine what
happens to her body parts after her death, similar to a person's right of disposition
over her property (although some important differences between these two rights will
be identified below). The basis of a person's right of disposition over her body parts
is the type of interest she may have in what happens to her body parts. Specifically,
she may be concerned that after her death her body parts be treated in a way that
reflects her values, beliefs and perhaps even her life when considered as a whole.
Such treatment may be a culmination of the different rituals that must be performed in

accordance with that person's religious beliefs or reflect a person's other, but equal
significant beliefs or values. The reasons why other people should respect and
promote this right will be explained in the next section.
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However, the possibility of using parts from recently deceased person's to save or
significantly improve other people's lives, either directly by transplantation or
indirectly by experimentation, may outweigh any prior interests the now deceased
person had. More than this, it may be asked why the prior directives of a deceased
person concerning the treatment of her body parts should be considered at all, when it

is possible to use such parts to save or significantly improve the lives of other peop

The need for organs to save lives is perhaps the strongest argument against adhering to
a person's directives concerning the treatment of her body parts. This is a specific

instance of a more general principle that the interest and needs of living persons sho
outweigh the directives or wishes of deceased persons, although this does not mean

such directives or wishes are necessarily insignificant. I now discuss and evaluate tw

proposals for modifying current organ procurement policies in line with this principle

ii. Compulsory Removal of Parts from Cadavers

There have been various proposals for modifying the current policies in order to
increase the supply of organs to be used for transplantation. Such proposals place
varying degrees of significance on any relevant prior directives given by deceased
persons. One of the more aggressive proposals recommends the compulsory retrieval
of parts from cadavers. Under this proposal, any parts deemed suitable for
transplantation would be retrieved from a cadaver regardless of whether the person
whose body it was had given permission.15 The motivation for a compulsory removal
organ procurement policies is that' ... a death resulting from the unavailability of a
organ ... must be seen for what it is in fact: a senseless tragedy which could be

15

Sometimes a presumed consent policy is known as a compulsory removal policy but this is not
h o w I a m using the term here.
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avoided by overcoming needlessly restrictive taboos'.16 Requiring the prior
permission of a deceased person before using her body parts for transplantation has
17

been argued to be one such taboo.

Proponents cite various aspects of the current situation in relation to organ
procurement to support the introduction of a compulsory removal policy on public
interest grounds. One of these is the discrepancy between public support for organ
donation, which opinion polls indicate to be around 80-90%, and the number of

people who actually indicate their willingness to make their body parts available fo
transplantation, which is around 19%.18

However, claiming the above discrepancy provides support for the introduction of a
compulsory removal policy assumes that the opinion polls, and not the number of
people who give explicit consent, better reflects public opinion. Further still, a
person's being 'in favour' of organ donation may only amount to being in favour of

the general permissibility of donation and not (necessarily) in favour of personally
donating. Moreover, empirical research suggests a person may have '... feelings of
uncertainty, fear and even horror' about their body parts being used for
transplantation. Such a reaction may be a result of a person's more general fear or

16

'Compulsory Removal of Cadaver Organs', Columbia Law Review, vol. 69, 1969, pp. 693-705.

17 See, for example, J. Dukeminier, 'Supplying Organs for Transplantation', Michigan
Review, vol. 68, 1970, pp. 831-837.

18 D. L. Manninen & R. Evans, 'Public Attitude and Behaviour Regarding Organ Donatio
Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 253, no. 21, 1985, pp. 3111-3115; see also
J. Prottas & H. L. Batten 'The Willingness to Give: The Public and the Supply of
Transplantable Organs', Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, vol. 16, no. 1, 1991,
pp. 121-134.

19 S. Younger, 'Psychological Impediments to Procurement', Transplantation Proceedin
no. 5, 1992, p. 2159.
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unwillingness to think about her o w n death. Further still, a person m a y be concerned

about the organ procurement procedure, specifically,'... the violation and mutilation
of their own or a loved one's body'.20 Whilst this does not mean reported public
support for organ donation is not genuine, it does raise questions about how best to
gauge a person's true intentions in relation to making her body parts available for
transplantation after her death.

The main argument of the proponents a compulsory removal policy is that more body
parts could be removed within the required time and under the appropriate conditions
to be used in transplantations and so more lives would be saved. This may initially
seem to make a compulsory removal policy a reasonable, perhaps even a morally

justifiable, alternative to policies which give priority to a deceased person's prior
directives concerning the treatment of her body parts after her death. Further, an
argument supporting such a policy could still acknowledge the significance of the

deceased person's directives or wishes, but maintain that priority should be given to
saving lives. Finally, it may also be argued a compulsory removal policy would be
less stressful for the deceased person's relatives since there would be no need to
consult them before organ retrieval took place.

Notwithstanding these seemingly strong supporting arguments for a compulsory
removal policy, adoption of such a policy has rarely, if ever, been seriously
proposed.21 Two specific objections raised against this policy are, first, the
compulsory removal of organs from a cadaver may result in demands for

20

S. Younger, 'Organ Retrieval: Can W e Ignore the Dark Side?', Transplantation Proceedings, vol.
22, no. 3, 1990, p. 1014.

21 For one of the very few assessments of the plausibility of adopting such a policy see A. H.
Barnett & D. L. Kaserman, 'The Shortage of Organs for Transplantation: Exploring the
Alternatives', Issues in Law & Medicine, vol. 9, no. 2, 1993, pp. 123, 126-134.
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compensation, and, second, that such a policy would contravene a person's freedom
of religion. Other objections concern the ' ... extreme intrusiveness of such
23

government action', which is given as the main reason w h y such a policy would find
little, if any, public acceptance. These reasons, though, are given in the context of
current organ procurement policies. It may be argued that the continuing shortage of
body parts for transplantation requires a change in policy, perhaps even the adoption
of one as aggressive as a compulsory removal policy.

Other rationales for adopting a more aggressive organ procurement policy seek to

undermine the significance of any directives a person may have given in relation to h
body parts. Joel Feinberg argues that giving such directives priority over procuring
and using such parts to save or improve other people's lives is an instance of
' ... attaching a value to a symbol, and then absorbing oneself in the sentiments

evoked by the symbol at the expense of real interests, including the very interests t
symbol represents'. The idea is that the prior directives of a deceased person

concerning the treatment of her cadaver are respected because it is a symbol of her li
but that this becomes an act of sentiment if done at the expense of saving other

people's lives. Feinberg also suggests some of a person's reasons for refusing to give

permission for her body parts to be used for transplantation after she dies just resu

22

See Dukeminier, 'Supplying Organs for Transplantation', pp. 833-837; P. Lee, 'The Organ
Supply Dilemma: Acute Responses to a Chronic Dilemma', Columbia Journal of Law and
Social Problems, vol. 20, 1986, pp. 404-405; T. Silver, 'The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ
Draft and a Proposed Model Organ Draft Act', Boston University Law Review, vol. 68, 1988,
pp. 709-718.

23 M. J. Butler, 'The Law of Human Organ Procurement: A Modest Proposal', Journal of
Contemporary Health Law and Policy, vol. 1, 1985, pp. 201-202.
24 J. Feinberg, Offense to Others: The Moral Limits of Criminal Law, Vol II, Oxford
Press, N e w York, 1985, p. 75.
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from squeamishness, and so are clearly less important than saving or improving of
other people lives.

However, arguments that dismiss a deceased person's prior directives concerning the
treatment of her body parts as being based on misplaced sentiment or squeamishness
fail to acknowledge the personal nature of such directives, and as a consequence their
whole significance. Any body parts were previously part of a particular body which,
in turn, had been the body of a particular person. That person may have had an
interest in, and so give directives concerning, how her body parts should be treated
after her death.

The reason a person may give directives concerning what happens to her body parts

after her death is to ensure they are treated in a way consistent with her values, beli
and other significant aspects of her life. Moreover, the treatment of a person's body

parts after her death is an event that contributes to the completing of her life. So ra
than overriding a person's opposition to her body parts being used for transplantation
purposes because it undermines the value of human life, avoiding such devaluation is
precisely why such opposition should be respected. If deceased people are so
unimportant that their strongest beliefs and deepest values are not worth respecting
then this seems to detract from the importance of respecting the beliefs and values of
living persons. Saving other people's lives at the expense of disregarding a person's
prior directives concerning the treatment of her body and its parts is to undermine the
value of such directives and their importance in completing a person's life.

There is another, possibly more morally acceptable, proposal for modifying the current
policies, and which may significantly increase the supply of organs available for
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transplantation whilst allowing, even requiring, prior involvement by the person from
whose body the parts are to be removed.

Hi. Does a Person Have a Moral Duty to Make Her Body Parts Available for
Transplantation ?

Rather than a person's having a choice to m a k e her body parts available for
transplantation after her death, it has been suggested she has a moral duty to do so.

The moral justification of such a duty is that"... no person has the right to withhold
life from another where there is neither serious harm to the person in assisting nor

benefit in withholding that assistance'.25 It has been suggested that this duty is aki
Of.

the better k n o w n duty of easy rescue.

This is the duty a person has to rescue

someone in situations where there is little or no risk to herself, hereafter known as
easy rescue situations. Patricia Smith describes such situations as ones where there
' ... one person in peril whose only real chance of survival depends on the action of

one agent who has no special relationship to the victim other than the (accidental) f
27

that she happens to be on the scene'. In addition to various parallels between such

25

M . A . Sommerville, '"Procurement vs. Donation"-Access to Tissues and Organs for
Transplantation: Should "Contracting Out" Legislation B e Adopted?', Transplantation
Proceedings, vol. 17, no. 6, Suppl. 4, 1985, p. 65.

26 See Sommerville, pp. 53-68; A. L. Caplan, 'Requests, Gifts and Obligations: The Ethics of
Organ Procurement', Transplantation Proceedings, vol. 18, no. 3, Suppl. 2, 1986, pp. 49-56;
and P. T. Menzel, 'The Moral Duty to Contribute and Its Implications for Organ Procurement
Policy', Transplantation Proceedings, vol. 24, no. 5, 1992, pp. 2175-2178.
27 P. Smith, 'The Duty to Rescue and the Slippery Slope Problem', Social Theory and Practice,
vol. 16, no. 1, 1990, p. 27. There are at least two other important questions about this type of
duty raised in the literature. First, whether there is a legal duty to rescue, which need not concern
us here, since the proposal under scrutiny here is that a person has a moral, rather than a legal,
duty to make her body parts available for transplantation after her death. See J. Feinberg, Harm
to Self. The Moral Limits of Criminal Law, Vol I, Oxford University Press, N e w York, 1984,
pp. 126-186; and J. Kleinig, 'Good Samaritanism', Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 5, no. 4,
1976, pp. 382-407. The second question, also not relevant here, is what the causal relevance of
not rendering assistance is when determining the overall harm the victim suffers. See Kleinig,
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situations, identified below, it has been argued that '"[e]asy rescue cases"... are
often used as the basis of analogical arguments designed to show that we have duties
9ft

to save, which often go unrecognised'.

Thomas Young undertakes a detailed analysis of the supposed analogy between a duty
of easy rescue and a person's proposed duty to make her body parts available for
transplantation after her death. In seeking to identify a point of disanalogy between

these two duties, Young explores and dismisses several possibilities. First, he argues

that although a potential organ donor is not the only one in a position to help, this
not obviate the duty, since ' ... if numbers weaken obligation, then ... [in an easy
rescue situation] ... the more people standing around doing nothing, the less ... [a

particular person] ... is obligated to assist'.29 Second, in response to the suggestio
person may suffer psychological harm if obligated to become an organ donor, and
further that this would not happen in an easy rescue situation, Young queries whether
suffering mild or even severe psychological harm removes moral obligation. He
suggest that if it did, that would, for example, "... allow a racist who refused to
throw a life preserver to a drowning black man to claim he had no moral obligation to
help because doing so would have caused him some mental distress'.30

The point of disanalogy between a person's duty to make her body parts available for
transplantation after her death and the more general duty of easy rescue Young

pp. 391-407; E. Mack, 'Bad Samaritanism and the Causation of Harm', Philosophy and Public
Affairs, vol. 9, no. 3, 1980, pp. 230-259; and E. J. Weinrib, 'The Case for a Duty to Rescue',
Yale Law Journal, vol. 90, no. 2, 1980, pp. 247-293.

28 T. Young, 'Analogical Reasoning and Easy Rescue Cases', Journal of Philosophical R
vol. 18, 1993, p. 327.
29 Young, p. 329.
30

Young, p. 330.
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identifies arises from a rights-based approach. O n the assumption that"... w e stand in
a special relationship with our body parts and it makes sense to capture this
relationship by saying that we 'own' our organs, blood etc.',31 Young argues that if

person has a duty to make her body parts available for transplantation after her deat
she would forfeit her right of disposition over them, whereas a person in an easy

rescue situation is not asked to forfeit any rights. Rather, a person in an easy resc
situation is at most asked to temporarily surrender his freedom and perhaps use his

skills to render assistance, for example by interrupting his walk by a river to rescu
drowning person. Young attempts to restore the analogy in two ways. First, he
constructs a situation where a person is required to give up some of his property in
order to perform a seemingly easy rescue, but then rejects such situations as ones
where a person would have a duty of easy rescue, since requiring people to give up
property to help others would make ' ... supererogatory actions into obligatory
32

actions'.

Further, only those w h o had property rights in objects needed to perform

such a rescue would have such an obligation. For this reason, Young concludes that
such a duty would be unjust.

Young's second attempt to restore the analogy between a person's duty to make her

body parts available for transplantation after her death and the more general duty of
easy rescue involves construing a person's time and energy as her property. Young
argues this would have the same undesirable implications: some people would have

certain obligations whilst others would not, given their particular circumstances. If

however, it does not make sense for a person's time and energy to be her property, bu
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Young, p. 339 footnote 9.

32 Young, p. 334 There is a further aspect to this argument, namely that it would be restricted to
those people w h o did not suffer any psychological harm by giving up their property-thus
supererogatory actions would become obligatory actions for only some (generous) people.
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a person does have the right of disposition—which is typically taken to be a property
right—over her body parts, then this would be a disanalogy between the two duties.
Whilst the question of whether a person has such rights over her body parts is the
subject of later chapters, it is worth noting that Young's assumption of a person's
having a right of disposition over her body is also made by current organ procurement
policies, and for which I have provided part of a justification above.

There are more straightforward reasons why a person's supposed duty to make her
body parts available for transplantation after her death would not be the same kind of

duty as that arising in an easy rescue situation. Smith identifies five features of suc
situations. First, the act of rescue only requires minimal action, since '[n]o one is

obligated to incur great cost or risk to himself in order to a help a random stranger'.
Second, easy rescue situations typically involve one person acting to save another.34
Third, in such situations a person must be confronted by a situation which at
'... minimum [requires] the agent must be close enough to be aware of a problem,
identify it as a problem and act on it'. Fourth, a duty only arises in such situations
where there is a clear and immediate need—that is an emergency. The fifth, and final,
feature is that easy rescue situations present a need for harm prevention.

So does the need for body parts, and the action required to alleviate this need, share
any criteria with easy rescue situations and associated duties? Three of the above

criteria do seem to be met: a person making her body parts available for transplantati
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Smith, 'The Duty to Rescue and the Slippery Slope Problem', p. 25.

34 Smith concedes in some circumstances a person may have a duty to rescue more than one person,
although '[a] single agent w h o is in the position to help has merely a duty to do what she can.
She does not have a duty to save all of them if she cannot do so without risk to herself.' See
Smith, p. 26.
35

Smith, p. 28.
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after her death will assist at least one other person; that person has a clear and usually
immediate need; and that assistance would be a form of harm prevention. Two
remaining criteria of easy rescue situations—a person's being confronted by another's
need, which only requires minimal action to alleviate—do not, however, seem to be
met. Even though potential organ recipients do have an immediate need, a person will
not be confronted by it at the time he can alleviate it.36 Whilst this is true, if this
the only difference, it would not be sufficient grounds to dismiss a possible analogy
between a duty of easy rescue, and a person's duty to make her body parts available

for transplantation after her death. After all, this need for body parts is well known,

and, although a person is not able to alleviate the need of potential recipients she ma
be confronted with whilst alive, there will be other potential recipients whose need
may be alleviated if her body parts are available for transplantation after her death.

The final criterion of easy rescue situations may seem relevant to the shortage of body

parts for transplantation: that alleviating the situation only requires minimal action
37

person.

Paul Menzel, one of the main proponents of a person's having a moral duty

to make her body parts available for transplantation after death, argues that this way
of'... contributing is a very easy thing to do in terms of time, effort, of life plans
38

effects on one's other duties'.

T h e bureaucratic procedures by which a person

makes her body parts available for transplantation after her death are simple, for
example carrying a signed donor card or ticking the appropriate box on a driver's
license application. A person's making her body parts available for transplantation

36

In the case of living organ donation the exact opposite is the case.

37 It may be argued that it is the transplant surgeon who has a 'duty of easy rescue' to the potential
recipient rather than a potential donor. This is because the surgeon has the relevant skills.
38 Menzel, 'The Moral Duty to Contribute and Its Implications for Organ Procurement Policy', p.
2175.
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after her death m a y , however, be contrary to her deeply held convictions, such as

religious beliefs. This would mean that 'contributing' in this way would not be simple
in the relevant sense.

Admittedly, some of the reasons a person may have for not making her body parts

available for transplantation after her death could be morally dubious. Earlier in thi

chapter I indicated support for the practice of designated donation, or more generally
allowing a person to put restrictions on the use of her body parts after her death,
suggesting this would allow a person to give directives which more accurately reflect

her interest in what happens to her body parts after her death than just consenting to
their use for transplantation. Some designated donation may, however, be motivated
39

by prejudices such as religious bigotry.

Such prejudices should be no more

condoned in this context than any other, such as employment, housing, participation in
leisure activities and so on. At the same time, though, if a person has some deeper

reason for a seemingly irrational prejudicial restriction on the use of his body parts
after his death—such as having being persecuted by a particular group of people—then

such a restriction should not necessarily be overridden. This does not detract from th
general point that donating body parts is not necessarily a simple act.

Consider, though, Menzel's suggestion that a person's duty to make her body parts

available after her death is part of her more general duty to contribute to society. A

justification for a person's having this type of duty may be that since she has utilis
medical resources and benefited from medical practice throughout her life, making her
body parts available for transplantation after her death would seem a reasonable form
of repayment. Such a duty would be less stringent than a duty of easy rescue, which

39 Although it m a y seem a more likely example, I have not referred to racial bigotry here since
members of different races are rarely physiologically compatible.
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seems to be a strong prima facie duty, given that acting in accord with it usually saves

a particular person's life. In particular, a general duty to contribute does not meet
of the five criteria for easy rescue: no one person is the only one who can act, and

person is not confronted by a clear and immediate need. This would not preclude there
being such a duty, it just that it would not be the same kind of duty as one of easy
rescue.

Those who argue a person has a moral duty to make her body parts available for

transplantation after her death, either as a duty of easy rescue or some other weaken
duty, usually allow exemptions. For example, Menzel's specific proposal is where a

person '... had no objection [she] would be morally required to allow [her] organs to
be used'.4 It is unclear, though, what Menzel views as a valid objection. At one

point he says ' ... any objection a person is willing to state counts, with no need t

justify the objection', but later he says that if a person 'object[s], but [her] obje

is not serious, [she] still has a moral duty to contribute'. It is unclear what count
'serious' objections, but it seems Menzel would include any based on a person's
religious beliefs or ethical concerns.

A person's 'duty' to make her body parts available for transplantation after her deat
may be weakened further once it is acknowledged that a person has a morally

significant interest in what happens to her body parts after her death. The nature an

the significance of a person's interest in what happens to her body parts after her d
competes strongly with those who claim such parts should be available for

40

Menzel, p. 2177.

41 Menzel, p. 2176.
42 Menzel, p. 2176.
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transplantation after her death. Moreover, a policy which makes it obligatory, morally

or legally, for a person to make her body parts available for transplantation after he
death is little better than just taking parts from a cadaver regardless of any prior

directives from a deceased person. Further, any claims that such a policy adheres to a
person's prior consent would be deceptive. Allowing exemptions of the type
discussed above would, however, make a policy advocating this duty unjust, since the
duty would be extinguished if a person had some specific beliefs but would remain for
someone else whose beliefs were as significant but differed in content.

In this section I have examined two proposals which give the needs of the living
priority over any directives a person may have given concerning the treatment of her
body parts after her death. The first proposal was argued to be abhorrent, whilst the
second shown to be impractical. More generally, I suggested the underlying rationale
for these proposals—namely, that the prior directives of a deceased person concerning
the treatment of her body parts should be overridden in order to save as many lives a
possible—would be self-defeating. This is because such policies would diminish the
value and respect for human life, specifically by undermining the significance of a
person's directives concerning the treatment of her body parts after death. This will
clearer when it is explained exactly why a deceased person's prior directives
concerning the treatment of her body and its parts should be respected.

SECTION II: RESPECTING DECEASED PERSONS

Respect for deceased persons is common to most societies, although the actual
practices exhibiting this respect vary between societies and even within the same

society, particularly pluralistic ones. Such practices often appeal to the moral princ

of respect for persons, but at least two questions have to be addressed before such an
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appeal is justified: w h o or what is the object of respect, and w h y should she or it be

respected? After a brief discussion of the relevant principle, I address these questio
both generally in relation to deceased persons and their outstanding affairs, and

specifically in relation to a person's interest in, and the associated directives she
give concerning, the treatment of her body parts after her death.

i. The Principle of Respect for Persons

The principle of respect for persons is common to diverse moral theories, and,
although explanations of its importance vary, it has been argued to be amongst the
basic moral principles. According to Aristotle, the virtuous person is disposed to act
from the right motives, and so presumably would act in accord with this principle.
Kant argues a person ' ... possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he

exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world'. This princip
also underlies Mill's principle of negative liberty, because it ' ... derives from
commonsense views about the moral importance of being left free to make choices
rather than having them imposed on us'. However, despite its commonality to
different moral theories, and the fundamental nature of the principle of respect for

persons, there is ' ... little agreement about the nature and strength of the obligati
owed to persons, and still less agreement about what is to be respected'.
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See R. S. Downie & E. Tefler, Respect for Persons, Allen & Unwin, London, 1960, p. 15.

44 I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. M. Gregor, Cambridge University Press,
1991 (1797), p. 230 (author's emphasis).
45 T. Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics, McGraw Hill Inc., New York, 1991, p. 196.
46 Beauchamp, p. 194.
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Broadly speaking, different moral theories interpret the principle of respect for persons
in one of two ways. For Kant, and following him many deontologists, this principle
entails respect for a person's moral autonomy, that is for a person's ability for
'... willing moral principles and acting is accordance with them'.47 The second

interpretation, which has its roots in Humean moral theory but finds its full expressi
in Utilitarianism, is as respect for a person's individual autonomy, which entails
' ... a fundamental moral obligation to respect autonomous agents by duly
recognising their considered value judgements and outlook, including their right to
their beliefs and their right to take actions based on their beliefs'.48 The second
interpretation of the principle of respect for persons is relevant here, although my
concern is to establish its relevance in an unusual context—namely in relation to
deceased persons and their outstanding affairs.

One of the more important questions raised by the principle of respect for persons is:
why should persons be respected? One possible explanation is that persons deserve
respect because of their merits, but'... since people's merits vary, there seems to be
49

a problem about understanding what it is that about persons as such w e value'.

An

alternative explanation is that a person should be respected in virtue of those featur
'... which constitute the "generic" human "self" or are the "distinctive endowment of
being human'".50 One suggestion of what constitutes the distinctive endowment of

being human is the ' ... exercise of rational will, taking that concept in a broad sens
which does not exclude the concomitant presence of feeling and desire'. This

47

Beauchamp, p. 195.

48 Beauchamp, p. 196.
49 Downie, Respect for Persons, p. 19.
50 Downie, p. 19.
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answer incorporates the Kantian idea of a person deserving respect because of her

capacity to be rational, as well as other aspects that are distinctive of persons whi

despite Kant's views to the contrary, '... contribute something of distinctive value
52

the h u m a n personality'.

Whenever the notion of respect is invoked there must be an object of respect. So the
specific question that needs to be addressed whenever the principle of respect for
persons is invoked is: Why should a person be respected? Although general answers

such as persons having dignity, are still relevant, answers to this question typicall

refer to a person's capacity to be autonomous. More specifically, it is the degree to
which a person can be autonomous and the variety of ways in which a person could

exercise her autonomy that are considered worthy of respect. This is not to say those
persons who are unable to act autonomously should not be respected, it is just that

when the principle of respect for persons is invoked in relation to those persons, it
usually the more general aspects of why all persons should be respected that are
relevant.

Once it has been established, generally, why persons deserve respect, the next

question to be resolved is: What is entailed in respecting a person? One suggestion i
that respecting a person means making their '... ends one's own ... and to take into

account in all one's dealing with him that he too is self-determining'. Amongst other

things, this entails respecting a person's values, convictions, aspirations, concerns

and, more generally, allowing that person to live his life as he chooses, albeit with
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52 Downie, p. 21.
53 Downie, p. 37.
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certain general limits. A person's interests would also be respected, since they often
reflect that person's convictions and may directly relate to her aspirations.

A further question raised by the principle of respect for persons is what type of
obligations this principle places on persons regarding their treatment of each other.
Exactly what is entailed in any given instance of this principle varies since it gives
' ... rise to certain characteristic principles of actions—ways of treating persons'.
The particular principle of action that is relevant depends very much on the context,

since whenever this principle is invoked, the concern is that a particular person shou
be treated in accord with respect in the particular circumstances.

Given its centrality to moral theory and discussions of many moral issues, the
principle of respect for persons could be discussed in much more detail. This brief
examination of this principle will, however, be sufficient to determine whether and
why the principle of respect for persons entails respect for deceased persons.

ii. Why Respect Deceased Persons ?

It has been argued that acts which seem to respect deceased persons are undertaken

because '[t]he living have a deeply rooted need to be able to look forward with solidly
grounded confidence to having their own determinations carried out'. So, for
example, ' ... because the living have expectations and concern for having their own
wills [etc.] respected, they also have an interest in respecting the wills of the
deceased'.56 Whilst admitting such explanations seem inadequate—perhaps because

54 Downie, p. 37.
55 Quay, 'Utilising the Bodies of the Dead', p. 913.
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no reference is m a d e to the person w h o gave the directive—Ernest Partridge contends
the only way to make sense of the various obligations and prohibitions concerning
deceased persons and their outstanding affairs is as a contract between successive
generations.

Some of a deceased person's prior directives may have positive implications for those

still living—for example, the distribution of her property or use of her body parts for
transplantation. Hence a more specific explanation why such directives should be
adhered relates to the benefits to, for example, the beneficiaries nominated in a
person's will or potential organ recipients. There may, however, be more efficient
ways for living persons to receive such benefits. For example, if the sole reason for
adhering to a deceased person's prior directives concerning her body parts is for the
benefit of those still living, then this would justify adopting the compulsory removal
policy that was discussed and dismissed above.

Whilst part of the reason for carrying out a deceased person's prior directives may be

to reassure living persons that their own directives will be carried out after they ha
died, or because of the benefits to specific individuals, by themselves such
explanations are inadequate. They do not identify what I contend is a morally
important reason for carrying out such directives, namely that doing so is in

accordance with the principle of respect for persons. It is not, however, the person as
she is now—a corpse—who is being respected, but rather the person who once was.

W h a t precisely would failing to respect the person w h o once w a s — f o r example, by
ignoring a deceased person's prior directives—amount to? Feinberg and others,

56 E. Partridge, 'Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect', Ethics, vol. 91, 1981, p. 261
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argue it is possible to harm deceased persons, whilst Partridge, amongst others,59
deny the possibility of such harms. Since Feinberg's suggestion that deceased
persons can be harmed is one of the more recent and interesting philosophical

explanations why the various obligations and prohibitions relating to deceased person
should be respected, it is worth briefly outlining his argument and explaining my
reasons for rejecting it.

The notion of 'posthumous harm' seems clumsy, perhaps as a result of using a
common well-understood notion, namely, that of a person being harmed, to explain
something to which the concept is not usually applied, namely, a rationale for the
various prescriptions and prohibitions concerning deceased persons and their
outstanding affairs. Some attempts are better than others. For example, Raymond

Belliotti claims that ' ... human beings have interests that can be satisfied after t

are dead and they have rights which can be violated or respected after they are dead'.
But even Belliotti's phrasing is slightly problematic, since it implies a person's
interests and rights somehow survive her death—an idea advocated by the proponents,
and rejected by the opponents, of posthumous harms.

By contrast, Feinberg and others argue for the possibility of posthumous harms.
Whilst I agree with their first claim—that a person can have interests in events that

will, and perhaps can only, take place after her death—it is their next claim that mak
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Feinberg's original argument is in 'Harm and Self-Interests', in Law, Morality and Society:
Essays in Honour of H. L. A. Hart, ed. P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz, Oxford University Press,
N e w York, 1977, pp. 299-308. He later revises his argument in Harm to Others, pp. 79-95.

58 For example, W. J. Waluchow, 'Feinberg's Theory of Posthumous Harms', Dialogue, vo
1986, pp. 727-735.
59 For example, J. Callahan, 'On Harming the Dead', Ethics, 97, 1987, pp. 341-352.
60 Belliotti, 'Do Dead Human Beings Have Rights?', p. 201.

99
such arguments problematic. That claim is that if any of a person's interests relating to
things that m a y happen after her death are thwarted after she has died, then that person
has been harmed. This claim give rise to the following dilemma: either a person's
interests can in s o m e sense survive her death—which raises the question of whose
interests they are w h e n they are thwarted—or, as Feinberg contends, the person was
harmed whilst still alive by an event that occurred after they died.

In attempting to explain how a deceased person would be harmed if interests she had
whilst alive are s o m e h o w thwarted after her death, Feinberg invokes George Pitcher's
distinction between two ways a deceased person m a y be thought or spoken about:
either as the postmortem person (a buried and decomposing corpse), or as the
antemortem person (the person as she was before she died). According to Pitcher
' ... harming a person changes his condition for the worse',

and so '... the sense

in which an antemortem person is harmed by an unfortunate event after his death is
this: the occurrence of the event makes it true that during the time before the person's
death he was h a r m e d — h a r m e d in that the unfortunate event was going to happen'.

Feinberg clarifies Pitcher's explanation with the following example. A person would
be harmed if, shortly after his death, the insurance company where he established a
trust fund for his children goes bankrupt. His interest in providing for his children,
however, w a s not thwarted when the company collapsed but rather he was in a harmed
condition from the time he started the trust fund—it is just that the harm only becomes
apparent after the insurance company collapses. According to Feinberg, from the time
the person m a d e the investment, he was 'playing a losing game, betting a substantial
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G. Pitcher, 'The Misfortunes of the Dead', American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 2,
1984, p. 185.
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component of his o w n good on a d o o m e d cause'.

Feinberg is more precise than

Pitcher in pin-pointing when a person may be harmed by a posthumous event.

Specifically, the person was in a harmed condition from the time he gained the releva
interest that was subsequently thwarted by an event occurring after his death.64

Although I agree with Feinberg, that a person may have interests in events that will
happen after her death, I also agree with Partridge that ' ... the relation "P has an

interest in Y" cannot survive the death of the interest bearer—the relatum "P"'65. Thi
means that all of a person's interests, including those concerning events that will
happen after her death, cease to exist when she does. A distinction needs to be made,

though, between an interest, which is contingent on there being an interest-bearer, an
the object of an interest, which could still be brought about even though there is no

longer an interest-bearer. For example, when I request an inter-library loan I have an
interest in a particular book coming to the library, so I can borrow it. If, however,

decide I no longer need the book before it arrives, I would no longer have that inter

It is, though, still possible for the book to arrive at the library because of my req
and so the object of my (now former) interest would have been brought about.

Similarly with a person's interests concerning events that will happen after her deat
her children could continue to prosper, or her book may be published, even though her
interests in such things will cease to exist when she does.

63

Feinberg, Harm to Others, p. 92.

64 According to Feinberg, when a person is in a harmed condition he '... may or may not be in a
harmful condition, depending on whether it has itself the tendency to generate further harm',
Feinberg, p. 31. W h a t Feinberg seems to have in mind is that those events which m a y cause
immediate minimal harm or even discomfort but do not have any long term consequences and
only cause a person to be in a harmed condition, rather than being (significantly) harmed.
65 Partridge, 'Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect', p. 248.
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In light of the above example, it m a y be objected that once an interest ceases to be an
interest, either because the interest-bearer no longer has the relevant concern or has

died, then there is no reason for the object of that interest to be brought about. Afte

all, it is merely because a procedure was in process that the library book still arriv
despite my no longer wanting it. The analogy between this reconsidered interest and a
person's interests in events that will happen after her death breaks down precisely

because in the second case the person retained the interest until her death. Specifica
part of the content of that interest is that the relevant events or whatever do occur

her death, and moreover the person continued to have that interest until the time of he
death, and (unlike the inter-library loan example) had no reason to reconsider her
interest. So a person does not 'lose' such an interest in the same way that a person
would lose an interest when she was alive. The moral imperatives for bringing the
object of such interests about was because, first, it was part the interest that the

relevant event that place after her death, and, second, the person continued to have t
interest up till the time she died.

Even though a person's directives relating to events that will occur after her death m

be morally significant, she necessarily relies on other people to ensure such directiv
are carried out. Some directives are legally recognised and so in some instances
adherence to them is enforced, the most obvious being the disposition of a person's
property according to her will. Such directives are not, however, absolute since, for
example, a person's will may be challenged and, in some instances, overridden. Other
directives a person may give are more informal, such as making a request of family

members or friends. Due to the informal nature of these types of directives, the person
relies wholly on the goodwill of others for them to be carried out.
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Even if she gave no explicit directive, it m a y be assumed that a person had an interest
in a particular event occurring after her death. For example, if a person died
unexpectedly prior to sending the final version of a manuscript to a publisher or
completing a business venture, then it would be reasonable to assume she had an

interest in such events occurring. That interest may not have been explicit, but if a
person had known she was going to die prior to completing a major project, she
probably would have wanted it to be completed, and moreover made it known that this
was what she wanted. Further, the completion of such projects would be one of those
events that, although happening after a person's death, in some sense completes her
life. The nature of a person's interests in events that will happen after her death

require other people to be involved in the realisation of those interests, for exampl
adhering to directives or completing an outstanding project. Such involvement, I

suggest, is not supererogatory but rather is one manifestation of respecting deceased
persons.

iii. Adhering to a Deceased Person's Directives Concerning Her Body Parts

Although a person's interests in events that will happen after her death may be

significant, the only involvement she can have in bringing about such interests is to

give the relevant directives prior to her death. Someone else has to act in accord wi
those directives and so needs a reason for doing so. I suggest the reason is out of
respect for the person who once was.

Just because a person no longer exists, and so cannot be harmed, this does not mean
that she can no longer be respected. There are a variety of reasons why a deceased
person may be respected: for example, because of her character, for her achievements

and because of events that take place after her death which she had been instrumental
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in bringing about. Respecting a person after her death is an act of recognition of her
achievements, and the life she had lived, and signals that a person's death does not
eliminate all there is about that person. Further, it is still possible to recognise a
person as having been self-determining and to make a deceased person's previous
ends one's own, specifically by adhering to any directives she may have given to
concerning events being that will occur after her death.

Hence, failing to adhere to a deceased person's prior directives is a failure to respec
the person who once was. Specifically, it is a failure to acknowledge the type of
person she was and what was important about her life both to her and others. It may
be objected that whilst these various acts of respect for the deceased persons are
admirable, there is no moral imperative to exhibit such respect in the absence of
something akin to the possibility of posthumous harms. I have argued, though, that
there are significant moral reasons for respecting deceased persons, for example, by

adhering to the directives that a person gave prior to her death. The purpose of at lea
some of these directives would be to ensure consistency between significant aspect of
a person's life. Moreover, it is particularly important that events at the end of a

person's life, or after her death, are consistent with her values and beliefs, since t
events may in some sense complete that person's life.

There are, though, limitations on how much a person deemed responsible for carrying
out a deceased person's prior directives has to do. Generally, the limitations on
adhering to a particular directive are determined by what the request was, what is
required for the request to be fulfilled, and whether the designated person has the
necessary resources or skills to do so. So, for example, the completion of a deceased
person's outstanding project is contingent on whether the person has the skills or
resources, how much effort would be involved and what sacrifices he would have to
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make, as well as the nature of the project. O n e general guideline m a y be that those
directives that are minimally burdensome should be adhered to out of respect for the
person w h o once was.

Some of a deceased person's prior directives concerning the treatment of her body
parts may be too burdensome, for example distributing individual strands of hair to
specified people around the world, and so no one would be obliged to carry them out.
Another reason for not carrying out such directives would be if doing so utilised too
many of society's resources, for example a person's directive that her various body
parts be kept viable in case her children ever need replacement organs.66 When the
content of a person's directives concerning the treatment of her body parts after her
death do not contravene public health standards, are within that relevant cultural
constraints, and do not make unreasonable demands, then they should be carried out.

Typically, a person's directives in relation to the treatment of her body part after her

death will either relate to the manner of their disposal or give permission for them to b
used for transplantation or experimentation. Such directives would pose a minimal, if
indeed any, burden on those deemed responsible for carrying them out. Moreover,

given the possible significance of such directives, that little effort is required to br
about their fulfilment would presumably provide an additional incentive for adhering to
them. That is, as well as it being important for such directives to be adhered to,
typically there is no burden in doing so.

What implications does this have for practice? Recall my central concern in this
chapter has been to argue against the use of parts from the body of a deceased person

66 Even if the person provided the means to finance such a request, utilising the necessary resources
which are scarce in this way may still be considered wasteful.
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in ways other than that the person wanted, or in ways she m a y have objected to. This
possibility of misuse arises for at least two reasons. First, parts from cadavers can
used to save or improve other people's lives. I have argued that meeting the needs of
the living does not justify using parts from a cadaver in ways that would be contrary
to, or ignores, the prior directives of the deceased person, whose body the cadaver
once was. To do so would be to devalue both the life of that person and perhaps
human life generally, since it would devalue not only the person's directives but also
the values and beliefs on which they were based. In practice, though, there would be
few instances of a deceased person's prior directives concerning the treatment of her
body parts being disregarded or overridden in this way. This is typically prevented by
the current organ procurement policies which require that a person had consented, or
least not objected, to her body parts being used for transplantation after her death.

Rather it is the involvement of the deceased person's relatives that is the second, and
more probable, reason why the deceased person's prior directives concerning the
treatment of her body parts may be ignored or overridden.

It is the deceased person's relatives who are usually deemed responsible for carrying
out that person's prior directives. This is because determining what happens to the
cadaver has been deemed the legal, and moral, responsibility of the family. This is
because the family is ' ... the basic social group and the one containing those with
whom the deceased had the closest natural bonds ... [and this creates] ... natural

bonds of familial piety, of fidelity to promises made to the deceased and reverence for
him and his memory'.67 For this reason ' ... the right of the deceased to dispose of

his cadaver is equivalent to the obligations of the next of kin (to honour their prom

67

Quay, 'Utilising the Bodies of the Dead', p. 901.

106
and to s h o w familial reverence and piety) conjoined with the indirect duty that binds
society (to see that the survivors are free to meet those obligations)'.68

As discussed in chapter two, even though current organ procurement policies do not
require consultation with the deceased person's relatives, their wishes and preferences
may determine how that person's body parts are treated. Whilst in the majority of
instances this would probably result in the deceased person's directives being adhered

to, where the wishes of her relatives are at odds with those directives, it is the wishes
of the relatives that usually prevail. Despite a common perception to the contrary,
perhaps inadvertently encouraged by routinely consulting the relatives, the '... next
of kin are not free to simply deal with the cadaver in accord with their own desires'.69
Rather, because of the nature and significance of such directives the relatives have a
duty to carry out the deceased person's directives relating to the treatment of her body
parts after her death, as part of their 'intrafamilial obligations to the deceased'.70

At the same time, though, in meeting their obligations the relatives are not obliged to
forgo their own beliefs, since ' ... the decedent cannot require ... a positive act by
7 1

his next of kin of which they cannot approve'.

This would suggest a person's

directives concerning the treatment of her body parts after her death would only be

carried out if the relatives agreed with or, at least, did not object to them. The relat

are, however, "... obliged to tolerate those who are willing to carry out the act he [the
decedent] prescribed'.72 Further, even in situations where a person has not given any

68 Quay, p. 906.
69 Quay, p. 906.
70 Quay, p. 906.
71 Quay, p. 909.
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directives, it is not up to the relatives to determine h o w the deceased person's body
parts will be treated. Rather, it should be discerned from what is k n o w n about the
deceased person—for example her religious beliefs or whether she had been an
altruistic person—what she would have wanted, and where possible her body parts
should be treated accordingly. The relatives will be an, if not the most, important
source of evidence on this matter, but this role need to be distinguished from giving
the relatives' o w n beliefs and values a determining role in what happens to the
deceased person's body parts.

In this section I have rejected various explanations for the prescriptions and
prohibitions relating to deceased persons and their outstanding affairs as either
incomplete or problematic, and suggested an alternative justification based on the
principle of respect for persons. W h e n this principle is invoked in this context, it is
the person w h o once was w h o is being respected. There are m a n y manifestation of
such respect, ranging from not slandering a deceased person to completing her
outstanding projects. M y main focus has been on a deceased person's prior directives
concerning events that will happen after her death, specifically those in relation to the
treatment of her body parts. Despite the possibility of using parts from cadavers in
other ways, I argued there are important reasons w h y such directives should be
adhered to, and, further, in the absence of such directives, that it should be discerned
from what was k n o w n about that person h o w she would have wanted her body parts
treated.

CONCLUSION

On reflection, the suggestion that deceased persons be included within the scope of th
principle of respect for persons is not particularly novel or strange. There is,

72 Quay, p. 909.
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however, m o r e to respecting deceased persons than simply treating the cadaver with
respect and dignity. A person may give directives that are to be, and perhaps can only
be, carried out after her death. At least some of these directives are given to ensure

events that relate to her life but occur at the end of her life, or after her death, are
consistent with her values and beliefs and other significant aspects of her life.

Adhering to such directives is to act in accord with the principle of respect for person
specifically to respect the person who once was.

The directives a person may give relating to how her body parts should be treated may,
however, be overridden. This is because there is uncertainty about the nature of the
relationship between a person and her body parts. As suggested at the end of chapter

two, there is a need to clarify the nature and significance of the relationship between
person and her body parts in order to address the discrepancies between organ
procurement policies and what happens in practice. More importantly, this

clarification is needed to ensure recognition of a person's prerogatives relating to he
body parts, and that where she exercises these prerogatives, her body parts are treated
accordingly. It is my contention that this clarification will be achieved if it is
recognised that a person owns her body parts. A conceptual defence and moral
argument (incorporating the arguments given in this and the previous chapters)
supporting this proposal will be given in chapters five and six respectively.

CHAPTER FIVE
A CONCEPTUAL DEFENCE OF THE
OWNERSHIP OF H U M A N B O D Y PARTS

David Peters suggests many of the decisions a person may make regarding her body
and its parts involve her exercising property rights over them, and although some of
these rights '... m a y not intelligibly apply to the relationship of a person to his or her
body ... enough do apply to warrant the claim that a person's body or parts is (are)
that person's property in an important sense'.1 Peters' project is not unlike m y own,
in that he argues '[something else must be added to an autonomous decision ... [in
relation to the treatment of body parts] ... before such a decision can c o m m a n d first
authority'.2 M y claim is, however, stronger than Peters': that in order to ensure
recognition of a person's prerogatives to determine what happens to her body parts she
should be recognised as the owner of her body parts.

In this chapter I defend the conceptual possibility of a person's owning her body par
In the first section I determine which, if any, of various property systems has rules
suitable for governing access to and control of human body parts. The property
system identified as being the most appropriate will be examined more closely in the
second section. And, in the third section, I give two further arguments to strengthen
m y conceptual defence of a person's owning her body parts.

SECTION I: PROPERTY SYSTEMS AND HUMAN BODY PARTS

According to the legal theorist A. M. Honore, '[o]wnership is one of the characterist
institutions of h u m a n society. A people to w h o m ownership was unknown, or w h o

1 D. A. Peters, 'Protecting Autonomy in Organ Procurement Procedures: Some Overlooked
Issues', The Milbank Quarterly, vol. 64, no. 2, 1986, p. 253.
2

Peters, p. 252.
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accorded it a minor place in their arrangements ... would live in a world that is not our
world'.3 Perhaps, because the concept of ownership is so central to our society, few
people "... pause to ask w h y anyone should be thought to o w n anything at all, w h y
property of any kind is desirable, or on what grounds they should assert their
entitlement to what they call "their own".'4 Yet whenever these, or any one of
numerous other, questions about the concept of ownership are asked, its complexity
quickly becomes apparent. Also, m a n y of the issues that arise in such discussions are
themselves perplexing and have generated m u c h debate. Further, '[t]he focus of
explanatory and normative discussions ... [of ownership] ... varies according to the
sort of inquiry on which a writer is engaged'.5

That is, historians, lawyers,

economists and political scientists, as well as philosophers, have all developed theories
of ownership approaching the debate from different theoretical positions and focussing
on different issues. M y purpose in discussing the concept of 'ownership', and related
concepts such as 'property' and 'property rights', is as background for a conceptual
defence of the possibility of a person's owning her body parts. In this and the
following section I address two broad questions. First, which property system has
rules which could conceptually govern access to and control of h u m a n body parts?
And, second, is it conceptually possible for a person to exercise any of the rights of
the most appropriate of these systems over her body or its parts?

i. Different Property Systems

According to Waldron, a property system is '... a system of rules governing access
to and control of material resources ... [which are] ... material objects[s] capable of

3

A. M . Honore, 'Ownership', in Oxford Essays of Jurisprudence, ed. A. G. Guest, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1961, p. 107.

4 A. Reeve, Property, MacMillian, Baskingstoke, 1986, p. 4.
5 Reeve, p. 9.
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satisfying s o m e h u m a n need or wants'.6 These rules determine w h o can use a
particular material object, under what conditions and, to some extent, for what
purpose, although wider considerations such as the nature of the object and general
rules of behaviour are also relevant. Further Waldron and others have suggested that
property rules do not govern the relationship between persons and the material
resources over which they seek to have control, but rather govern relations between
persons with respect to those resources.7

Waldron argues that each of the three property systems he identifies has an 'organisin
idea' which '... serves as an essential point of reference by which the operation of
these systems of very detailed and complicated rules is to be understood'.8 Without

such an idea '[e] very one would need to become a legal expert to determine at any poi

what he could or could not do in relation to the resources he came across'.9 People are
not, however, always making decisions about which particular resources they may
have access to or use. Rather, the organising idea of the relevant property system,

along with aspects of a society's legal systems, enables a person to ' ... negotiate h
way through the complex web of property relationships that structure his social
universe without even perceiving a need for expert guidance'.10 Waldron claims the
organising idea of a property system provides the main basis for members of a society
to '... learn to apply the property rules of the society [and in any] given property

6

J Waldron, The Right to Private Property, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, p. 31. Waldron does
not claim that only material objects can be property, but argues it is easier to sort out the more
basic questions concerning property in relation to material objects rather than incorporeal ones.

7 Waldron pp. 27-29; Reeve, Property, pp. 6-7.
8 Waldron, p. 42.
9 Waldron, p. 42.
10 B. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1977,
p. 33 (cited in Waldron, The Right to Private Property, p. 43).
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system m a y be important for its legitimation'.11 O n e function, perhaps the most
important one, of the organising idea of a property system is to deal with the problem

of the allocation of resources, although in each property system Waldron identifies the
potential for this problem remains.

In a system of collective property "... the problem of allocation is solved by a social

rule that the use of material resources is to be determined by reference to the collec
interests of society as a whole'.12 In such a system ' ... material resources are
answerable to the needs and purposes of a society as a whole, whatever they are and
however they are determined ... [and so] ... [n]o individual has such an intimate
association with an object that he can make decisions about its use without reference
the interests of the collective'.13 It has been suggested collective property could be
viewed as a type of ownership, where the state 'owns' those things (for example,
water and energy sources) to which all members of a society need access. However,
as indicated below, such an idea seems contrary to the usual sense of ownership.

Although superficially similar to collective property systems, under a system of

common property, the collective interest of a society has no special status. Rather, th

organising idea of this type of property system is that'... each resource is in princip
available for the use of every member of society ... [where] ... the needs and wants
of every person are considered, and when allocative decisions are made they are made
on a basis that is in some sense fair to all'.14 Waldron argues there is no society

11 Waldron, p. 43.
12 Waldron, p. 40.
13 Waldron, p. 40.
14 Waldron, p. 41.
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where a collective property system dominates. Rather in m a n y societies, the allocation
of those resources that all members of the society are entitled to have access to, for
example public parks, accords with the organising idea of a common property system.

Such resources are not often referred to as being the 'property' of those who choose to
make use of them. Rather, they are resources held in common. This may in part

explain why the question about the fairness of resource allocation also arises in rela
to a common property system, particularly in relation to finite resources or those
resources that cannot be used simultaneously by everyone who wishes to do so.

The organising idea of both a collective and a common property system specifically
seels to address the problems of, and provide a rationale for, the allocation of those
resources to which two or more people may need access. Since excised human body
parts or parts from cadavers can be appropriately regarded as resources, and further
are in short supply but high demand, then perhaps they should be regarded as either
common or collective property. I argue below, though, that the rules of either
property system are inappropriate to govern access to and control of human body
parts. Prior to this, I will briefly describe the third property system identified by
Waldron.

The organising idea of a private property system is that material resources are separa

objects, each assigned and belonging to specific individuals. This correlation between
individual persons and material resources is used as a basis for the allocation of
resources, and, further, is upheld by rules and regulations of the society. These
aspects of a private property system are captured by the concept of 'ownership' which,
as Waldron points outs, is ' ... peculiar to systems of private
property ... [and] ... the owner of a resource is simply the individual whose
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determination as to the use of the resource is taken as final in any state of this kind'.15
This makes the suggestion mentioned above—that the state 'owns' those resources
governed by the rules of a collective property system—misleading. It may be asked,
though, '[w]hy should one individual be put in a privileged position with regard to a
given resource.'16 This is one of the central questions any justification of a private
property system has to address.

In most societies, two, if not all three, property systems operate, though one usually
dominates, and, Waldron argues, that system is determined by the society's dominant
ideology. The property system relevant in any particular instance of allocation and
control of a resource partially depends on the nature of that resource. Within many
western societies, for example, personal belongings are usually governed by the rules
of a private property systems; natural resources needed for public utilities such as

water and energy, by the rules of a collective property system; and recreation faciliti
such as public parks and swimming pools, by the rules of a common property system.
In such societies a private property system dominates, and I argue below that such a
system should also govern access to and control of human body parts.

ii. Which Property System is Applicable to Human Body Parts?

As mentioned above, the nature and use of an object partially determines which
property systems governs access to and control of that object. In determining which

property system's rules are conceptually appropriate to govern access to and control of
human body parts, I focus specifically on the use of excised body parts removed for

15 Waldron, p. 39.
16 Waldron, p. 39 (author's emphasis).
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experimentation, and the use of parts from cadavers for transplantation. W h e n human
body parts are used in either of these ways they can be sensibly viewed as resources
which are potentially useful to more than one person. So, theoretically, the rules of
any of the above three property systems could govern access to and control of them.

Under a collective property system, access to and control of body parts would be
determined by reference to the needs of a society. This seems to be the suggestion of
the US Federal Task Force on Organ Transplantation in its final report, where it states
that 'donated organs should be considered a national resource to be used for the public
good'.17 In response to this report James Childress identifies some unresolved
ambiguities about 'collectively' owning body parts made available for transplantation,
particularly in relation to allocation and distribution.18 In addition, when a human
body part is made available for transplantation, it is difficult to understand what

reference could be made to the 'collective interest', since there are only a small numb

of potential beneficiaries, and ultimately, only one person will benefit from the use o

that body part, and then only if the transplant is successful. In that event, the recipi
would be granted exclusive access to and control of that part, so that other people
would be excluded from using it. The rules of a collective property system, however,
may seem more appropriate if human body parts are donated for experimental
purposes, since the benefits of such purposes are easier to relate to the collective
interest.

17

Task Force on Organ Transplantation, Organ Transplantation Issues and Recommendations,
Washington, D C : U.S. Department of Health and H u m a n Services, 1986 (cited in see J. F.
Childress, 'Ethical Criteria for Procuring and Distributing Organs for Transplantation', Journal of
Health Politics, Policy and Law, vol. 14, no. 1, 1989, p 103).

18

See Childress, p. 103.
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The U S Task Force endorsed the current voluntary donation procurement policy, and
thus their proposal is limited to donated organs being 'collectively owned'. If this
proposal were widened so that excised body parts suitable for experimentation were
also collectively owned, then the status of the body parts after being removed from a
person's body but before that person has consented to any use of that part would still
need to be addressed. Moreover, this is one of the circumstances I have previously
identified as involving uncertainty about the relationship between a person and her
body parts.

The organising idea of a common property system makes no reference to the collective
interest, rather, each individual has equivalent access to the available resources.
Decisions of allocation are made by evaluating and comparing the needs of each
individual, and so this property system may seem more appropriate for governing
access to and control of body parts available for transplantation. Problems of
allocation would still arise, however, since if more than one person needs a particular
body part then they could all have the equal claims to it.19 Further, the organising idea
of a common property system only becomes applicable once a person's body part(s)

has been removed, since it is only then the part may be of potential use to other people.
Therefore, the same issues concerning the status of body parts after being removed but
before the person has consented to that part being used would also remain unresolved
if a common property system were deemed suitable for governing access to and
control of human body parts.

19 This may not necessarily be the case, since one person may desperately need the replacement
body part whilst for another person the replacement may be desirable but not necessary.
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It could be argued that w h e n body parts are still part of a particular person's body they
are not resources that could be used by another person,20 and so access to and control
of such parts does not need to be governed by the rules of any property system. There
is, though, a clear correlation between a particular person and particular body parts,
and since such a correlation is the defining feature of a private property system, this
indicates it might be fruitful to investigate whether the rules of that system would be
appropriate for governing access to and controlling the use of human body parts.

The particular rules of a private property system, and whether it is conceptually
possible for a person to exercise these over her body parts, will be the focus for the
remainder of this chapter. It is worth noting here, though, that because such rules
could conceivably continue to govern access to and control of a person's excised body
parts, then this may mean she could make various determinations in relation to any of
her body parts removed for therapeutic reasons. Further, if the rules of a private
property system govern access and control to a person's body parts when still part of
her body, then because some of those rules are concerned with the disposition of a
person's property after death, she could make determinations as to how her body parts
should be treated after her death. The relevant property rights a person would need to
have over her body parts to make such determinations will be identified below.
Suffice to say that the organising idea of a private property system seems the most
appropriate for governing access to and control of a person's body parts, both when
still part of her body and prior to her relinquishing them.

20 Although other people may benefit from the way a person uses her body parts.
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S E C T I O N II: O W N E R S H I P , B O D I E S A N D B O D Y

PARTS

Waldron distinguishes the concept of ownership in a private property system, which is
concerned with there being 'a correlation between individual names and particular

objects',21 from conceptions of ownership, which are '[t]he rules of real or postulated

legal systems assigning rights, liberties, powers, immunities and liabilities to people
regard to particular resources'.22 So, it is the conception rather than the concept of
ownership that is relevant when determining whether a person owns an object. Whilst
conceptions of ownership have normative force, my concern here is to determine

whether it is conceptually possible for a person's having the various rights, liberties
powers, immunities and liabilities assigned by the rules of a private property system
over her body and or its parts. The further question of why a person should be
recognised as the owner of her body parts will be addressed in the following chapter.

In his account of the '"liberal" concept of "full" ownership',23 Honore offers the

following provisional definition of ownership: 'the greatest possible interest in a th
which a mature system of law recognises'.24 He argues, though, that the
'... common features transcending particular systems'25 are worth identifying and,

for this reason, compiles a list of the standard incidents of ownership. He claims the
' ... may be regarded as necessary ingredients in the notion of ownership ... [but]
are not individually necessary, though they may be together sufficient'.26 The

21

Waldron, p. 52.

22 Waldron, p. 52.
23 Honore,'Ownership', p. 110.
24 Honore, p. 108.
25 Honore, p. 108.
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individual incidents Honore identifies are ' ... the right to possess, the right to use,
the right to manage, the right to the income, the right to the capital, the right to
security, the incidents of transmissibility and absence of term, the prohibition of
harmful use, liability to execution, and the incident of residuarity'.27 Whilst he
acknowledges there are other ways of classifying them,28 Honore argues these
incidents also demonstrate that"... the owner is subject to characteristic prohibitions
and limitations ... '29, contrary to other analyses, which give the impression that
being the owner of an object simply entails having rights over it.

It is beyond the scope of this discussion to provide a justification for using Honore's
classification of the constitutive features of ownership rather than one of the many

others.30 Suffice to say that property theorists from various disciplines have described
Honore's incidents as one of the more comprehensive classifications, and as being
both lucid and helpful.31 For example, Waldron endorses Honore's incidents as a list
of the ' ... common features ... [of ownership] ... in ordinary "uncomplicated"
cases'32 within a private property system. The following description of each incident

26 Honore, p. 112.
27 Honore, p. 113.
28 Perhaps the most common characterisation of the constitutive features of ownership is as
'property rights'. See Honore, p. 113.
29 Honore,'Ownership', p. 113.
30 For an alternative characterisation, see G. Calabresi & A. D. Melamed, 'Property Rules,
Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral', Harvard Law Review, vol. 85,
no. 6, 1972, pp. 1089-1128.
31 See, for example, L. Becker, Property Rights: Philosophical Foundations, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, London, 1977, p. 18; Reeve, Property, p. 14; A. Ryan, Property, Open University Press,
Milton Keynes, 1987, pp. 53-54; and S. Munzer, A Theory of Property, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 22-28.
32 Waldron, The Right to Private Property, p. 49. Waldron does take issue with one of Honore's
incidents'- namely the prohibition of harmful use-which, as previously indicated, he would
describe as a general background constraint rather than a detailed property rule.
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pertains to its general function, though, for s o m e objects particular incidents will
operate in slightly different ways.

i. Honore's Standard Incidents of Ownership

The right to possess, which Honore suggests is "... the foundation on which the
whole superstructure of ownership rests',33 has two aspects: "... the right ... to be

put in exclusive control of the thing and the right to remain in control'.34 The inciden
of the right to use may be interpreted narrowly (as the owner's personal use and
enjoyment of an object) or widely (to include two other incidents, the right to manage
and the right to the income). Someone has the right to manage an object when he has
'... the right to decide how and by whom the thing owned shall be used'.35 According
to Honore, the simplest way of deriving income from a thing is to use or occupy that
thing, but usually deriving income from an object involves the owner '... forgoing
personal use of a thing and allowing others to use it for reward'.36 The right to the
capital ' ... consists in the power to alienate the thing and the liberty to consume,
waste or destroy it'.37 The power to alienate may be further '... subdivided into the
power to make a valid disposition of the thing and the power to transfer the holder's

title ... to it'.38 The incident of transmissibility is concerned with the power to devis
or bequeath the thing owned, and is usually confined to posthumous bequests.39 All

33 Honore, 'Ownership', p. 113.
34 Honore, p. 113.
35 Honore,'Ownership', p. 116.
36 Honore, p. 117.
37 Honore, p. 118.

38 Honore, p. 118. Honore specifically mentions gifts and other modes of transfer in thi
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of the above incidents, and, more generally, any of a person's actions with respect to a
thing he owns, are '... subject to the condition that uses harmful to other members of

society are forbidden'.40 This, in general terms, is the incident of the prohibition of
harmful use.

The remaining incidents are not concerned with what a person is permitted to do with
or to an object he owns, but rather whether there are any limitations on a person
exercising the incidents discussed above. If someone has the right to security in an
object, he can ' ... look forward to remaining owner indefinitely, if he so chooses
and he remains solvent'.41 The incident of absence of term refers to the type of
(ownership) interest the owner has in an object: determinate, indeterminate or
determinable. Someone has a determinate interest for a limited time, whereas
indeterminate interests have no such limit.42 A determinable interest is one where
1

... the present holder [owner] may lose his [ownership] interest in certain events'.

Liability of execution allows things a person owns to be taken away from him in lieu
of paying of his debts. Finally, the right of residuary determines what happens to the

39

It has been suggested by some authors that the power of transmissibility is required for any
transfer of goods. Honore seems to suggest that the power of transmissibility is only required
for posthumous bequests and other ways of transferring goods are forms of alienation, which is
an aspect of the right to the capital.

40 Honore, p. 123.
41 Honore, p. 119.
42 Honore's discussion indicates the difficult of making sense of a person having an indeterminate
interest due to their mortality. At one point he suggests that if a person has the power of
transmissibility over an object then she would have an indeterminate interest in it, but elsewhere
he says that '[o]n inspection it will be found that what I have called indeterminate interest are
determinable', since all of a person's interests m a y be lost in certain events, thefinalevent being
w h e n a person death. Honore, p. 122.
43 Honore, p. 122. Honore suggests that most determinate interests are in fact determinable since
an interest in a thing m a y be lost in certain circumstances or when the person dies.
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other incidents ownership after they lapse under some arrangement, such as in a
leasing agreement.

A person need not have all of the incidents of ownership in relation to an object in
order to own it. Conversely, a person could have many of the incidents over an object
without owning it. Further, under some arrangements, two or more persons may have
different incidents of ownership over the same object. For example, under a tenancy
agreement, a tenant has the rights to possess and use as well as some rights to manage
the property for the duration of the lease. The landlord has the rights to the income
from, security in, and a residuary right over her property, as well as other rights to
manage which she may relinquish to an agent. Although the landlord is the owner of

the property, the property would probably be identified as the tenant's in the everyda
sense of being a particular person's to use.

As mentioned above, the different constitutive features of ownership determine what it
is possible for a person to do with a particular thing. When a person has all the

incidents of ownership in relation to an object then there are quite a few things he is
permitted to do with or to that object. Conversely, if a person only has a few of the

incidents over an object then what he could do with or to that object would be limited.
For example, if a person has the rights to possess, use, and manage, but not the right
to the capital in an object, then he owns the object in a restricted sense—namely, he
cannot relinquish possession of the object. In other circumstances, a person may own

an object but the means by which it is possible for him to alienate it may be restrict
More generally, there are always restrictions on what a person is permitted to do with
objects he own.
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I have only provided a cursory description of the standard incidents of ownership.
Much more has been said on the individual incidents and their interrelation. Further,
Honore's incidents may be compared with other lists of the constitutive features of
ownership for accuracy or completeness. Nevertheless, this brief description of the

individual incidents is sufficient to determine whether if is conceptually possible for
person to have some, or all, of the standard incidents of ownership over her body or
its parts.

ii. Incidents of Ownership Over Bodies and Body Parts

Given the fundamental importance of a person's body and its parts, it is difficult to s
who other than that person would have the greatest interest in a whole intact live body
and, similarly, in her body parts when still part of her body. Some possible
contenders for having such an interest may be that person's owner, if she were a
slave, or her employer. In relation to body parts someone in need of a transplantation
or transfusion might have a strong interest in a healthy person's body parts. Yet, even
in these circumstances, until the person agrees to her body being used in a way that

benefits others, or relinquishes the relevant body part, that person would still have t

strongest claim to that part, in the sense of having the most defensible claim. Also, as

argued in chapter three, a person may have a significant interest in her body parts aft
they have been removed, on the basis that she continues to identify with that part.
Hence, on Honore's provisional definition of ownership—as the greatest possible
interest in a thing—a person would own her whole intact body, and her body parts,
both when in situ and after having been removed.

Nevertheless, to talk of a person owning her body parts is at odds with the usual
understanding of the relationship between a person and her body parts, and both
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conceptual or moral objections have been m a d e to this and similar proposals. In

chapter seven I respond to the moral concerns. Here I argue it is at least conceptually
possible for a person to exercise many incidents of ownership over her body and its
parts, although it is worth noting at the outset that in practice a person would only
exercise a few of these incidents.

Those incidents of ownership it seems conceptually possible for a person to exercise

over her body are the right to possess, which consists of an exclusive right to control
and the right of non-interference, a right to use, and a right to security. Also, the
incident of prohibition of harmful use also applies to the body, as there are, for
example, laws against assault. As discussed in the previous chapter, a person may
give directives concerning the treatment of her body after her death, and such

directives could be described as her exercising the power of transmissibility over her
body. Given it is conceptually possible for a person to exercise this power over her
body, she would then have a determinable interest in them, where the relevant event
causing the person to lose that interest would be her death.

Likewise, it is conceptually possible for a person to exercise some incidents over her
body parts. There is, however, an added complication. Since it is possible for a

person to have body parts removed and remain alive, it is conceptually possible for her
to exercise various incidents of ownership over her body parts after they have been
removed, as well as when they are part of her body. Prior to its removal, it is

conceptually possible for a person to have the rights to possess and use, as well as th
incident of transmissibility, over body parts. In addition, some of the more
contentious suggestions made in the debate about how to increase the number of body

parts available for transplantation, such as the payment of debts by selling blood or a
kidney, suggests a person could conceivably have a liability of execution over her
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body parts.44 Finally, it could be argued a person has determinable interest in her
body parts, since the person could lose that interest w h e n she has her body part
removed or w h e n she dies.

It may initially seem conceptually problematic for a person to exercise other incident
of ownership over her body or its parts; however, in particular contexts they could be
exercised. A person could exercise the right to manage her body by determining h o w
it could be used, and perhaps by determining w h o uses her body—for example, by
undertaking forms of employment involving physical activity, or consenting to
experiments being performed on her body. Whilst it is not clear h o w a person would
exercise the right to manage her body parts when still part of her body, once removed
there is no conceptual problem with a person's determining h o w parts will be used and
by w h o m . For example, acts of living organ donation or designated organ donation
on death involve a person's specifying w h o should use her body parts. Also, a person
m a y place restrictions on the use a part of her body removed for therapeutic reasons.

In the context of employment, it is conceptually possible for a person to exercise the
rights to the income and residuary over her whole body. If the right to the income of
the thing is understood as Honore characterises it (namely, as the right to the benefits
derived from forgoing personal use of a thing and allowing others to use it), this could
be one possible interpretation of the employee-employer relationship, where a person
performs certain activities, some of which presumably involve the person using her
body in accord with a contract in return for payment. Similarly, if an employment
contract is described as a person's leasing out her body for a specified period, perhaps
for a certain number of hours each day, then the person's 'regaining' the use of her

44 See 'Pay your Debts with your Kidneys', Bioethics News, vol. 8, no. 2, 1988, p. 2.
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body, and associated incidents, at the end of each work period could be described as
the person exercising the right of residuary over her body.

Similarly, there are certain acts that could be described as the person's exercising th
incidents of the right to the income and residuary over her body parts. A person could
conceivably 'rent-out' a part from her body on the condition that under certain
circumstances she gets it back. For example, a person could 'rent-out' one of her

kidneys on the condition that if her other kidney failed she could get the 'rented' one

back. A variation on this suggestion would be to rent out the use of a. body part for a
limited period. This is one possible description of commercial surrogacy
arrangements, where a woman is paid for the use of her body, specifically her uterus
(but also provides the developing fetus with nutrients via her blood), for a definite
period, after which she regains the use of it.

The remaining incident is the right to the capital which, as mentioned above, can be
subdivided into the liberties to destroy, waste or consume, and the power to alienate.
A person committing suicide could be described as exercising her liberty to destroy or

power to alienate her body, although, as I argue in the next section, there is somethin
problematic about a person exercising the power to alienate over her whole body.

When a person goes on a diet, it could be said she is exercising her liberty to waste h
body, but it is not clear how a person would exercise the liberty to consume her whole
intact body. The opposite is true of body parts. There is nothing conceptually
incoherent about a person consuming her body parts, for example by chewing finger
nails, having hair cut, removing growths, but it is not clear how a person would waste
a part of her body, although alcohol abuse or smoking tobacco could be described as a
person wasting her liver or lungs respectively. Nor is there anything conceptually
problematic about a person exercising the power to alienate or liberty to destroy her

127
body parts, and, as will be discussed in the next section, it is these aspects of the right

to the capital that a person is in practice most likely to exercise over her body parts.

So whilst it is conceptually possible for a person to exercise many of the incidents of
ownership over her body and it parts, some incidents seem more readily applicable to
body parts than to whole intact bodies. Although this is contingent on what the
specific incidents of ownership are, this may mean body parts have more in common
with things which can be owned than do whole intact bodies. In addition, if a
person's exercising these incidents over her body parts is similar to the way a person
exercises them over things she does own, this provides further support for the
conceptual possibility of a person's owning her body parts. In the next section I
provide further arguments in support of these suggestions.

SECTION III: OWNING ALIENABLE BODY PARTS

Although a conceptual defence of a person's owning her body parts may be provided
by demonstrating it is possible for a person to exercise all the incidents of ownership
over her body parts, such a defence may take on a surreal character. There are two
reasons for this: first, it only makes sense for a person to exercise various incidents
ownership over her body or its parts in specific circumstances; and second, and more

pertinent, many of the descriptions of a person exercising particular incidents over he
body or its parts are unrealistic. In this section, I strengthen my conceptual defence
a person's owning her body parts by providing two further arguments in support of it.
First, I argue that a person's alienating her whole intact body differs in an important

respect to her alienating a part of her body, and that only the second case is really ak
to alienating an object a person owns. Second, I demonstrate that the determinations a
person may make concerning her body parts that I have focused on in this thesis—
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instructing that a body part removed for therapeutic reasons be used for experimental
purposes or alternatively that it be destroyed, and giving directives concerning the
treatment of her body parts after her death—can be re-described in terms of a person
exercising various incidents of ownership over her body parts. I argue this
strengthens m y defence of the conceptual possibility of a person's owning her body
parts.

i. Alienating Bodies and Alienating Body Parts

Although it is conceptually possible for a person to exercise the power to alienate ove
both her whole intact body and individual body parts, there is a marked difference in
these two instances of alienation with regard to their consequences. If a person
alienates her whole body, or any vital body parts, she commits suicide. It is possible
for a person to alienate some of her body parts and remain alive, although alienating
m a n y such parts would result in her becoming debilitated. The salient difference
between a person's alienating her whole body and (some of) her body parts which
needs to be examined further is the person's existence after the act of alienation.

One point on which those who have considered the question of whether a person owns
her body agree is that if she does o w n her body, it will be in a different sense to which
she o w n s alienable property.45 This is because the idea of a person's 'alienating' her
whole body misconstrues what is involved in an act of alienation. W h e n a person
alienates an object, she 'puts it away' from herself.46 But how could a person put her
body away from herself? Since h u m a n persons are necessarily e m b o d i e d — a person

45

C. S. Campbell, 'Body, Self and the Property Paradigm', Hastings Center Report, vol. 21, no. 5,
1992, pp. 35-37.

46 See A. Reeve, Property, p. 139.
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has to have a body in order to exist—a person's 'alienating' her whole intact body
amounts to her alienating at least part, albeit an essential part, of herself, which simply
does not m a k e sense on the above explanation of what it means for a person to alienate
something. Further, w h e n a person alienates an object, the previous relationship
between a person and an object has ended. However, w h e n a person alienates her
whole intact body, the relationship between the person and her body has not ended,
but rather the person has 'ended'. There is then something conceptually problematic
about describing acts of suicide in terms of alienation, since it is not possible for a
person to alienate her body in the w a y she does other objects or even parts of her

body.

Another aspect of the incident of the right to the capital—namely, the liberty to
destroy—seems to m o r e accurately capture what happens w h e n a person commits
suicide. Describing this act as a liberty conveys the idea of a person choosing to end
their life. At the same time, the results of a person exercising this liberty are at least
unusual if not drastic. That is, by exercising her liberty to destroy her body, 47 a
person foregos exercising any other liberties, or indeed doing anything at all. There is
then one similarity between a person's exercising her liberty to destroy her body and a
person exercising the liberty to sell herself into slavery, which, for the duration of the
'slavery-contract', would m e a n she foregoes the possibility of exercising most, if not
all, her other liberties. T h e difference between these two liberties, however, is that a
slave can regain her power to exercise other liberties, but a person's exercising her
liberty to destroy her body cannot.

47 One explanation of a person instructing that her body be cremated is as her exercising her liberty
to have her body destroyed.
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A person's exercising the power to alienate over any of her vital body parts would also
bring about her death, and so it may be argued that for the same reasons it seems odd
to say a person alienates her whole body, it does not make sense for a person to have
this aspect of the right to the capital over her vital body parts. As mentioned above,
there are other body parts over which a person can exercise the power to alienate and

remain alive. Further, even though it is conceptually possible for a person to exercise

all the incidents of ownership over her body parts, in practice it is because the parts
can be alienated that a person can exercise particular incidents in a greater variety
ways over her body parts than her whole intact body.

ii. Those Incidents a Person Would in Practice Exercise Over Her Body Parts

The final part of this chapter bridges the gap between the foregoing discussion, which
aimed to provide a conceptual defence of a person's owning her body parts, and the
moral argument why it should be recognised that a person owns her body parts, which

will be given in the next chapter. Here I argue that the various determinations a perso
may make in relation to her body parts I have been concerned with in previous
chapters can be re-described as a person's exercising various incidents of ownership

over that part, and, further, that these ways a person may treat her body parts are aki
to ways a person may treat other objects she owns.

Each of the three determinations a person may make in relation to her body parts
focussed on throughout this thesis—consenting to a part removed for therapeutic
reasons being used for experimental purposes, instructing that it be destroyed, or

giving directives as to how her body parts should be treated after her death—can be redescribed as a person's exercising various incidents of ownership over her body parts.
A person exercises aspects of the right to the capital over a part of her body removed
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for therapeutic reasons if she consents to its being used for experimental purposes or,

alternatively, gives instructions that the part be destroyed. In both cases she exerci

the power to alienate, and, in the second, she also exercises the liberty to destroy a
of her body. When a person gives permission for her body parts to be used for
transplantation purposes after her death, she exercises the incident of the power of
transmissibility over her body parts.

A person's giving permission for a part of her body removed for therapeutic reasons to
be used for experimental purposes is similar to some acts of donation. When a person
donates an object she divests herself of it, and transfers ownership of it. When a
person has a body part removed for therapeutic reasons, she usually divests herself of

it, although this is not done simply by having it removed, but rather by her consenting

to a particular use of that part. Further, by giving this consent she does more than j

divest herself of the body parts; she indicates that she wants it to be used in a part
way. This is similar to common acts of donation, such as giving money or goods to a
charity organisation, where there may be a designated, albeit a general, use for the
donated object. For example, if I give money to a disaster appeal, I expect it to be
used to help the victims of that disaster. Further, I would object to the money being
used in other ways, for example to invest on the short-term stock exchange.
Similarly, if a person consents to a part of her body being used for experimentation,
she would not expect, and would probably object to, it being used (say) as a prop in a
horror movie.

Acts of donation involve a person's both divesting himself of, and transferring
ownership, of an object. It is possible for a person to divest himself of something he
doesn't own, such as returning something he has borrowed. Also, if a person found
an abandoned object and gave it to another person it may seem she transfers ownership
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of that object, without first owning it herself. In such cases, though, ownership m a y
not be transferred. Rather, the person receiving the object has acquired and so comes
to own it, albeit through someone else's actions. Alternatively, even though a person
finding the abandoned object does not intend to keep it for herself, she does own it
until she gives it away, and so transfers ownership of it. Either way, it would seem

that prior to it being legally or morally acceptable for a person to transfer ownership
an object, either by donation or some other method, she would first have to own, or at
least have the strongest claim, to that object.

Whilst it is possible for a person to destroy an object she does not own, typically she

would own, or at least have the strongest claim to, that object. This is indicated by th
relevant right of ownership being a 'liberty'. There are at least two possible

interpretations of what it means for a person to be at liberty to do something. The firs
and weaker interpretation is that there are no impediments to her performing the
relevant actions whereas the second, stronger, interpretation is that a person has a
prerogative to do that thing. Whilst either interpretation could describe a person
exercising her liberty to destroy objects-including her body parts-it may seem the

second, stronger, interpretation of liberty would be required. Just because there are no
impediments to destroying something, does not mean that anyone is permitted to do
so. Rather, when a person exercises the liberty to destroy an object, she should have a

special claim to that object. I argued in chapter three that a person had such a claim t
an excised part of her body. Further, a person exercising the liberty to destroy her
body parts has more in common with a person exercising this liberty over an object
than her exercising it over her whole intact body.

The third determination a person may make in relation to her body parts—that some or
all of them be used for transplantation purposes after her death—could be described as
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her exercising the power of transmissibility over her body parts. In his discussion of
this particular incident of ownership, Honore seems to limit the exercise of this
incident to transfer of ownership interests in objects between family members. There
could, however, be other instructions a person could give which could be described as
her exercising the power of transmissibility. For example, a person could make
arrangements for all her possessions to be donated to a charity organisation after her
death.

When a person exercises the power of transmissibility over an object she transfers
ownership of that object. Unlike other ways of transferring ownership, this method

(usually known as a bequest) occurs in two or three stages. In the first stage, a person
specifies the object, beneficiary and any conditions of the bequest. The second,

optional, stage, occurs when a nominated trustee carries out these directives. The thir
stage occurs when the beneficiary receives the object of the bequest. At this point
transfer of ownership of the object being bequeathed is complete. Similarly, a person
may also indicate prior to her death how she wanted her body parts to be treated after
her death, but the person's body parts are not removed in accord with her instructions
until after she has died. Further, where the person's directives are for some or all of
her body parts to be used for transplantation after her death, the relevant medical
personnel carry out the second stage of the bequest process. Unless a person has the
power of transmissibility over an object, any directives as to how it should be treated
after her death would have little or no force. Further, a person must have this power
over the objects till the time of her death. These requirements would perhaps be more

easily met in the case of a person's body parts than other objects, since the body parts
are clearly still something a person could have this power over, since they would still
be part of her body.
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So, in addition to it being conceptually possible for a person to exercise m a n y
incidents of ownership over her body parts, several of the determinations a person
may actually make in relation to her body parts can be re-described as a person's

exercising specific incidents over her body parts. Whilst the body parts are still part
her body, a person would exercise the rights to possess and use them. Also, if a
person needs to have a body part removed for therapeutic reasons, she may exercise

the power to alienate that part in a particular way, either by consenting to its use fo
experimental purposes, or by instructing that it be destroyed, which also involves

exercising the liberty to destroy over that part. Further, she may choose to exercise t
power of transmissibility over her body parts by giving directives as what should
happen to them after her death. Unlike her whole intact body, a person exercising
these incidents over her body parts has much in common with the way a person
exercises these over objects that she owns.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have provided a conceptual defence of the possibility of a person's
owning her body parts. This, however, only shows that there are no conceptual
obstacles to recognising that a person owns her body parts; a moral argument is still
needed why it should be recognised that a person owns her body parts. I have already

argued that a person has certain prerogatives in relation to her body parts, and, furth
that the exercise of these prerogatives can be re-described as her exercising various

property rights in relation to her body parts. It still needs to be established, though
that recognising a person owns her body parts would be more likely to ensure
recognition of a person's prerogative to determine what happens to them. An
argument to support this further claim will be given in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX
WHY IT SHOULD BE RECOGNISED THAT
A PERSON OWNS HER BODY PARTS

Those who oppose a person's owning her body parts would probably respond to my

argument in the previous chapter by saying just because there is no conceptual proble
with a person's owning her body parts, does not mean it would be a morally
acceptable for it to be recognised that she does. Moreover, they may argue there are
good moral reasons why a person should not own her body parts (some of which will

be discussed in the next chapter). In this chapter, I argue for the opposite position
that, for moral reasons, it should be recognised that a person owns her body parts.

In the first section, I discuss and evaluate two proposals which, although not explic
claiming to, may ensure recognition of a person's prerogatives to determine what
happens to any of her body parts removed for therapeutic reasons, or some or all of
them after her death. One significant benefit of either proposal is that should they

ensure such recognition, it would not be necessary to deal with many of the objection
to a proposal which would entail a person owning her body parts. Neither proposal

does, however, ensure recognition of these prerogatives. So, in the second section, I
provide an argument why it should be recognised that a person owns her body parts,
drawing on the various moral arguments concerning the nature of the relationship
between a person and her body parts (from previous chapters), as well as two

additional arguments relating to the notion of ownership. In the third section, I arg
that recognising a person owns her body parts would be more likely to ensure

recognition of the various prerogatives I have argued a person should have in relatio
to her body parts.
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SECTION I: A L T E R N A T I V E PROPOSALS T O A PERSON'S O W N I N G

HER

BODY PARTS

Opposition to, or at least ambivalence about, a person's owning her body parts is

perhaps strongest in legislative and judicial arenas. This was recently demonstrated b
the inconsistencies and ambiguities in the various rulings in the Moore case. In

particular, the different Courts came to contradictory conclusions about whether Moore
owned or had property rights over his spleen after it had been removed. As discussed
in chapter two, the Supreme Court dismissed Moore's claim of unlawful conversion,

but upheld two of the other causes of action he originally brought: breach of fiduciar
duty and lack of informed consent. Below I determine whether a proposal made in
light of the Supreme Court's ruling on these two causes of actions would ensure
recognition of a person's prerogative to determine what happens to any of her body
parts removed for therapeutic reasons.

In contrast to the Supreme Court's ruling in the Moore case, Stephen Munzer

maintains that since there are ' ... a great many things that the law permits or enabl

people to do with their bodies, it would be a mistake to say that they have no propert
rights in them at all'.1 At the same time, though, he claims that ' ... [t]oo many
incidents are lacking to say people own their bodies'.2 In the previous chapter I
suggested that the various determinations a person would usually make in relation to
her body parts—consenting to a part removed for therapeutic reasons being used for
experimentation, or give instructions that it be destroyed, and giving permission for

her body parts to be used for transplantation after her death—could be described as th
person exercising various property rights over them. So, explicitly recognising a

person has these relevant property rights in her body parts, may be sufficient to ensu

they were treated according to any of the directives she may give. Prior to evaluating

1 S. Munzer, A Theory of Property, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1990, p. 43.
2 Munzer, p. 43.
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this proposal, Munzer's argument that s o m e body rights are property rights will be
discussed. First, though, I determine whether a proposal arising from the Moore case
would ensure recognition of a person's prerogatives concerning her body parts.

i. Implications of the Moore Case for a Person's Prerogatives Over Her Body Parts

One discrepancy between the relevant policies regulating the use of body parts
removed for therapeutic reasons and what happens in practice is that a person m a y not
always be consulted before an excised part of her body is used in experimentation.
Further, even if a person were consulted and subsequently consented to her body part
being used in this way, she m a y not have given her fully informed consent, since she
m a y not have been told all the relevant information prior to giving consent. This,
according to the Supreme Court, was w h y M o o r e deserved compensation. G o l d e —
Moore's physician and one of the defendants in the Moore case—had not disclosed his
research interest in developing a cell-line from Moore's spleen and other body parts
removed under the guise of post-operative testing and treatment. T h e court argued
that:

[t]he possibility that an interest extraneous to the patient's health has
affected the physician's judgment is something that a reasonable
patient would want to know in deciding whether to consent to a
proposed treatment. It is material to the patient's decision and thus a
prerequisite for informed consent.3

The Court concluded Golde breached his fiduciary duty by failing to disclose his
research interests, and because M o o r e had not had this information prior to consenting
to the removal of his spleen, the consent he had given had not been fully informed.

3

Moore v. Regents of the University of California et al, 1990 793, P 2d 479, (Supreme Court) at
484.
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T h e Supreme Court's direction that Golde had a duty to disclose his research interests
to M o o r e w a s based o n previous U S court rulings which had recognised the
importance of patient autonomy and informed consent.4 Specifically, in relation to the
allegation that the defendants had '... concealed the full purposes for which they
sought consent for access to the plaintiffs cells',5 the Supreme Court directed that:

(1) a physician must disclose personal interest unrelated to the
patient's health whether research or economic, that m a y affect the
physician's professional judgement; and (2) a physician's failure to
disclose such interests m a y give rise to cause of action for
performing medical procedures without informed consent or [for]
breach of fiduciary duty.6

Thus the Supreme Court's ruling sought to clarify the requirements of a physician's
fiduciary duty, specifically concerning what information she has to disclose prior to
obtaining a patient's consent, in light of the circumstances that resulted in the M o o r e
case.

The directions from the Supreme Court for extending the requirements of a physician's
fiduciary duty have been criticised, however, for lack of clarity and for failing to
consider the possible negative effect that disclosing such information would have on
the physician-patient relationship. T h e Supreme Court did not, and failed to suggest a
mechanism to, establish which of her peripheral interests a physician would have to
disclose prior to obtaining a patient's informed consent beyond the general description
of her 'research or economic' interests. Whilst it is clear that a substantial financial
interest—such as the physician's possibly receiving remuneration for any products

4

For details see H. R. Bergman, 'Case Comment: Moore v. Regents of the University of
California', American Journal of Law and Medicine, vol. 18, no. 1/2, 1992, pp. 134-135.

5 B. M. Dickens, Living Tissue and Organ Donors and Property Law: More on Moore', Jou
Contemporary Health Law and Policy, vol. 8, 1992, p. 87.
6

Moore v. Regents of the University of California et al., 1990 at 483.
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developed from research, or holding shares in companies associated with the
developments of such products—should be disclosed; what if remuneration were not
expected or the physician only held a few shares in the relevant company? A related
question is: at what point does a physician's research interest become relevant? When,

for example, he assesses a patient's cells to determine their suitability for his resear
project, or after it has been determined they would be suitable?

Such concerns are not, however, decisive against the Supreme Court's directions, but
merely identify some of the questions that still need to be resolved. In relation what

constitutes a relevant interest, I suggest it may be worth erring on the side of caution,
although this needs to be balanced with the physician's right to privacy. As to when a

patient's treatment becomes related to or part of a physician's research project, the be
rule of thumb would be for the patient's consent to be sought when any aspect of her
treatment is assessed for its potential research value. This would cover a range of
research activities, such as the experimental use of body parts, or a patient's proposed
participation in a clinical trial.

Another objection to the Supreme Court's ruling—namely, that the physician
disclosing relevant research or economic interests may adversely affect the physicianpatient relationship—is perhaps of more concern. The suggestion is that disclosure of
such information may indicate a physician has '... conflicting goals ... [and that this]
... will compromise the vital trust between a physician and her patient'.7 Further, if

such disclosure were mandatory, the trust that is important to this relationship could b
jeopardised, even in cases where the potential research never eventuated. A related
concern is that ' ... disclosing research interests may obscure the patient's treatment
decisions by shifting the patient's focus from the patient's immediate health needs to

7

J. Lavoie, 'Ownership of H u m a n Tissue Life after Moore versus Regents of the University of
California', Virginia Law Review, vol. 75, 1989, p. 1382.
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the collateral issues of research and development'.8 If the patient were suffering a
serious illness, as Moore was, then any negotiations relating to the proposed research
may delay the patient's treatment and so could exacerbate her illness or condition.
Further, if the patient refused to participate in the research after the disclosure of
information, either actively or by allowing parts from his body to be used in the
research, then the patient may no longer receive the optimum level of care from that
physician, or the physician may even refuse to continue treating him.

Some of the specific objections mentioned above, for example that additional
information may distract the patient and result in his treatment being delayed and
possibly endangering his health, seem to have more to do with the context in which the
information is presented rather that its content. A person is usually asked for her
consent to use her (soon to be) excised body part for experimentation as part of
consenting to a surgical procedure. In that context, the patient's main concern will be
to understand what the surgery involves, its success-failure rate, expected recovery
time, how debilitated she will be and for how long. So even if one of the clauses on
the consent form gave a person the opportunity to determine what happens to part(s) of
her body that will be removed during the procedure, this would not ensure the consent
was given after appropriate deliberation. This, however, is a fairly minor problem,
and it could be addressed by modifying the consent procedures, specifically by
separating the two types of consent. For example, one form could be used for
obtaining a patient's consent to the surgical procedure and another for obtaining her
consent to a proposed use for her excised body parts, or for specifying the manner of

their disposal. Further, the patient could be given these forms at different times and/
by health professionals other than his treating physician(s), who would provide the
relevant information and give any explanations required.

8

R G Hartman, 'Beyond Moore: Issue of Law and Policy Impacting Human Cell and Genetic
Research in the Age of Biotechnology", The Journal of Legal Medicine, vol. 14, 1993, p. 470.
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These various objections to the Supreme Court's directions are all underpinned by the
general concern that the physician's disclosing additional information prior to

obtaining a patient's consent could adversely affect the physician-patient relationshi

This is precisely the opposite of what the court intended. The rationale for giving the
patient additional information is so to enhance both her capacity for making a fully
informed decision and the trust in the physician-patient relationship.

The Supreme Court's direction in the Moore case would not ensure recognition of a
person's prerogative to determine what happens to a part of body removed for
therapeutic reasons. Simply requiring a physician to disclose any information she
thought was relevant to the patient's treatment would not necessarily guarantee the
person from whose body the part has been removed was told everything he thought
was relevant. For example, he may want to know about the other activities of any
company involved or what other experiments could her excised body part(s) be used
for.

More generally, simply asking for the patient's consent to use an excised part of her
body in a particular way is not the same as that person determining what happens to
that part. In chapter three, I identified a number of reasons why a person may want an
excised part of her body to be treated in a particular way. Whilst the recommendations
of the Supreme Court perhaps may ensure the patient is better informed about one
proposed use of an excised part of her body, it would not necessarily ensure a patient
will be told all her options and, perhaps more importantly, ensure she understood that

she has a right to refuse permission. Finally, this proposal does little to clarify the
nature of the relationship between a person and her body parts, which I have argued is
the reason why, amongst other things, a person is not always consulted before an
excised part of her body is used for experimental purposes. Such clarification may be
given by another proposal, that a person has some property rights in, but does not
own, her body parts.
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ii. Explicit Recognition that a Person Has Property Rights Over Her Body Parts

In chapter two, I discussed policies and practices for procuring human body parts for

various purposes. I argued that, despite the relevant policies giving a person a primary
role in determining what happens to part of her body removed for therapeutic reasons,
the consultation required by these policies either does not happen or is inadequate.
Further, although current policies for procuring body parts from cadavers for
transplantation only require consultation with the deceased person's relatives if that
person's prior wishes are not known, such consultation occurs on a regular basis.

Since the relevant policies already implicitly recognise a person has certain rights ov

her body parts (which I argued in the previous chapter it makes sense to characterise as
property rights) it needs to be determined whether explicitly recognising these rights

property rights would ensure recognition of a person's prerogatives. Prior to this, it i
worth examining Munzer's arguments to the conclusion that"... people do not own,
but have some limited property rights in their bodies'.9

Whilst it is not Munzer's primary focus, his discussion of ' ... the status of the body
and body rights ... '10 provides an analysis of the rights a person has over her body
that is both conceptually and morally useful. His taxonomy of body rights provides a
framework for determining the nature, role and strength of specific rights a person has
over her body as well as showing how they interrelate. Further, although Munzer
does not give a moral justification for a person having these rights, he is concerned
with moral property rights—that is, property rights justifiable under moral
principles—which a person may have over her body, which once established would be

9

Munzer, A Theory of Property, p. 37.

10 Munzer, p. 37.
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useful in determining what moral claims a person has over her body and, by
extension, its parts.

Munzer suggests it is "... analytically useful to draw attention to the different

elements in the collection called body rights and to regard only some of these elements
as property rights'.11 Reflected in his taxonomy of body rights is his contention that
persons ' ... have interests and make choices and ... [so] ... are potential bearers
of rights.12 The rights a person has either protect her interests, which Munzer refers

as personal rights, or protect individual choices, which he refers to as property right

If I am right and the basis for a person's prerogatives concerning her body parts is t
she may have a morally significant interest in them, then, in Munzer's terms, having
personal rights over her body parts would protect that interest. Further, a person
having property rights in her body parts would protect any choices she made in

relation to her body parts. That is, both her interests in her body parts, and, her cho
to determine what happens to them would be protected. In principle, then, Munzer's
taxonomy of body rights may ensure recognition of the various prerogatives I argued a
person should have in relation to her body parts.

According to Munzer, although most body rights are personal rights, some are

property rights, since they protect choices involving transfer of a particular body ri
to another person, which "... is a highly important feature of property as usually
understood ... [and] ... is even more important in the special case of body rights
because of their close connection with autonomy'.13 A person may make various
choices of transfer in relation to her body—this, for example, would be one way of
explaining labour contracts and, perhaps more obviously, organ donation. Property

11 Munzer, p. 45.
12 Munzer, p. 43.
13 Munzer, pp. 49-50.
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rights can be further divided into w e a k property rights, which protect gratuitous

transfers, such as gifts, and strong property rights, which protect those transfers th
are part of an exchange, usually for money.14 An example of a weak property right is
a person's right to donate her body parts, and an example of a strong property right
would be a person's right to sell her body parts.

Munzer argues his taxonomy of body rights '... undercuts some overly simple

conceptions of what should count as a property right in the body',15 including: the id
that a person's rights in her body must be original (that is, she must have them from
birth), whilst property rights in external material objects must be acquired; and,
further, that the more intimate the connection between a person and an object the less

likely it is to be that person's property. In response to the first, Munzer rightly po
out that, for example, the (property) rights a model has to control the commercial

exploitation of his appearance are not rights a person would have at birth. In respons
to the second claim—that intimacy between a person and her body precludes her
having property rights over it—Munzer argues that "... parts of one's body seem
very intimate, and yet the power to transfer them is a property right'.16

Finally, Munzer claims his taxonomy may have ' ... illuminating applications in
many moral and constitutional problems involving body rights',17 including the
problems of suicide, slavery, self-enslavement and abortion. He suggest, that because
previous appeals to ownership in such debates have been met with mixed reactions,
and, where applied, have had mixed results, his ' ... finer-grained
taxonomy ... may help to draw morally pertinent distinctions more clearly than

14

Munzer, p. 49.

15 Munzer, p. 52.
16 Munzer, p. 53.
17 Munzer, p. 53.
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saying, or denying, a person owns her body'.18 O f particular interest here is whether
Munzer's taxonomy of body parts is of use in resolving problems concerning the
procurement of body parts; in particular, what should be the extent, and limitations
the role of the person from whose body the part is to be removed in determining how
her body parts are treated. In evaluating this proposal I continue to focus on the
various determinations a person may make in relation to her body parts discussed in
previous chapters.

Munzer's suggestion that a person does not own but nevertheless has some property
rights over her body would not, I contend, ensure recognition of a person's various
prerogatives concerning her body parts. The current policies, regulating the
procurement of body parts from both living persons and cadavers, already implicitly
assume a person has some rights over her body parts, which I argued in the previous

chapter made sense to describe as property rights, but such rights are usually ignore
or overridden.

Moore was asked to relinquish certain rights regarding products that may be developed
from his spleen and cells, which may indicate it was recognised he has some rights
over his body parts.19 At the same time, though, some of his other rights were not
recognised. Specifically, it was not recognised he had a right to determine what
happened to his excised spleen.

The circumstances of the Moore case provides evidence that when a person no longer

has any use for an excised part of her body, it may be assumed that she will no longe

have an interest in, and certainly will not exercise any rights over, that body part.

Moreover, there may be a further assumption that if a person did have such an interes

18

Munzer, p. 54.

19 A less charitable, but perhaps more accurate, interpretation may be that the researchers were
ensuring M o o r e would not have a legitimate claim to the cell-line.
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it would be insignificant and justifiably overridden by, for example, research interests.
These, and perhaps other assumptions concerning a person's lack of concern about the
treatment of part of her body removed for therapeutic reasons may explain why a
person's fully informed consent is not always obtained prior to using such body parts
for experimental purposes.

Both policies for procuring parts from cadavers for transplantation purposes described
in chapter two give a significant role to the person from whose body the parts may be

removed after her death. There are, though, various logistical and contextual problems

which have resulted in the deceased person's relatives being routinely consulted befor
that person's body parts are removed which may in turn lead to any that person's prior

directives being ignored or overridden. It is difficult to see how explicitly recognis
a person's right of disposition over her body parts, already implicit in the relevant
policies, as a property right would ensure any relevant directives were adhered to.
This is because the reasons for overriding such directives do not question the
legitimacy of a person's right to make such directives concerning her body parts, but
rather simply assume these other reasons are considered to be more important.

I argue in the following two sections that the best way of ensuring recognition of a
person's prerogatives in relation to her body parts is for her to be recognised as the
owner of her body parts. Ownership, however, is only a prima facie relationship
between a person and object which can be overridden. For example, a person's
vehicle could be requisitioned by some authority in an emergency. So an explanation
is needed why recognising a person owns her body parts would do more to ensure her
prerogatives concerning her body parts were acknowledged and respected than just
recognising a person had some property rights over her body parts. The explanation
lies, in part, in some of the pragmatic features of ownership.
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SECTION II: O W N I N G THINGS CONSIDERED U N O W N A B L E

The suggestion that a person owns her body and/or body parts has been variously
described as odd, 20 inappropriate,21 or demeaning. 22 A useful starting point for
challenging such descriptions is the liberal idea of self-ownership, which provides a
justification w h y a person should o w n her body parts whilst they are still part of her
body. This, however, will only get part of the argument required. I also need to
explain w h y recognising that a person owns her body parts will better ensure her
prerogatives in relation to them will be acknowledged and respected. This explanation
draws heavily on C. B. Macpherson's argument that a person should have access to
those things necessary to obtain and maintain a certain quality of life, and that the best
w a y to ensure such access is to recognise a person has property rights in these things.
After discussing the notion of self-ownership, with particular reference to a person's
relationship to her body parts, Macpherson's argument will be discussed in detail. I
then use both these arguments to provide the final part of the argument w h y it should
be recognised that a person owns her body parts.

i. Self-ownership and Body Parts

Both right-wing liberals such as Robert Nozick and left-wing liberals such as Gerald
Cohen defend "... the thesis that each person has full private property in himself.23

20

J. J. Thomson, The Realm of Rights, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 1990,
p. 223.

21 C. S. Campbell, 'Body, Self and the Property Paradigm', Hastings Center Report, vol. 22,
no. 5, 1992, p. 34.
22 Paul Ramsey, The Patient as a Person, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970, p. 193.

23 G A Cohen, 'Self-Ownership, World-Ownership and Equality', in Justice and Equality Here an
Now, ed. F. S. Lucash, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1986, p. 114 (hereafter 'Self-Ownership

D.
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C o h e n suggests that the attractiveness of Nozick's political thought lies in its
foundation, which he paraphrases thus:

... each person is the morally rightful owner of himself. He
possesses over himself, as a matter of moral right, all those rights that
a slaveholder has over a complete chattel slave as a matter of legal
right, and he is entitled, morally speaking, to dispose of himself in
the w a y such a slaveholder is entitled, legally speaking to dispose
over his slave. Such a slaveholder m a y not direct his slave to harm
other people, but he is not legally obliged to place him at their
disposal to the slightest degree: he owes none of his slave's service to
anyone else. So, analogously, if I a m the moral owner of myself,
and therefore of this right arm, then, while others are entitled to stop
it from hitting other people, no one is entitled without m y consent, to
press it into their o w n or anyone else's service, even when m y failure
to lend it voluntarily to others would be morally wrong. 24

The issue on which right-wing and left-wing liberals differ is that the former argue that
self-ownership provides a justification for the appropriation of external resources
while the latter do not. M y interest in self-ownership here, however, is limited to any
justification it m a y provide for a person's owning her body parts.

Cohen suggests that the 'self in self-ownership ' ... has a purely reflexive
significance. It signifies that what o w n s and is o w n e d are one and the same, namely,
the whole person'.25 In various discussions about self-ownership the 'whole person'
at the very least includes a person's body and, by extension, its parts. H e argues that
what m o s t people find appealing about the idea of self-ownership is ' ... the idea of
controlling one's life'.26 That is, there is a significant connection between a person's

24

Cohen, p. 109.

25 Cohen, p. 110.
26

G. A. Cohen, 'Self-Ownership, World-Ownership and Equality: Part II', Social Philosophy and
Policy, vol. 3, no. 2, 1986, p. 86 (hereafter 'Self-Ownership IF).
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being self-owning and a person's being self-determining, perhaps to the extent that the
later is contingent on the former.

Those advocating self-ownership do not seem to think it necessary to explicitly argue
that a person o w n s her body or body parts, but, rather, seem to assume this is
obvious. A s argued in previous chapters, though, the relationship between a person
and her body parts is uncertain. So some justification w h y a person o w n s her body
parts in virtue of being self-owning would be useful. T o motivate such a justification,
it m a y be instructive to examine another issue from the debate about self-ownership:
whether a person o w n s her natural talents and capacities.

As part of establishing his egalitarian principles of justice, John Rawls argues that
person's natural talents and capacities should be collectively owned, because
1

... inequalities of birth and natural endowment are undeserved',27 and, further, are

arbitrary from a moral point of view. Just because a person has various talents she is
not morally entitled to them, or more specifically, to decide to what ends they should
be used. Cohen has interpreted Rawls as suggesting that "... it is a matter of brute
luck that people have the talents they do, their talents, do not, morally speaking,
belong to them, but are, properly regarded, resources over which society as a whole
m a y legitimately dispose'.28 This, Cohen argues, would amount to a significant
restriction on a person's being self-owning.

There is some uncertainty about what Rawls' proposal that natural talents and
capacities be collectively o w n e d entails. A n d r e w Kernohan, in attempting to
undermine claims that Rawls' proposal deprives people of basic rights, argues that
Rawls is only suggesting that '... the natural talents of others are useful to all of

27

J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972, p. 100.

28

Cohen, 'Self-Ownership II', p. 79.
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us ... [and] ... that w e all have a claim on the produce of these talents ... [but
this] ... does not deny personal freedom or self-ownership in any significant way'.29
Kernohan's interpretation of Rawls' proposal seems to suggests that Rawls is more
concerned that a person's talents or capacities be used to benefit as m a n y people as
possible rather than w h o it is that determines their use.

By contrast, proponents of self-ownership, such as Robert Nozick and Cohen, reject
the collective ownership of natural talents and abilities on moral grounds. Responding
to Rawls' specific suggestion that a w a y should be found to ensure natural talents are
used to benefit all m e m b e r s of a society, Nozick (rhetorically) asks

[i]f people's assets and talents couldn't be harnessed to serve others,
would something be done to remove these exceptional assets and
talents, or to forbid them from being exercised for the person's own
benefit or that of someone else he chose, even though this limitation
wouldn't improve the absolute position of those somehow unable to
harness the talents and abilities of others for their own benefit?30

Elsewhere Nozick argues that Rawls' proposal denigrates ' ... a person's
autonomous choices and actions ... [which is] ... a risky line to take for a theory that
otherwise wishes to buttress the dignity and self-respect of autonomous beings'.31 H e
further criticises Rawls' proposal that natural talents and capacities should be
collectively o w n e d , since it would ' ... prevent the better e n d o w e d gaining extra
material benefits for themselves unless this would also improve the position of the
worst off,32 and that this would violate the separateness of persons.

29

A. Kernohan, 'Rawls and the Collective Ownership of Natural Abilities', Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 20, no. 1, 1990, pp. 27-28.

30

R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Blackwell Oxford, 1974, p. 229 (author's emphasis).

31 Nozick, p. 214.
32

J. Wolff, Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State, Polity Press, Cambridge,
1991, p. 122.
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Whilst Cohen is sympathetic to Rawls' broader egalitarian principles, particularly with
regard to the appropriation and distribution of external resources, he nevertheless
wants to affirm self-ownership. He suggests that those, like Rawls, who want to
deny "... each person's rights over himself lose confidence ... when they are asked to
consider who has the right to decide what should happen to their own eyes'.33 Cohen

argues further that '[i]t is an intelligible presumption that I alone am entitled to de
the use of this arm and to benefit from its dexterity',34 since the fact it's being his

is a plausible basis for the normative claim that he alone is entitled to decide its us
benefit from it. Rawls may concede that the person whose arm it is should have first
claim to determine it use, but still require that the central concern of such
determinations should be, as far as possible, to satisfy the collective interest. More
generally, Cohen argues that whilst a compelling case can be made for no one person

to have a greater prima facie right to external resources than any other, this is not t

of a particular person's parts and powers since '... few have discerned an ... injustic
in a person's insistence on sovereignty over his own being',35 which for Cohen
includes not only a person's body and, by extension, its parts, but also her natural
talents and capacities.

Several of Nozick's arguments implicitly suggest a person has the full complement of
property rights over her body and its parts. One of these that is a person has a basic
entitlement to her body parts in order to avoid their ' ... forcible
redistribution ... ',36 since "... only you have the right to decide what is to happen

33

Cohen, 'Self-Ownership r, p. 111.

34 Cohen, p. 112.
35 Cohen, p. 112.
36 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 206. Further evidence of Nozick's view that a person h
the full complement of body rights over her self is that he believes voluntary self-enslavement
permissible. See Nozick, p. 331.
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to your life, your liberty, and your body, for they belong to no-one but you'.37
Further, it has been argued that an '... implication ... [of Nozick's argument against
the redistribution of body parts] ... is that only a right of self-ownership ... can

provide protection for individual integrity against these proposals, and that such a ri
has simply to be accepted as a axiom, rather than established as a theorem, in our
thinking about these matters'.38

As mentioned above, the proponents of self-ownership see no need to argue a person
owns her body parts but rather take it as given. Moreover, proponents of selfownership respond to the suggestion that a person's natural talents and capacities
should be collectively owned by comparing it with a suggestion that a person's body

parts should be collectively owned, which they assert is either conceptually incoherent
or morally abhorrent. Although this argument relies primarily on intuition, it does

indicate that at the very least self-ownership entails a person's owning her body parts
whilst they are still part of her body.

Once part of a person's body has been removed, however, an argument based on selfownership no longer seems to provide a justification for her owning that part. Excised
body parts can be plausibly viewed as external resources, and so, at least for some
right-wing liberals, anyone who is self-owning can appropriate them. As argued in
chapter three, a person exercising her prerogatives to determine what happens to an
excised part of her body is an act of self-determination. Since, according to the selfownership thesis, a person owns her body parts whilst they are still part of her body,
and further that part of what it means for a person's to be self-owning is that she is
self-determining, this may provide the basis for distinguishing excised human body
parts from other external resources. This idea will be used in the final part of my

37

Wolff, Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State, p. 7.

38 J. Waldron, The Right to Private Property, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988; Waldron,
to Private Property, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, p. 400.
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argument below. Prior to this, another argument, with important similarities to the
argument I give below will be described and evaluated.

ii. Human Rights as Property Rights

Macpherson argues that it should be recognised that a person has property rights in

those things necessary to obtain and maintain a certain quality of life, such as natur
resources. Such a proposal may not be as problematic as may initially seem, since
' ... the concept of property has changed in several ways ... and is now again
perceptibly changing and may be expected to change further'.39 Two of the changes to
the concept of property Macpherson identifies are relevant to the present discussion.

First, the concept of property was previously much broader. For example, Thomas
Hobbes included a person's ' ... life, his limbs and in the next degree (in most men)
those that concern conjugall affection; and after them riches and means of living',40
amongst his property. Moreover, a person's having property rights in such things
seemed particularly important, since these "... were seen as the source and
justification of individual material property'.41 With the growth of full capitalist
market economies, the concept of property has narrowed, because "... every
individual's effective rights and liberties, their effective ability to develop their
persons and exercise their capacities came to depend so much on what material
property they had'.42

39

C. B. Macpherson, 'Human Rights as Property Rights', Dissent, 1977, p. 72.

40 T Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson, Penguin Books, Great Britain, 1968 (1651), pp.
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Second, the concept of property previously included '... both an individual right to
exclude others from some use and enjoyment of some thing and an individual right not
to be excluded from the use and enjoyment of things which society had declared to be
for common use',43 but now is just the right to exclude others from use or enjoyment

of certain objects. So, whilst previously each person had individual property rights to
use, enjoy and not be excluded from those things deemed to be for common use, such
as the local water supply or public places, access to such things is now governed by
the rules of a common or collective ownership system. When a person does have
private property rights over something, the right to exclude other people from the use
and enjoyment of that thing is generally one of them.

These and other changes to the concept of property have, according to Macpherson,

made this institution inconsistent with democracy. Specifically, there are inequalitie

between persons in relation to access and control of those material resources necessar
to maintain a certain quality of life. This type of inequality undermines one of the
basic justifications for property: namely "... that human needs cannot be met without

that institution'.44 That is, whilst this modern conception of property has provided th
means for persons to acquire and use resources necessary for fulfilling their various
needs, it has also allowed those individuals with the means to do so to acquire more
than their fair share of some resources. This means other people may not have enough

of a particular resources to meet their needs, whilst others may have an excess, and so
more than their fair share, of that resource.

For these reasons Macpherson suggests it may be worth investigating whether
' ... some further change is needed, in order to make the concept of property
consistent with a democratic society'.45 Specifically, he is concerned that a person

43

Macpherson, p. 73.

44 Macpherson, p. 74.
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should be ensured access to those things necessary for her to obtain and maintain a
certain quality of life.

Macpherson maintains that everyone needs a certain amount of '... individual
property, in the means of life and to the means of labour, as will ensure the
continuance of his or her life'.46 Further, a person needs to have two kinds of rights
to property to continue living and develop his capacities: an exclusive right to some
the means of life, and a right to the means of labour, which need not be exclusive and
may entail the right not to be excluded from the use and enjoyment of those things. He
suggests the concept of property needs to be 'rebroadened' to a "... more natural
sense of an individual right to some exclusive property and to some nonexclusive right
of access to the remaining natural resources and accumulated capital of a given

society'.47 This 'rebroadening' would recapture ' ... the idea that individual property
is much more a matter of property in life and liberty, in the use and development and
enjoyment of human capacities, than it is merely a matter or rights in things and
revenues'.48

According to Macpherson, the conception of property prior to the development of a
market economy was more consistent with the principles of a democratic society,

because 'society did establish and maintain legal rights, not only to life but to a ce

quality of life'.49 Despite this, he believes contemporary democratic societies are in a

much better position to 'assert an equal right for everyone to a certain quality of li
certain liberties to develop and enjoy the use of our capacities'.50 It is important,

45 Macpherson, p. 73.
46 Macpherson, p. 74.
47 Macpherson, p. 74.
48 Macpherson, p. 76. Macpherson claims, and gives examples of how, this rebroadening of the
concept of property is already occurring.
49 Macpherson, p. 77.
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though, to recognise these rights as property rights, otherwise '... the whole prestige
of property would work against it... [because] ... [w]e have made property so central
to our society that any thing and any rights that are not property are very apt to take
second place'.51 This is because on '... our present scale of values it is only if the
human right to a full life is seen as a property right that it will stand much chance of
general realisation'.52 Implicit in Macpherson's argument is that property rights are
amongst the 'strongest' rights a person can have.

Whilst it seems Macpherson is right in saying that property and property rights are
central to our society, some may think his claim that any right that is not a property
right will immediately be secondary to, and overridden by, such rights is too strong.
They may argue some of a person's more important rights, such as a right to free
speech, are not, and perhaps should not be, property rights. Macpherson would reply
that whilst ideally this might be true, it may be that if such rights were characterised
this way it would be clearer a person had these rights and was entitled to all they
entailed.

There are, then, good strategic reasons for recognising a person has property rights in
those things necessary for obtaining and maintaining a certain quality of life. This
would ensure a person access to such things since, at least in western democratic
societies, property rights are amongst the strongest rights a person can have. More
than this, Macpherson claims that a person's having property rights in such things will
minimise her claims to them being overridden. This is the crux of his argument, and it
is because ownership has a similar role and status in western democratic societies that
argue that it should be recognised that a person owns her body parts. Although very
often the terms 'ownership' and 'property' are interchangeable, Macpherson

50 Macpherson, p. 77.
51 Macpherson, p. 77.
52 Macpherson, p. 77.

deliberately avoids the term 'ownership'. Rather, he deliberately uses 'property' and
'property rights', since he maintains any rights a person has, even in those things he
should have in order to obtain and maintain a certain quality of life, can be restricted. I
have acknowledged there are limitations on the rights a person m a y exercise in relation
to her body parts. Nevertheless, simply recognising a person has some property
rights in her body parts would not ensure recognition of her prerogatives in relation to
them. Rather, as I argue below, this is more likely to be achieved if it is recognised
that a person owns her body parts.

iii. Why it is Necessary to Recognise a Person Owns Her Body Parts

Macpherson's argument for a person's having property rights in those things
necessary for a certain quality of life could justify a person's having such rights over
her body parts w h e n they are part of her body. M a n y of a person's body parts are
necessary for her to remain alive, whereas others m a y be relinquished, although doing
so m a y have a detrimental effect on her quality of life. So a person should at least
have property rights over her body parts w h e n they are still part of her body (the most
important one perhaps being the right to exclude others from their use) in order to
maintain bodily integrity, which is necessary for obtaining and maintaining a certain
quality of life. It does not seem necessary for a person to have a stronger claim to her
body parts w h e n they are still part of her body, since other people do not have the
same type of claim to a person's intact body parts as they do to c o m m o n resources.
Nevertheless, as will be argued below, it m a y be prudent for a person to o w n her
intact body parts, since it will clarify the type of claims she has in relation to them.

Once a person's body parts have been removed, however, it is not so clear she would
need to have access to them to maintain a certain quality of life. Moreover, the
potential uses for such parts, notably in medical research, m a y have implications for
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the quality of life of other people.53 Also, in order for her to obtain and maintain a

certain quality of life a person does not seem to need the power of transmissibility ov
her body parts, which is the property right a person seems to exercise when she gives
directives concerning the treatment of her body parts after her death. There may,
further, be a number of people who need the various parts from the cadaver to

maintain their quality of life, or in some cases any life at all. So a specific applica
of Macpherson's argument would seem to justify those persons in need of replacement
organs having property rights over the relevant body parts from cadavers.

I claim, however, that a comparable argument both in strength and structure can be
given for a person having such rights in, even owning, her body parts. To motivate
my argument for this conclusion it is worth briefly restating Macpherson's argument.
Macpherson is concerned that a person should have access to those things necessary to
obtain and maintain a certain quality of life. He argues the most effective way of
ensuring this access is for a person to have property rights in such things. This is
because in western democratic society property rights are amongst the strongest rights
a person can have in relation to an object. So when a person has property rights in an

object, she probably has a stronger claim to it than if she had any other type of right
over it. Further, if a person had other types of rights in such things they may be
overridden.

My argument that a person should be recognised as the owner of her body parts runs
parallel to Macpherson's. My concern is that it should be recognised a person has
various prerogatives in relation to her body parts. As argued in chapter three, a
person's directives concerning the treatment of part of her body removed for
therapeutic reasons may be given to ensure consistency between significant aspects of
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that person's life, thereby exercising self-determination. So, just as a person should
have access to those things necessary to obtain and maintain a certain quality of life, I
contend she should have access to the means for making the significant aspects of her
life consistent.

If, as Macpherson claims, the best way to ensure such access to something is for her
to have property rights in it, then a person also needs to have property rights in those
things necessary for her to m a k e the significant aspects of her life consistent. It is here,
though, that m y argument differs from Macpherson's. A person's having the relevant
property rights over her body parts would not be sufficient to ensure that if she
exercise any of these prerogatives, her body parts will be treated accordingly. Rather,
it is clearest a person has the prerogative to determine what happens to an object when
she owns it. This is not to say that whenever a person owns an object she has such
prerogatives over it, just that it would be unusual for a person to have such a
prerogative over something she did not own.

Other events or aspects of a person's life which she may wish to be consistent with her
values and beliefs m a y not occur until the end of her life or even after her death. In
order to ensure such consistency a person m a y give directives stating what she wants
in relation to those events. Although a person would not be adversely affected if such
directives were not carried out, a person's giving such directives would, nevertheless,
be an act of self-determination. This is because the events at the end of a person's life
m a y be particularly significant, since they m a y in some sense complete a person's life.
O n e such event m a y be what happens to a person body parts after her death. A s
argued in the previous chapters, the various determinations that a person m a y choose
to m a k e in relation to her body parts after her death involve her exercising property
rights. Given there are competing claims concerning the use of parts from cadavers,
recognising that a person owns her body parts would be more likely to ensure that her
prerogatives to determine what happens to them after her death will be respected.
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Like property and property rights, the institution of ownership is central to our society,
and for similar reasons. Ownership makes it clear—more clear than a person's having
specific property rights in an object—that she has an array of claims to that object,
which together usually constitute a stronger claim than anyone else. Although the
particular claims a person has over objects she owns may vary, those claims a person
would need to have in relation to her body parts in order to determine what happens to
them either if removed for therapeutic reason or after her death would be amongst
them. Finally, a person owning an object would mean that her claim to it would have
a greater chance of being realised, since other types of claims would probably be more
likely to be overridden.

It may be objected that whilst it may seem important for there to be consistency
between significant aspects of a person's life, it is more important to ensure that she
has access and control of those things necessary for a certain quality of life. So,
although my argument may be analogous to Macpherson's, it may not seem to carry
the same weight. Joel Feinberg's distinction between ulterior interests which concern
a person's ' ... ultimate goals and aspirations ... '54 and welfare interests, which are
the ' ... basic requisites of a man's well-being ... '55, discussed in chapter three,
may be relevant here.

The objection put simply is that satisfying a welfare interest, by, for example,
receiving a replacement body part, is much more important than satisfying an ulterior
interest, for example that a person's body be buried with all her body parts intact. In
response, whilst Feinberg acknowledges some of a person's welfare interests need to

be fulfilled for her ulterior interests to be realised, he argues the former "... achiev

54

J. Feinberg. Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of Criminal Law, Vol I, Oxford University
Press, N e w York, 1986, p. 37.

55

Feinberg, p. 37.
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their status as interests in virtue of their being generalised means, often indispensable
ones, to the advancement of more ulterior interests'.56

Macpherson's concern that a person has access to things necessary for a certain quality

of life may, at first glance, be interpreted as ensuring a person's welfare interests a
fulfilled. However, Macpherson's more fundamental concern is to ensure a person
should obtain and maintain a certain quality of life. Although he does not make

explicit what is required for a person to do this, it would include, but also go beyond,
having access to the necessities of life such as food, shelter and so on. This would
require that, as well as many of a person's welfare interests, at least some of her
ulterior interests would need to be fulfilled. Further, in order for many of a person's

welfare interests to be fulfilled, they would have to be met beyond a certain level, si

barely meeting the relevant conditions would not constitute fulfilment of them. If, for
example, a person only had minimum access to medical resources, so that her healthcare requirements were only just met (so that she may remain alive but not be able to,

say, undertake employment or partake in leisure activities) then her welfare interest i
obtaining and maintaining good health has not been met. Finally, the fulfilment of a

specific interest, either welfare or ulterior, is contingent on which of the person's o
interests have already been fulfilled and to what extent, the nature of the specific
interest, and what if any of that person's other interests will remain unfulfilled.

A person has a welfare interest in her body parts when they are still part of her body,
since some of her body parts are necessary for her to continue living, and further
whilst having an intact body means it is easier for a person to act to fulfil her other

welfare, and her ulterior interests, and so obtain and maintain a certain quality of lif
A person may also have ulterior interests in her body parts. Specifically, she may be
concerned about what happens to any excised parts, or all of them after she has died.

56

Feinberg, p. 42.
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Although these interests would not be ongoing in the same sense as s o m e of a
person's other ulterior interests, such as her career plans, such an interest is a specific
example of a person's more general ulterior interests, such as being autonomous and
ensuring consistency between various significant aspects of her life. A person's
interest in being autonomous would in m a n y instances warrant as m u c h respect as her
welfare interests.

Two or more people may need access to the same resources in order to fulfil their
interests. So it is possible that fulfilling one person's ulterior interests m a y m e a n
someone else's welfare interests remain unfulfilled. It could be argued that this is
what happens if a person's directives concerning the treatment of her body parts after
her death precludes using them for transplantation, and perhaps less clearly if a person
refuses to consent to part of her body being used for experimentation. In such
circumstances, perhaps the fulfilment of one person's ulterior interest should be
sacrificed in order to fulfil other people's welfare interest.

I have already indicated that Macpherson's argument could be thought to provide a
rationale for a researcher having access to excised h u m a n body parts for
experimentation. I argued in chapter three, though, that there m a y be a number of
reasons w h y a person m a y object to an excised part of her body being used for
experimentation. S o a person would need to have at least the same type of claim as
any researcher with a potential claim to her body parts. In the Moore

case it was

recognised that the researchers could have property rights in Moore's excised body
parts; I contend that it should have been recognised that Moore had such rights.

It is perhaps more obvious that Macpherson's argument could be used to justify
potential organ recipients being entitled to and obtaining property rights in parts from
cadavers. In chapter four, I rejected the similar proposal the interests of living should
take precedence over the prior directives of a deceased person because such a proposal
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fails to respect the person w h o once was. So if the potential organ recipient had
property rights over parts from cadavers which would be supported by Macpherson's
rationale, then a person needs to have an equally strong, if not stronger, claim to her
body parts, in virtue of the significant interest that person would have in h o w her body
parts m a y be treated after her death.

Although they differ in detail, my argument—that it should be recognised that a perso
o w n s her body parts—has a similar structure and underlying rationale to
Macpherson's—that a person should have property rights in the things necessary for a
certain quality of life.

Both arguments are motivated by moral concerns:

Macpherson's being to ensure a person has access to those things necessary to obtain
and maintain a certain quality of life, and mine to ensure recognition of a person's
prerogative to determine what happens to any of her body parts removed for
therapeutic reasons or some or all of them after her death. Both arguments appeal to a
contingent fact about society to bring about these outcomes, namely the centrality and
importance of property and property rights (in Macpherson's argument) and
ownership (in mine) in our society. It would not be sufficient for m y purposes to
simply apply an u n a m e n d e d version of Macpherson's argument, since, as
demonstrated in the evaluation of Munzer's argument earlier in the chapter, simply
recognising a person had certain property rights over her body parts would not ensure
recognition of a person's prerogatives in relation to her body parts. Rather, it is
necessary to recognise that a person owns her body parts.

Whilst I have used the controversial notion of self-ownership to explain why we
should recognise a person owns her body parts whilst still part of her body, it would
generally be accepted that a person has some sort of sovereignty over her body parts
w h e n they are still part of her body. The problem arises when a part is removed from
a person's body. Having previously been part of a person's body, and so according
to the self-ownership thesis being owned by that person, a body part does not simply
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become a resource, since it cannot be assumed that the person no longer has an interest
in it. A person may also have an interest in what happens to her body parts after her

death, and so it cannot be assumed that parts from cadavers are resources, for example

to be used in transplantation. To the contrary, because of the nature of these intere
and their associated prerogatives, they need to be protected and promoted. I have
suggested that because of the centrality of ownership in our society, and, more
importantly, the strength and array of claims a person has over an object she owns, a
person should be recognised as the owner of her body parts. This, I contend, is the
best way of ensuring her interest in them, and the associated prerogatives will be

protected and promoted. In the final section of this chapter, I explain how a person's
owning her body parts will ensure recognition of these prerogatives.

SECTION III: OWNERSHIP AND A PERSON'S PREROGATIVES
CONCERNING HER BODY PARTS

Throughout this thesis I have been concerned primarily with three determinations a
person may make in relation to her body parts—consenting to a body part removed for

therapeutic reasons being used for experimentation, or instructing that it be destroy
and giving directives concerning the treatment of her body parts after her death. In

section, after identifying some general benefits of recognising that a person owns he
body parts, I explain why such recognition would be more likely to ensure that a
person's determinations would be respected.

i. General Benefits of Recognising that a Person Owns Her Body Parts

It may be possible to promote and protect a person's interests and associated

prerogatives in relation to an object—similar to those interests and prerogatives I h
argued a person may have in her body parts—without having to recognise she owns
that object. This, however, does not seem to be possible in relation to human body
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parts. This is partly because one person's body parts could be used to save or

improve the lives of other people, directly through transplantation or indirectly thr
experimentation. Another problem is the assumptions that may be made concerning a
person's interest in her body parts. Alternative proposals—such as recognising that a

person had certain property rights in her body parts or enhancing the informed consent

procedures—would not ensure recognition of a person's prerogatives in relation to her
body parts. This is because these proposals do not address the reasons why such

prerogatives are ignored or overridden, and, further, do not clarify the nature of the
relationship between a person and her body parts.

My proposal that it should be recognised that a person owns her body parts will, I
suggest, address each of the problems mentioned above. Although the potential uses
and subsequent need for human body parts for medical purposes would remain, it will

be clearer that there are requirements to be met before body parts can be used for suc

purposes. Specifically, it would be clearer that a person has to be consulted, and hav
given her consent, to any proposed use of her body parts. This is because included

amongst the various claims a person usually has to an object that she owns is the clai
to determine what happens to that object.

Recognising that a person owned her body parts would also undermine the various
assumptions made by the relevant medical personnel and researchers about access to
and uses for excised human body parts or parts from cadavers. When a person owns

an object it is at least assumed that she has various types of claims to it, includin
determine what happens to that thing. So if a person had such claims over her body

parts then, at the very least, it would be required that she had relinquish her claims

them before someone else uses them. Further, and this is particularly relevant to usi
parts from cadavers, a person's (prior) permission would be all that was required.
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Finally, a person's owning her body parts would clarify the nature and significance of
the relationship between a person and her body parts. It is, though, not sufficient to
merely assert a person owns X, but rather some justification for a person owning X is
required. In previous chapters I have provided such a justification. I have argued that

the lack of clarity of this relationship had given rise to practices that were at odds
organ procurement policies, and, more importantly, assumed that a person had no
concerns relating to the treatment of her body parts. Contrary to such assumptions, a
person may have a morally significant interest in what happens to her body parts in
these circumstances and so it should be recognised that she had certain prerogatives in
relation to her body parts. Below I establish that the specific prerogatives I have
argued a person should have in relation to her body parts are more likely to be
acknowledged and respected if it is recognised that a person owned her body parts.

ii. Recognising that Moore Owned His Body Parts

In the first section I argued the directions from the US Supreme Court in the Moore
case, requiring a physician to disclose additional information in order to fulfil his
fiduciary duty and ensure a patient gives her fully informed consent, would not ensure
recognition of a person's prerogative to determine what happened to a part of her body
removed for therapeutic reasons. This is because simply requiring a person's consent
to a proposed use for an excised part of her body is not the same as her determining,
amongst a number of options how she wants that part treated. In addition, this
proposal did not so much improve the informed consent procedures as just require

disclosure of specific, albeit additional, information. Finally, it does not address wh
I have suggested is the main cause of the discrepancies between the relevant policy and

practices: that there is uncertainty about the relationship between a person and her bo
parts.
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A person's prerogative to determine what happens to any of her body parts removed

for therapeutic reasons means that within the general constraints discussed in chapte
two a person could make any of a wide variety of determinations in relation to her

body parts. In practice, a person will typically either give permission for an excise
body part to be used for experimentation or instruct they be destroyed, perhaps
specifying the manner of disposal. These and other specific determinations a person
may make concerning the treatment of her body parts could be described as her
exercising one or more property rights over them. I argued above, though, that
explicitly recognising a person had the relevant property rights over her body parts

would not ensure the proper consultation takes place before her excised body part was

used for experimentation or, more generally, ensure recognition of her prerogative to
determine what happens to such parts.

Circumstances such as those resulting in the Moore case provide evidence of the

assumption that once a part of a person's body has been removed, particularly if it w

diseased, she no longer has an interest in what happens to that part. This assumption
would be undermined, and a number of aspects of the relationship between a person
and her body parts would be clarified, if it were recognised that a person owned her

body parts. First, it would be clearer what sort of claim a person had to her excised
body parts—usually one that is stronger than anyone else's claim. Second, this claim
is not extinguished simply when a person has a part of her body removed. Third,

because a person continues to have a significant claim over her excised body part, it

would be clearer that she had to be consulted before anything is done with or to that
part. More than this, though, a person's having such a claim in relation to her body
parts entitles her to determine what happens to any excised parts, and as argued in
chapter three, a person may have significant moral reasons for making such
determinations.
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S o m e of the implications of a person's owning her body parts for the use of h u m a n
body parts in experimentation can be illustrated by speculating what would have
happened if it had been recognised Moore owned his spleen and other body parts

removed during the course of his treatment. To begin with, it would have been clear
Moore had a claim over his excised body parts. So Golde and his associates would

not only have needed Moore's consent to the removal of his body parts but also that

had explicitly relinquished his claim to them.57 At that point, Moore could have aske
about what would happen to his excised body parts and if, as he suggested in his

evidence to the various court hearings, he did not want his spleen used for medical
experimentation, he could have refused to give his consent.

If it has been recognised that Moore owned his body parts, it would have been clear

what information he should have been told prior to being asked for his consent. Thi

would include, but also go beyond, the type of information specified by the Supreme
Court. Specifically, Moore should have been told what the cell-line developed from
research using his body parts would be used for and about any legal and commercial

implications. Further, it may have been clearer what type of claim Moore had to the

profits from the cell-line. Resolving this issue would require a detailed analysis of
relevant complex aspects of property and commercial law in order to answer various

specific questions: How much did the raw material from Moore's spleen contribute to

the development of the cell-line? How does this compare to the knowledge and skills

of the researchers? And, if such a comparison is possible, are there other property

rules which would justify awarding Moore a share in the profits?58 It will suffice f

my purposes to suggest that if is recognised that a person owns her body parts, the

57

Whilst M o o r e was asked to relinquish some specific rights in relation to his spleen and other
body parts, it was indirectly via a hypothetical clause on the consent form, and further Moore
was not told that his body parts were being used either at the research stage of Golde's project or
when the cell-line was being developed.

58 For a detailed discussion of these and other issue and a suggestion as to their resolution, see R
Hardiman, 'Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognising Property Rights in the
Commercial Value of H u m a n Tissue', UCLA Law Review, vol. 34, 1986, pp. 207-265.
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the various specific issues raised by the M o o r e case, and the more general issues
raised by the use of h u m a n body parts in medical experimentation, would be easier to
resolve.

A person's owning her body parts would also be more likely to ensure a person's
prerogative to give instructions that an excised part of her body be destroyed would be
respected. This is because included amongst the rights a person usually has over
objects she o w n s is therightto destroy it. Since the various determinations a person is
most likely to m a k e in relation to a part of her body removed for therapeutic reasonspermitting it to be used in a particular w a y or instructing that part be destroyed—are
the types of determinations a person m a y m a k e over objects she owns, recognising
that a person o w n s her body parts would be the best way of ensuring recognition of
her prerogatives.

iii. Cadaver Organ Donation and Ownership of Body Parts

I argued in chapter four that adhering to the wishes of the deceased person's relative
is the main reason w h y a deceased person's prior directives concerning the treatment
of her body parts after her death m a y be ignored or overridden. M y proposal that a
person should be recognised as owning her body parts would help to address this
discrepancy between the relevant policies and practices in relation to cadaver organ
donation. This is because if a person owned her body parts, the significance of any
directives she gave concerning the treatment of such parts after her death would be
clarified and strengthened.

In chapter five, I suggested a person's giving directives about the treatment of her
body parts after her death was akin to her bequeathing her property. Both involve a
person's giving directives that are to be carried out after her death, and both have
formalised procedures regarding h o w these directives are m a d e k n o w n to the person
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responsible for carrying them out. So if a person were recognised as owning her body
parts, then her directives as to what should happen to them after her death would have
a similar status to the directives given as part of a bequest.

It is only morally and legally permissible for a person to bequeath something she owns

up until the time of her death. Although it is conceivable for a person to give direct
concerning the treatment of an excised part of her body (kept in a suitably preserved

state) after her death, such directives usually pertain to body parts that are still p
person's body at the time of her death. As argued above, a person has sovereignty
over her body parts when they are still part of her body, and there is at least one
argument why this sovereignty should amount to ownership. So a person would have

sovereignty over, or have owned, those body part that are still part of her body up til
the time of her death. This means any directives a person gave concerning the
treatment of her body parts after her death have a further similarly to bequests—
namely, both concern things a person owned up until the time of her death.

Bequests may be challenged, and when such challenges are successful, the relevant
prior directives of the deceased person are overridden. Such challenges are usually a
result of uncertainty, or a dispute, about what the person wanted, and there are
procedures for resolving such disputes. Since similar disputes may arise concerning
how a person would have wanted her body parts treated after her death, if it is
recognised that a person owns her body parts, then the same procedures could be used
for resolving those disputes.

Other challenges to a person's will could be made if someone who expected to benefit

from the deceased person's estate (typically because they were related to the deceased
person) is in her or someone else's view unjustly treated under the terms of that
person's estate. It is difficult to see how a comparable challenge could be made in
relation to a deceased person's directives concerning the treatment of her body parts
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after her death. O n e possibility is that the deceased person's relatives could claim they
would suffer emotional or psychological distress if the deceased person's prior
directives concerning the treatment of her body parts were carried out.

Given the significance of the interests a person may have in how her body parts are

treated after her death, and the general significance of a person's directives relating

events at the end of her life or after her death, the interests of the deceased person'

relatives must take second place. After all, a person's being distressed by the content

of a will is not usually grounds for overriding that will. Further, because the decease
person's relatives are usually deemed responsible for carrying out many of that

person's prior directives, they have a responsibility to ensure, as far as they can, su
directives be adhered to. This, however, is not the extent of the deceased person's
relatives responsibilities. Where the deceased person did not give any explicit

directives, it does not become the relatives' prerogative to determine how that person'
body parts will be treated. Rather, as argued in chapter four, the relatives have a
responsibility to discern from what was known about the person how she would have
wanted them treated.

In practice, though, the relatives of a deceased person will not usually deliberately
ignore or override that person's directives concerning the treatment of some or all of

her body parts after her death. Rather, as argued in earlier chapters, the central, and
typically decisive, role of the relatives in determining whether a deceased person's
body parts will be removed and used for transplantation purposes has resulted from
uncertainty about whose wishes should prevail. As discussed in chapter four, one of
two outcomes usually result. When the deceased person's relatives are consulted
about the use of that person's body parts for transplantation purposes, they may well
be asked whether she would have wanted her body parts to be so used. In such
circumstances, the deceased person's directives may be adhered to, but it is also
possible, because of a combination of ignorance and the circumstances in which such
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decisions have to be made, that the relatives' wishes will prevail. Alternatively, and
this is perhaps more likely, no attempt will be made to determine the deceased person's
prior wishes, since the relevant health professionals will be reluctant to consult the
distressed relatives.

I have argued in this chapter that if it is recognised a person owns her body parts this
will serve to clarify both her relationship to and the claims she has regarding them.
Whilst such recognition may not immediately eliminate those practices which result in

the deceased person's prior wishes or directives being ignored or overridden, once it i

accepted that this is the nature of the relationship between a person and her body parts
and moreover that there are sound moral reasons for such a relationship, these
practices may well begin to decline. This is because, first, where the deceased person

had given prior directives regarding the treatment of her body parts after her death, it
will be clearer that she has the right to give such directives and, further, that such
directives are all that is required for her body parts to be treated according to her
wishes. Second, in the absence of such directives, the main objective of any
consultation that takes place between the deceased person's relatives and the relevant
health professionals would be to determine what the deceased person would have
wanted. Third, and finally, the health professionals' concerns about further
distressing the grieving relatives, which will probably be the most difficult obstacle
overcome, may well be diminished since it will be clearer what the role of the deceased
person's relatives is in such circumstances, namely to carry out the deceased person's
prior directives, or in the absence of any directives to determine what she would have
wanted, regarding the treatment of her body parts after her death.

So the directives a person may give concerning the treatment of her body parts after
her death have much in common with bequests a person may make, for example, in
her will. It is only legally and morally permissible for a person to bequeath those
objects she owns. So, if it is recognised that a person owns her body parts, any
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directives she gives concerning the treatment of her body parts after her death would
have the same status of the more usual types of bequest. M o r e importantly, such
recognition means any directives a person does give concerning the treatment of her
body parts after her death are more likely to be adhered to. This is because the main
objective in determining whether to retrieve a person's body parts for transplantation
purposes, or to use them in some other way, will become to try to do what would have
that person wanted.

In the next chapter, I identify and respond to what will probably be the main objection
to m y argument. Here, though, it is worth briefly responding to another objection that
m a y be m a d e specifically concerning the implications of m y proposal for the retrieval
of parts from cadavers for transplantation. It m a y be argued that one consequence of
recognising that a person owns her body parts is that there will be a decrease in the
already insufficient supply of organs available for transplantation. Those taking this
position m a y well acknowledge that it is important to protect the (prior) interests of
those from w h o m the body parts are removed, but argue that the social consequences
of a further decrease in the supply of organs suitable for transplantation would be a
greater social evil.

If my proposal is adopted, it would not necessarily lead to a decrease in the supply of
organs available for transplantation. This is because it does not follow from
recognising that a person o w n s her body parts that she would refuse to give
permission for any or all of them to be used for transplantation after her death. A s
discussed in this and the previous chapter, the current policies regulating the
procurement of body parts from cadavers seem to implicitly assume a person has
certain rights over her body parts, that can be re-described as property rights. So it
m a y be possible that once it is m a d e explicit that a person has these rights over her
body parts, which I have argued will be best achieved if it is recognised that a person
o w n s her body parts, then it m a y well increase the supply of organs available for
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transplantation. This is because it will be clearer that a person has the right to give the
relevant directives concerning the treatment of her body parts after her death. This
issue would ultimately have to be decided empirically.

Let us suppose, though, that recognising that a person did own her body parts did
result in a decrease in the supply of organs available for transplantation purposes.
Then it would need to be ascertained which is the greater social evil: the decrease in
organs, or ignoring or overriding the specific directives that a person gave concerning
the treatment of her body parts after her death. I argued in chapter four that the needs
of the living do not automatically extinguish any contrary directives a person had given
concerning events that would occur after her death. With regard to a person's
directives concerning the treatment of her body parts after her death-including refusing
to m a k e them available for transplantation purposes-such directives m a y have been
given in order to ensure that, after her death, her body parts were treated in accord
with her deeply held values and beliefs. Further, a person's body part being treated in
accord with her prior directives m a y be one of the events that whilst it happens after
her death, m a y complete that person's life w h e n it is considered as a whole. This in
turn would undermine the value of that person and her life. For these reasons, I
argued, a person's directives concerning the treatment of her body parts after her death
should only be disregarded in exceptional circumstances. A possible decrease in the
supply of organs for transplantation would not constitute such a circumstance.

More generally, recognising that a person owns her body parts clarifies the nature and
type of claims a person would have in relation to her body parts. Whilst I have mainly
been concerned with the interests and claims a person m a y have in relation to a part of
her body removed for therapeutic reasons and all of her body parts after her death, a
person m a y have other interests in her body parts. Recognising that a person owns
her body parts m a y also better ensure recognition of any further claims resulting from
such interests.
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In the first section of this chapter I rejected two alternative proposals that m a y have
ensured recognition of and respect for the prerogatives I have argued a person should
have in relations to her body parts. These proposals, I suggest, were perhaps the most
likely alternatives to m y o w n . First, the proposal to extend the notion of informed
consent so that a person would be given more information before being asked to
consent to a particular use of an excised part of her body being was m a d e in a legal
context, specifically as a remedy to the problems that arose in the Moore

case.

Second, Munzer's proposal that a person has some property rights in, but does not
o w n , her body parts, seems to reflect m e current policies regulating the various uses
of h u m a n body parts, although such policies only implicitly recognise that a person
has various rights in relation to her body parts.

These, however, are not the only possible alternatives to my proposal that in order to
protect and promote a person's prerogatives in relation to her body parts it should be
recognised that she owns them. There m a y be those w h o whilst agreeing with m e that
such prerogatives should be protected, feel uncomfortable with the idea of a person
owning her body parts, some of the reasons for which will be discussed in the next
chapter. They m a y then wish to explore other legal mechanisms for ensuring
recognition and protection of these prerogatives. It would be unlikely though that such
mechanisms will be as effective as ownership.

I argued in the previous section that it is clearer what claims and rights a person ha
over an object w h e n she owns that object than when she just has a number of property
rights in relation to it. This is despite Macpherson's contention that in western
democratic societies, all other type^of rights are subordinate to property rights.
Macpherson argued further that where there is a conflict or uncertainty as to the
strength of one partes claim against another, if one party has property rights in the
disputed object, then their claim will usually prevail. This is not to say that when a
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person has property rights in an object, that none of those right will ever be
contravened. For example, just because a person has the right to possess an object
does not guarantee that object will not be stolen from her. W h a t having property rights
over an object does guarantee though is that the person usually has a right of redress if
any of these rights are contravened.

It is my contention that, with respect to material objects, ownership is to property
rights as Macpherson has suggested property rights are to all other rights. This is
because, as argued earlier in this chapter, w h e n a person o w n s an object, rather than
simply having various property rights over it, it is clearer what claims and rights she
has in relation to that object. Further, just as other typejof rights generally take second
place to property rights in cases of uncertainty and conflict, so too if a person owned
an object then if some uncertainty or conflict in relation to that object would usually be
resolved in her favour, even if s o m e other person had various property rights over the
same object. Finally, w h e n a person owns an object if any of those rights that she has
in relation to it are contravened then it will perhaps be clearer that she entitled to some
form of redress rather than if she just had some property rights in that object. In sum,
then, in western democratic societies owning an object usually gives a person the
strongest set of claims, and corresponding types of redress should those claims be
interfered with, in relation to an object. For this reason, in addition to the other
arguments I have given earlier in this chapter, I contend a person owning her body
parts is the best w a y of ensure that the prerogatives I have argued a person should
have in relation to her body parts should be recognised as ownership.

CONCLUSION

Whilst the argument I have given in this chapter is, in part, a pragmatic one, it is bas
on the conclusion from earlier chapters that a person m a y have a morally significant
interest in her body parts and thus she has certain prerogatives in relation to them.
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After dismissing two other options for ensuring the recognition of these prerogatives, I
argued that because of certain pragmatic features of ownership (the most important one

being a person usually has the strongest claim to an object that she owns) the best way
to ensure recognition of a person's prerogatives in relation to her body parts is to

recognise that she owns her body parts. This is because of the centrality and status of
ownership in western democratic societies.

Nevertheless, because there is a common perception that, at the very least, there is
something odd about a person's owning her body parts, there will be various

objections to my proposal. Perhaps the most significant moral objection will a specifi

application of the commodification objection: since it is usually the case that a pers
is permitted to sell what she owns, human body parts should not be owned because
they should not be treated as commodities, since this would undermine the value and
dignity of persons. An analysis and evaluation of this objection will be the focus of
the next chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN
OWNERSHIP AND THE COMMODIFICATION
OF H U M A N B O D Y P A R T S

Macpherson characterises the modern conception of property as '... an exclusive
individual right to use and dispose of material things',1 and maintains that the concept
of property is n o w almost entirely associated with market transactions. The same is
true of ownership: although there are exceptions, it is generally assumed that if a
person o w n s something then she has the right to sell it. This, I argue in the first
section of this chapter, is the basis for one possible moral objection-probably the one
that will most likely be made against m y proposal-that it should be recognised that a
person o w n s her body parts. In the second section I describe and evaluate several
detailed philosophical arguments in support of this objection, arguing that at best they
are inconclusive. In the third section, I argue that m y proposal is not undermined by
the commodification objection.

SECTION I: A MORAL OBJECTION TO A PERSON'S OWNING HER BODY
PARTS

Since the argument I have given for a person's owning her body parts is primarily a
moral one, I need only deal with any moral objections it. S o other types of
philosophical objections (metaphysical, epistemological) to a person's owning her
body or its parts are not of concern here. In this chapter I will, unless otherwise
stated, be concerned with whether a person is morally permitted to o w n her body
parts.

1

C. B. Macpherson, 'Human Rights as Property Rights', Dissent, 1977, p. 73.
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W h e n the so-called commodification objection—that there are certain objects that
because of their nature should not be sold or treated as commodities—is made in

relation to human body parts, it is usually as part of the debate about a market for s

parts. In that context, it is not argued that a person should not own, or have propert
rights in, her body parts. Rather, specific moral reasons are given why the sale of
human body parts should be prohibited. These reasons usually relate to contingencies
about the current trade in organs from the third world: that persons already

impoverished are being exploited,2 and that the body parts from such transactions will
be unsuitable for transplantation since the 'donors' will be in poor health.3 A more

general objection to the sale of human body parts, not related to the current trade in
human body parts, is that permitting the sale of human body parts would obviate an
unusual and particularly important opportunity for altruism.4 The primary concern of

2

G. Abouna, 'Negative Impact of Trading in H u m a n Organs on the Development of
Transplantation in the Middle East', Transplantation Proceedings, vol. 25, no. 3, 1993,
pp. 2310-2313; F. Cantarovich, 'Values Sacrificed and Values Gained by the Commerce of
Organs. The Argentinian Experience', Transplantation Proceedings, vol. 22, no. 3, 1990,
pp. 925-927; S. Fluss, 'Commerce in H u m a n Organs: the International Response', World Health
Forum, vol. 12, 1991, pp. 307-310; K. C. Reddy, 'Unconventional Renal Transplantation in
India', Transplantation Proceedings, vol. 22 no. 3, 1990, pp. 910-911; and London Kidney
Exchange in Trouble', Nature, vol. 337, no. 2, 1989, p. 393.

3 These objections were originally raised by R. Titmus in relation to blood; see The Gift
Relationship, London, Allen & Unwin, 1971, pp. 158-173. Titmuss' concerns about the quality
of the blood supply do not necessarily apply in the case of the organs, because a major part of
that concern was that poorer people would repeatedly sell their blood without adhering to the
time period required between blood donation (sales). This concern could be also raised about
living organ donation but only in relation to bone marrow and liver lobes. Also, there are
conflicting views about whether a market in blood led to a decrease in the amount of donated
blood. It has been suggested that the only way to test this concern in relation to body part is to
allow a market in body parts to co-exist with the current system. See M . Brams, 'Transplantable
H u m a n Organs: Should Their Sale be Authorised by State Statutes?', American Journal of Law
and Medicine, vol. 3, no. 2, 1977, pp. 183-195.
4 See, for example P. Ramsey, The Patient as A Person, Yale University Press, New Haven,
1970, p. 290; and A. M . Sadler & B. L. Sadler, 'A Community of Givers, Not Takers', Hastings
Center Report, vol 14, no. 5, 1984, pp. 6-9.
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those making this objection is to promote organ donation as the preferred method of
organ procurement.

Attempts to give a more fundamental moral reason why a person should not be
allowed to sell her body parts usually claim that such sales would be degrading to the
person from whose body the part has been removed, and, further, would be contrary
to her dignity. It is in such discussions that the commodification objection is made. It
is because a person is usually permitted to sell something she owns that those raising
the commodification objection in relation to human body parts would probably also
object to m y proposal that it should be recognised that a person owns her body parts.

i. Owning and Selling

As James Childress has pointed out, ' ... when the language of ownership, property
and property rights is introduced, it is assumed that sales represents one acceptable
m o d e of transfer of one's o w n property'.5 W h e n an object is sold, the buyer acquires
a set ' ... of rights and duties concerning it and the previous

owner

.... [receives] ... money' 6 in exchange for the object. This means that 'nothing can
be sold unless it is first owned',7 or more precisely, '[njothing can be sold, ... unless
rights over it can and do exist. N o r can anything be sold unless it is possible to
separate those rights from the person w h o has them'.8 The converse however is not
true: just because an object can be owned does not necessarily mean it can be sold.

5

F. J. Childress, 'The Body as Property: Some Philosophical Reflections', Transplantation
Proceedings, vol. 24, no. 5, 1992, p. 2144.

6 J. Andre, 'Blocked Exchanges: A Taxonomy', Ethics, vol. 103, 1992, p. 31.
7 Andre, p. 31.
8 Andre, p. 32.
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A n y of the rights or incidents of ownership m a y be restricted in relation to a particular
object. Of particular interest here are any normative restrictions, rather than, for
example, legal or economic restrictions, on a person's right to sell something she
owns. In Honore's schema, the relevant incident of ownership a person needs to have

in an object in order to be permitted to sell it is the incident of the right to the

Specifically, selling an object is one way in which a person could exercise an aspec
that incident—the power to alienate that object. There are important differences
between the various ways a person may be permitted to alienate an object she owns.

When, for example, a person abandons an object she exercises her power to alienate it

but does not transfer any of the rights she has in that object. Another way a person'
power to alienate an object may be restricted is that she may only be permitted to
transfer her rights to it under certain conditions or in particular ways. A person's

being permitted to give away or donate, but not being allowed to sell, an object is a
example of this type of restriction.

There may be various reasons why a person may be permitted to give away, but not
sell, an object she owns. The object may, for example have historical or cultural
significance to the broader community, and, so whilst the person may have the rights
to possess, use and perhaps even manage it, she may not be allowed to sell it. She
may however be able to donate it to that community. Usually the reason particular

objects should not be sold has to do with the nature of that object. For at least som
these objects, though, a person's giving them away, particularly when doing so is an
act of generosity or altruism, somehow enhances her character and may even be

beneficial to her, whilst selling them might be detrimental to her and perhaps may h

wider adverse effects. As will be discussed below, this is part of some reasons given
why a person is permitted to donate but not sell her body parts.
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ii.

The Commodification Objection to a Person Owning Her Body Parts

The general idea underlying the commodification objection is that some objects, as
well as some intangible things such as some human interactions or some of a person's
rights, are corrupted by the market. Such corruption could be to the object of the

proposed sale (for example religious icons), the way participants in the transaction a

treated (for example slavery), or by undermining a general practice or institution (fo
example it is claimed that commercial surrogacy arrangements undermine parent-child

relationships, or vote-buying undermines democratic elections). Further, there is also
a general reason why a particular object should not sold, namely that it is closely
connected to or associated with the person in a some way, which means that if the

object was sold it may undermine the value of that person, for that object to be sold

When the commodification objection is raised in the debate about a market in body
parts, the general idea is that '...a free market for transplant organs would make
human organs a commodity, something to be brought and sold, and that this is
intrinsically morally wrong'.9 Explanations why it is morally unacceptable to treat
human body parts as commodities may be general: for example '[b]oth our cultural

heritage and our expressed attitudes are hostile to treating human bodies as marketab

commodities',10 or they may attempt to specifically identify why such transactions are

9

M . T. Nelson, 'The Morality of a Free Market for Transplant Organs', Public Affairs Quarterly,
vol. 5, no. 1, 1991, p. 68. See, also, for example, R. C. Fox, 'Regulated Commercialism of
Vital Organ Donation? Con', Transplantation Proceedings, vol. 25, no. 1, 1993, pp. 55-57; F. J.
Childress, 'The Body as Property: Some Philosophical Reflections', p. 2145; J. F. Blumstein,
The Case for Commerce in Organ Transplantation', Transplantation Proceedings, vol 24, no. 5,
1992, p. 2193; and T. Hartmann, 'The Buying and Selling of H u m a n Organs from the Living:
W h y Not?', Akron Law Review, vol. 13, no. 1, 1979, p. 169.

10 J. Prottas, 'Buying Human Organs — Evidence that Money Doesn't Change Everything',
Transplantation, vol. 53, no. 6, 1992, p. 1372.
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unacceptable: for example, there is a '... deep conviction that the body and its parts
are somehow different from other things, central to our dignity as human beings.'11
Common to both types of objections is the idea that treating human body parts as

commodities is contrary to the dignity a person has simply in virtue of being a perso

If it is recognised that a person owns her body parts, then it may well be assumed sh
has the right to sell them. Evidence of this association, and further of its being

objectionable for a person to own or sell her body parts, is provided by the language
used, and not used, to promote the various policies for procuring body parts for

transplantation and, more significantly, the extensive literature on the ethics of o
procurement. The terms 'ownership' or 'property' are not used in either context,
whereas 'donation' and 'gift-giving' appear frequently in both. Whilst these terms
were originally used to liken an unfamiliar and perhaps abhorrent practice—removing
parts of a person's body and placing them in the body of another person—to more
common and acceptable practice—such as gift-giving or donation. Further, in some
contexts, these terms seem to be meant literally.12 Body parts made available for

transplantation are often referred to as gifts, and, also, the person from whose body

the part has been removed is often said to have given the gift of life. The use of th
word 'donation' in this context emphasises the act of responding to the needs of

stranger, and that doing so is an act of generosity. I suggest these and other purpo

11

T. H. Murray, 'The Use of Human Biological Material in the Development of Biomedical
Products', [Testimony to] Committee on Science and Technology House of Representatives
1985, p. 210.

12 I have explored this issue in detail in N. Gerrand, 'The Notion of Gift-giving a
Donation', Bioethics, vol. 8, no. 1, 1994, pp. 127-150. For alternative views, see T. H.
Murray, 'Gifts of the Body and the Needs of Strangers', Hastings Center Report, vol. 17, no. 2,
1987, pp. 30-38; and D. K. Martin & E. M . Meslin., 'The Give and Take of Organ
Procurement', Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, vol. 19, 1994, pp. 61-78.
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similarities between acts of gift-giving or donation and a person making a body part(s)
available for transplantation after her death are more than just useful fictions.

In the debate about, and the promotion of, policies for procuring body parts for
transplantation, it may simply be assumed a person owns her body parts, or at least
has the relevant property rights in them, so she can 'donate' them or give them as
gifts. I suggest, though, that terms such as 'ownership', and 'property' are avoided

rather than assumed in this context. This is because those who promote the practice o
a person's giving permission for parts of her body to be removed for transplantation
purposes after her death often oppose the sale of human body parts, and so would
object to a person's owning her body parts, presumably because this would indicate

she could sell them. For this reason, discussions about using parts from cadavers for

transplantation are typically couched in terms of the potential recipient's needs an
importance of altruism and gift-giving for the community, rather than ownership or
property. The following quote is indicative: '... we should reject body markets
because our need to affirm community requires a realm of gifts by which we minister
to one another's needs. Gifts of the body, powerfully symbolic of our shared
embodiment, are especially important'.13

Such claims, however, fail to realise a person would have to own something before
she would be permitted to donate it or give it as a gift (even in the latter case a
owns the object for a short time between buying the gift and giving it). Further,

donation, giving or selling are all ways a person may alienate an object, and so invo
the person exercising the same property rights or incidents of ownership. This means

13

T. H. Murray, 'On the Human Body as Property: The Meaning of Embodiment, Markets
Meaning of Strangers', Journal of Law Reform, vol. 204, 1987, p. 1088.
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that' ... if there is a relation between a person and his body which legitimises a gift

of a body part, then the same relation may also legitimise the sale of a body part'.

I argue below that the different explanations why human body parts should not be

treated as commodities are usually inadequate since they do not explain, for example

why there is hostility to selling human body parts or how the treatment of a person'

body parts could be an affront to her dignity. There have been some attempts, notabl
in the philosophical literature,15 to provide more detailed explanations why it is
morally unacceptable to treat human body parts as commodities, and some of these

will be discussed and evaluated in the next section. And whilst in previous chapters

have given my own explanation for how the treatment of a person's body parts relates

to her dignity, in the final section of this chapter I argue this explanation does n
necessarily mean that a person should not be allowed to sell her body parts.

SECTION II: PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE

COMMODIFICATION OF BODY PARTS

Many of the philosophical arguments against human body parts being treated as
commodities cite several passages from Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy,
specifically his discussion about how a person should treat her body and its parts,
explain why such treatment would in some way degrade the person from whose body

a part has been removed, or is contrary to the dignity or value she has in virtue of

14

G. Mavrodes, 'The Morality of Selling Human Organs', Progress in Clinical and Biological
Research, 38, 1980, p. 139.

15 See, for example, T. H. Murray, 'On the Human Body as Property: The Meaning of
Embodiment, Markets and the Meaning of Strangers', pp. 1074-1088; Fox, 'Regulated
Commercialism of Vital Organ Donation? Con', p. 55; and Childress, 'The Body as Property:
Some Philosophical Reflections', p. 2145.
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being a person.16 After examining the relevant passages, I argue that once they are
understood against the background of Kant's broader moral philosophy it is clearer

that he had wider concerns than just prohibiting a market in body parts. I then disc

Stephen Munzer's unusually detailed analysis of these passages and his subsequen
argument against a person's having those property rights that operate in the market
over her body parts. Finally, I examine two other argument why human body parts

should not be viewed or treated as property which, whilst not citing Kant, expre
similar concerns as the arguments that do.

i. Kant on Treating Human Body Parts as Property

One position ascribed to Kant concerning the treatment of human body parts as

commodities is that doing so would involve the "... degradation of treating one's ow

(or another's) body in this way'.17 The passages which have led to this, and similar,

views being attributed to Kant can be found in two of his works: The Doctrine of

Virtue, and his Lectures on Ethics.18 It is worth noting at the outset these passage
part of arguments concerning suicide and sexual morality, rather than whether human

body parts should be viewed or treated as property. Further, the purpose of thes

discussions is to investigate the implications of Kant's moral philosophy , and so t
discussions themselves are peripheral to Kant's broader aims.

16

See, for example, R. Harre, 'Bodily Obligations', Cogito, 1987, pp. 15-19; R. Chadwick, 'The
Market for Bodily Paths: Kant and Duties to Oneself, Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 6.
no. 2, 1989, pp. 129-139; and S. Munzer, 'An Uneasy Case Against Property Rights in Body
Parts', Social Philosophy, vol. 11, no. 2, 1994, pp. 259-286.

17 B. Brecher, 'Organ for Transplant: Donation or Payment', in Principles of Health Care Ethics,
R. Gillon, John, Wiley & Sons Ltd., N e w York, 1994, p. 995.

18 Since Kant's lectures are collections of his students notes, there is some doubt as to the ex
which they reflect Kant's true views. This is of interest for m y purposes here, since there is an
important discrepancy between these two sources on the issue under discussion.
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Those writers w h o cite passages from Kant often give the impression that, like them,
Kant was solely concerned with arguing that human body parts should not be treated
as commodities. Kant's concerns, however, go beyond the effects or consequences of
selling human body parts, to determining the correct moral relationship a person
should have with her body, given persons are unique beings with the capacity to be
rational and moral. Further, the way a person may treat her body, and by extension

her body parts, may affect her capacity to be rational and to act morally. This wider
concern may even preclude some of the ways generally agreed to be acceptable for a
person to treat her body parts, such as living and cadaver organ donation.

Several aspects of Kant's broader moral philosophy need to be explained for the full

implications of the passages I discuss below. Since many of these passages are part o
Kant's discussions of the various duties a person has to herself, it is important to
understand the Kantian notion of duty, and more specifically what is entailed by a
person having duties to herself. At the beginning of The Doctrine of Virtue, Kant

seems to acknowledge that a person's having duties to herself may seem contradictory,
since it does not seem to make sense for a person to put herself under an obligation

herself. He goes on to argue, however, that unless a person has duties to herself the
would be no duties at all, since "... I can recognise that I am under obligation to

only insofar as I at the same time put myself under obligation'.19 In his Lecture Duti

to Oneself, Kant claims such duties are ' ... of primary importance ... [because] ..
is obvious that nothing can be expected from a man who dishonours his own
person'.20 The basis for a person's duties to himself is ' ... that we must reverence

19

I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. M . Gregor, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1991 (1797), p. 214.
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humanity in our o w n person because apart from this m a n becomes worthless in the
eyes of his fellows and worthless in himself.'21

Kant divides the duties a person has to himself into those he has in virtue of being a
animal (natural duties) and those he has in virtue of being a rational agent (moral
duties).22 The particular duty a person has to himself relevant here is the '... duty
man to himself as an animal being ... to preserve himself in his animal nature'.23 An
aspect of this duty is that one should not mutilate oneself by '... depriving oneself
certain integral, organic parts, that is, maiming oneself.24 Unlike another more
important aspect of a person's duty of self-preservation—the duty not to commit
suicide—a person's duty not to mutilate himself is prima facie. In his lecture 'On
Suicide', Kant qualifies a person's duty to maintain bodily integrity thus: '[w]e may

treat our bodies as we please provided our motives are those of self-preservation. If,
for instance, his foot is a hindrance to life, a man might have it amputated. To
preserve his person he has the right of disposal over his body.'25 So, a person's
having a body part removed for therapeutic reasons would be consistent with the duty
of self-preservation. Kant also allows for the severance and disposal of body parts,
such as hair, for practical reasons, although he does not specify exactly what
constitutes a 'practical reason'.

20

I. Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. L. Infield and foreword by L. W . Beck, Hackett, Indianapolis,
1963 (1775-89), p. 118.

21 Kant, p. 121.
22 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 216-217 on this division.
23 Kant, p. 218.
24 Kant, p. 218.
25 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, p. 149.
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All the duties a person has to himself are part of a more important duty to treat himself
in accordance with Kant's Formula

of the End in Itself. According to Kant, persons

alone have the capacity to be rational and perhaps the most important w a y a person
exhibits this capacity is by acting morally. It is because of this capacity that persons
have dignity, and so should be treated in accord with Kant's practical imperative, that a
person must '[a]ct in such a w a y that [she] always treat humanity, whether in [her]
o w n person, or in the person of any other, never simply, as a means but always at the
same time as an end'.26 T h e reason a person should be treated as an end in herself is
because she has a rational nature, which "... exists as an end in itself.27 With this
general understanding of s o m e of the fundamental aspects of Kant's moral
philosophy, those passages from his writings cited in arguments w h y h u m a n body
parts should not be treated as commodities can n o w be critically examined.

Perhaps the most considered, and, therefore, the most instructive passage from Kant's
writings cited in these arguments is the following:

To deprive oneself of an integral part or organ (to maim oneself) —
for example to give away

or sell a tooth to be transplanted into

another's mouth or to have oneself castrated in order to get an easier
livelihood as a singer and so forth—are ways of partially murdering
oneself. But to have a dead or diseased organ amputated when it
endangers one's life or to have something cut off that is a part but not
an organ of the body, for example, one's hair, cannot be counted as a
crime against one's person—although cutting one's hair in order to sell
it is not entirely free of blame. 28

26

I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton The
Hutchinson University Library, London, 1948 (1785), p. 91.

27 Kant, p. 91.
28

Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, p. 219 (emphasis added).
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In the above passage Kant allows the cutting of hair, since it is not an integral body

part, but does not countenance a person's cutting his hair in order to sell it. This m
seem to support those who invoke Kant to support their arguments against treating
human body parts as commodities. Such an argument, however, ignores Kant's

central concern, which is to identify the correct moral relationship a person has wit

her body and its parts in order to preserve her capacity to be rational and moral. Thi
concern may have wider implication than just prohibiting a person's selling her body
part. One indication of this is in the above passage Kant describes a person's giving
away part of his body as partially murdering himself.

In his lecture entitled Duties to Oneself, Kant argues ' ... a human being is not

entitled to sell his limbs for money, even if he were offered ten thousand thalers fo

single finger. If he were so entitled he could sell all his limbs ... [and] ... [w]e c
dispose of things which have no freedom but not of a being that has free will'.29 Kant
is making two related points here. First, a part of a person's body should not be

treated as a thing because this implies the person is a thing. He makes the same point
in more detail in a passage from another lecture (which I discuss immediately below).

His second point, not relevant for this discussion, is that a person has free will whi
in Kant's moral philosophy, means he will act in accord with the dictates of reason.

In his lecture Duties Toward the Body in Respect of Sexual Impulse, Kant makes it
clearer that a person treating her body, or part thereof, in a particular way has
implications for how she is perceived, both by herself and others. His specific
concern is that a person should not treat her body as a thing:

29

Kant, Lectures on Ethics, p. 124.
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M a n cannot dispose of himself because he is not a thing; he is not his
o w n property; to say that he is would be self-contradictory; for in so
far as he is a person he is a Subject in w h o m the ownership of things
can be vested, and if he were his o w n property, he would be a thing
over which he could have ownership.

But a person cannot be a

property and so cannot be a thing which can be owned, for it is
impossible to be a person and a thing, the proprietor and the
property.30

Following this Kant asserts '...a man is not at his own disposal. He is not entitled to
sell a limb, nor even one of his teeth'.31 Again the context is important. Kant is
arguing here that w h e n a person acts on a sexual impulse, he makes the other person
an object. This is because the person's primary interest is the fulfilment of his o w n
desires, and so he does not view or treat the other person as an end in herself. For
this, and related reasons, Kant argues a person cannot o w n his o w n body, because
then he could give or sell it to someone to m a k e use of, which would transform it, and
his person, into a thing. O f particular interest is Kant's claim that a person is a subject
in which property is vested, not something (that is an object) that is itself property.32
This m e a n s that, for Kant, a person cannot o w n her body because it is part of her
person.

It is not immediately clear, though, why a person's selling one of her body parts is not
allowed on the basis that a person's whole body cannot be his property. Kant explains

30

Kant, p. 165.

31 Kant, p. 165.
32

For Kant, a person has property in virtue of their capacity to 'will and act'. For details s
Munzer, A Theory of Property Rights, Cambridge University Press, N e w York, 1990, pp.
132.
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further: '[i]t is obvious that to surrender part of oneself is to surrender the whole,

because a human being is a unity. It is not possible to have the disposal of a part on
of a person without the same time having the right of the disposal over the whole
person, for each part of a person is integrally bound up with the whole'.33 This is
because ' ... [t]he body is part of the self; in its togetherness with the self it

constitutes the person'.34 In this passage it is clear Kant prohibits the sale of human

body parts because it would be contrary to a person's rational nature to treat her who

body in that way and, further, may interfere with her capacity to exercise that nature
As we saw in chapter five, however, there are significant differences in the capacity
exercise the incidents of ownership over one's body, on the one hand, and one's body
parts, on the other. Even if it were implausible to suppose a person could own her
body, she could still own her body parts.

Further, whilst those who cite Kant to support their arguments against treating human
body parts as commodities claim such treatment would degrade the person whose
body part it was, this claim is never explicitly made by Kant. Such claims are,
however, consistent with the spirit of Kant's broader moral philosophy. For Kant
something that has dignity is of incomparable and unconditional worth, and such
things are restricted to "... morality, and humanity so far as it is capable of
morality'35. Therefore, since persons have dignity in virtue of being rational, and a
body along with the self constitute a person, then a person's body, and by extension
its parts, should be treated in ways consistent with that person having dignity.
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35 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 96-97.
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The problem, however, for those w h o invoke Kant to support their arguments against
treating human body parts as commodities is that, unless a part is diseased, Kant

prohibits a person's giving away, as well as selling, her body parts and, moreover, f
the same reasons: that doing so would be to act contrary to her duty of selfpreservation. Since those who oppose the selling of human body parts seek to

promote, or, at least, preserve, the practice of organ donation, it is understandable
why they would be inclined to overlook this further prohibition. This selectivity,
though, suggests that they fail to fully understand Kant's rationale for prohibiting
person from treating her body parts in particular ways, which as described above

relates to his broader philosophy, in particular his conception of persons. This seem
to be true of even the more detailed philosophical analysis of these passages from
Kant, one of which will be discussed below.

ii. Munzer: Limited Property Rights in Human Body Parts

In his article, 'Kant and Property Rights in Body Parts', Munzer claims at least thre
possible arguments can be constructed from Kant's writings to the conclusion it is
degrading for a person to have property rights, and therefore perhaps to own, her
body parts. In explicating these arguments, Munzer undertakes a detailed analysis of
passages from Kant's writings, distinguishing him from many other writers that cite
Kant. Nevertheless, I argue that Munzer also fails to acknowledge Kant's broader
concerns.

For my purposes, it is only necessary to examine the second argument Munzer

constructs from Kant's writings, since it has most in common with the reasons usually
given why human body parts should not be treated as commodities, namely that doing
so constitutes an offence to human dignity. It is worth noting, though, that in his
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evaluation of one of the other arguments he constructs, Munzer exhibits the selectively
is his use of Kant that w a s noted above. Whilst he is correct in claiming Kant has 'a
special horror for sales',36 he ignores Kant's further prohibition that a person giving
away

her b o d y parts is partially murdering herself. M u n z e r suggests 'Kant's

comparison is extreme ... [and] ... his reason for rejecting donation should itself be
rejected'.37 Yet these reasons are the same as those Kant has for rejecting the sale of
body parts, namely it is contrary to the duties a person has to her body in virtue of
being a rational agent. So, like other writers w h o invoke Kant to argue against a
market in body parts, M u n z e r seems to overlook s o m e of Kant's other restrictions on
the w a y s a person, as a rational agent, treat her body parts.

Munzer gives the following summary of the second argument that he constructs from
Kant's writings, which he labels the Argument from Humanity and Dignity:

Human beings exhibit humanity. Key elements in this humanity are a
rational nature and a capacity to act on principles. The humanity in
persons, is roughly, the capacity to be a moral agent. H u m a n beings
also exhibit dignity. Dignity is an unconditional and incomparable
worth. ... [i]f human beings have property rights in body parts and
exercised those rights, they would treat parts of their bodies in ways
that conflicted with their dignity. They would move from the level of
entities with dignity to the level of things with price.38

Whilst Munzer recognises Kant's peculiar understanding of humanity and its
connection with morality and rationality in his construction of this argument, he
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misconstrues Kant's notion of dignity, suggesting that all h u m a n beings have dignity.

That is, he suggests that a person's having dignity is in addition to having the capac
to exhibit humanity, not, as Kant argues, in virtue of having that capacity. Whilst
Kant does suggest this in some passages,39 it is not the usual understanding of the
Kantian notion of dignity; namely that, only persons who have the capacity to be moral
have dignity.40

Munzer's main criticism of the argument from humanity and dignity is that it commits

the fallacy of division, because '... even if a living body is an entity that has a ra

nature, and a capacity to act on principles, it does not follow that parts of that bod
such entities'.41 Munzer concedes various passages from Kant Lectures seems to

counter this criticism, for example, the '... body is part of the self; in its togethe

with the self it constitutes the person'.42 Munzer interprets this as meaning '[t]o se
anything that is integral to the organism impairs humanity and dignity',43 but claims
Kant could only provide an argument in support of this by using his metaphysical
distinction between noumena and phenomena, since '... Kant has a complex view of
the relationship of various kinds of body parts, whole bodies, selves and persons'.44
Such a strategy would be complicated and also unnecessary. Munzer is right in that,
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for Kant, there is this relationship, but wrong to say it is complex. A s already
mentioned, according to Kant, the body along with the self constitute a person, who

because of her nature as a rational being should be treated with respect and dignity.
since body parts constitute the body, they presumably also constitute part of the
person, and it is because of the incomparable worth of persons that body parts are
significant and so should not be treated in particular ways.

Munzer suggests two possible reconstructions of the argument from humanity and
dignity that need not appeal to Kant's noumena-phenomena distinction. First
' ... one can appeal to the moral status of individual persons to preclude impairment
of humanity and dignity'.45 Munzer concedes this argument may not be compatible
with everything Kant says, but nevertheless claims it ' ... allows for a range of

transfers that, under the right circumstances and with the right motives, could qualif
as the performance of duties of virtue'.46 The second reconstruction Munzer suggests
' ... points to the impact of a system for buying and selling body parts ... [which
would] ... transform the attitudes that human beings have toward themselves and each

other'.47 Specifically, persons may be perceived as sources of spare parts rather than
as entities of incomparable worth. More generally, Munzer's main criticism of the
argument from human dignity is that it does not fully explain how treating human body
parts as commodities would constitute an offence to a person's dignity.

Munzer's analysis of the Argument from Humanity and Dignity, which he constructs
from Kant's writing, is a springboard for his own argument against a person having
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47 Munzer, p. 328 (author's emphasis).

197
property rights in her body parts, which I evaluate below. It is worth noting, though,
that in his earlier work, A Theory of Property, Munzer takes a different position in
relation to the problem of human body parts being commodities. As part of his
argument for a person's having some property rights in, but not owning, her body
parts, Munzer gives several responses to the commodification objection. One relevant

for the present discussion is that it' ... may overlook the fact that persons do have
physical bodies, and may overemphasize the popular conception of property as

things'.48 He argues it is difficult to see, except in specific circumstances, such as
person's selling her body parts in order to alleviate impoverishment, how having
property rights over her body would interfere with that person's autonomy, and
suggests, rather, that a person's autonomy may be enhanced by having such rights.

However, in his later article, 'An Uneasy Case Against Property Rights in Body
Parts', Munzer argues a person should not have those property rights that operate in

the market over her body parts, since this would amount to an offence to her dignity.

He suggests ' ... human actions can offend dignity in at least three ways ... [by] ..
affronting, insulting or demeaning the moral status of the human being'.49 Munzer

argues further that"... the unified organisation of body parts, of various kinds, mak
up a living human being',50 and ' ... the status of any given body part is a function

of the status of the whole organism and the role of that part in the whole ... [sugge
reasons for why] ... treating body parts as commodities can offend a person's
dignity'.51
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M u n z e r suggests the possible offence to a person's dignity m a y have theoretical

implications for a person's having those property rights in body parts which operate i
the market. One implication is that whether a person's dignity is offended by
exercising such property rights over human body parts is contingent on the role she
has in the transaction—as a buyer, seller, intermediary or uninvolved observer.
Further, the type or degree of offence may vary depending on the type of body parts a
person exercises her property rights over. Finally, it possible that"... the language
the market might distort the way in which people view themselves and others. They

might tend to see persons as repositories of body parts with a market worth rather than
entities with a Kantian dignity'.52 However, there are monetary values are placed on
different body parts in particular contexts, for example in tort laws dealing with
physical injury and workers compensation schedules, without there being a
' ... property rule ... [which] ... operates ... to make body parts commodities'.53

More generally, Munzer himself gives several reason why his argument against a
person's having those property rights which operate in the market over her body parts
is uneasy: namely, it is difficult to clarify what is wrong with selling human body
parts, and, further, the effects of the market will vary depending on the role of the

person effected and what particular body part is being sold. Finally, he concedes ther
is no '... cogent move from the mere existence of a market in body parts to a sound
objection, in terms of commodities and Kantian dignity, to that market'.54 This, I
suggest, is partially because of the peculiar notion of Kantian dignity often invoked
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support arguments against treating h u m a n body parts as commodities. Perhaps the
reason why Munzer, and others, invoke Kant for this purpose is that he gives one of
the few philosophical explanations for a connection between the treatment of human
body parts and a person's dignity. Once the relevant passages from Kant are
understood against the background of his broader moral philosophy, which includes
but is not limited to his peculiar notion of dignity, they may not be as useful for
arguing against treating human body parts as commodities as those who cite them

believe, since the same rationale would prohibit the donation of human body parts. I
may be a broader notion of dignity would be more useful.

iii. Further Arguments Why Human Body Parts Should Not be Treated as
Commodities

Other writers have expressed concerns about human body parts being treated as
commodities, but without invoking the peculiar Kantian notion of dignity. Judith
Andre compiles a taxonomy of the 'blocked exchanges', identified by Michael
Walzer,55 which seeks to explain more fully why such things should not be brought or

sold. Walzer does not specifically include human body parts amongst those things th

should be subject to a blocked exchange, although the current trade in body parts fr

third world countries would probably be classified as a 'desperate exchange' akin to
that of slavery. As part of her taxonomy of Walzer's blocked exchanges, Andre
suggests human body parts are an example of something that should not be sold
because of the possibility of '... endangering buyers and exploiting sellers'.56
Although most of the concerns Andre discusses relating to the sale of human body

55 M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Basic Books Inc., New York, 1983, pp. 100-103.
56 Andre, 'Blocked Exchanges: A Taxonomy', p. 40.
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parts are the more specific concerns that were mentioned, but not discussed in detail, at

the beginning of this chapter, she also has general '... fears about changes in socia
relationships and in cultural climate'57 that may result from such a market.

Margaret Radin attempts to identify why human body parts should not be treated as
commodities. She discusses the ownership and sale of human body parts in the

context of giving a justification for property rights based on personhood, drawing on
Hegel's theory of property,58 that'... people become bound up with "things'".59 In
order to ensure a person has control over such things, Radin suggests they should be
recognised as that person's personal property. Of particular interest is Radin's

discussion of the implications of this theory for the topic at hand, namely her argum
that it is degrading to treat human body parts as commodities.

The possibility of a market for human body parts is one reason Radin gives why
'universal commodification' should be avoided. According to Radin '[universal
commodification implies that all things can and should be separable from persons and
exchanged through the free market, whenever some people are willing to sell and
others are willing to buy.'60 There are though some things that, for a variety of
reasons, "... should not be conceived of or treated as ... commodit[ies]'.61 One
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interpretation of Radin's response to the problems of universal commodification is that
' ... things necessary for h u m a n flourishing should be market-inalienable in order to
avoid the harms caused by commodification'.62 W h e n something is market inalienable
it cannot be sold, although it m a y be transferred in other ways, for example, by gift.
There m a y be degrees of market-inalienability: an object m a y only be sold under
particular circumstances; or some aspects of a thing m a y be market inalienable, for
example an object m a y be rented but not sold. In order to determine what precludes
h u m a n body parts (amongst other things)63 from becoming commodities, Radin gives
three arguments, although only one of these is relevant here, since it is '... based upon
the degradation and invasion of personhood occasioned by allowing sales'.64

The Personhood Prophylaxis argument, as Radin labels it, seeks to prevent harm to
personhood by, for example, selling body parts. This argument is often raised '...in
connection with organ transplants, especially from living people'.65 According to
Radin ' ... the general idea [of this argument] is that it is s o m e h o w degrading to be
selling off one's body parts and this is an injury to personhood that society should
prevent'.66 She concedes though, that, despite something generally worrying about
selling h u m a n body parts, for any particular person selling a body part m a y be the
lesser of two evils.
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Radin suggests the '... sale of one's body parts presents a dilemma because it seems
that we cannot honour our intuitions of what is required for society to respect
personhood, either by permitting sales or banning them'.67 On the one hand, a
person's selling part of her body degrades her personhood, but, on the other hand,
'[i]f people are so desperate for money that they are trying to sell things we think
cannot be separated from them without significant injury to personhood, we do not
cure the desperation by banning sales'.68 Faced with this dilemma, Radin argues that
the issue becomes one of social justice, which means "... we must rethink the larger
social context in which this dilemma is embedded. We must think about wealth and
power redistribution'.69 Whilst this is a reasonable response to the current trade in
human body parts from third world countries, it is not an adequate explanation why
human body parts should not be sold per se, but rather raises other moral concerns
such as poverty and the unfair allocation of resources between different countries.

Michelle Bray provides a detailed application of Radin's own theories of property and
personhood, universal commodification and market inalienability, to the questions of
person's owning or having property rights in her body parts. She argues that because

'[t]he body is central to each living individual's identity and self-esteem',70 it sho
be recognised a person has property interests in her body. However, this property
interest should be market inalienable because ' ... universal commodification
threatens to undermine the uniqueness of each body by treating all bodies as fungible
commodities.'71 So by having market inalienable property rights in her body parts, a
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person "... would have the right to control the disposition of [her] bod[y] and could
give away parts of [her] bod[y], but could not transfer [her] bod[y] in exchange for
consideration'.72 O n e of the implication of her argument that Bray points to is that a
'... market inalienable property right in the h u m a n body would solve m a n y of the
problems in the existing law',73 including those arising out of the Moore case and in
relation to the treatment of cadavers.

Bray's use of Radin's theories of universal commodification and market inalienability
to argue a person should have limited property rights in the body has certain important
similarities with arguments I have given in previous chapters: namely, she recognises
that a person m a y have certain interests in her body parts and, further, seeks to
accommodate and protect the various determinations a person m a y make because of
such interest. At the same time, though, she does not m a k e it clear h o w treating
human body parts as commodities will have the negative effects she suggests, the main
one being to threaten the 'uniqueness' of each body, and by implications each person.
Her suggestion is similar to the usual response given by those arguing against treating
h u m a n body parts as commodities, namely, that it would offend or undermine a
person's dignity, and is just as inadequate. A s mentioned above, Munzer explicitly
acknowledges it is not clear what exactly is wrong with selling human body parts, and
so it is not entirely clear h o w doing so would be an offence to a person's dignity.
There is no such acknowledgment by Bray. Whilst it remains unclear whether treating
body parts as commodities will have these undesirable effects or, further, how, for
example, a person not owning or having some property rights in her body parts would
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prevent such effects, then any objection to a person's owning her body parts because
this would mean she can sell them is not particularly substantial.

However, even if we assume for the sake of argument that it can be made clear what

precisely is wrong with selling human body parts, the concerns raised about treating
human body parts as commodities could still be accommodated by my proposal.

SECTION III: MEETING THE COMMODIFICATION OBJECTION

In response to my proposal—that it should be recognised a person owns her body

parts in order to ensure recognition of the prerogatives she has in virtue of having
morally significant interest in them—those who object to treating human body parts
commodities may respond that, given a person can usually sell something she owns,

the problems resulting from a person's having the right to sell her body parts would
outweigh any benefits that would amount from recognising a person owns her body
parts. They would argue that some other ways needs to be found to ensure
recognition of a person's prerogatives concerning her body parts. I have, however,
already rejected various weaker proposals, arguing they would not ensure a person's

prerogatives in relation to her body parts will be respected. This, however, may not
satisfy those raising the commodification objection, so I either have to undermine

objection or accommodate their concerns. In this section, I give both of these possi
responses, and so conclude that this objection does not present an insurmountable
problem for my proposal.

i. Undermining the Commodification Objection

M a n y , if not all, explanations of w h y selling her body parts should not be permitted
some point appeal to notions such as dignity or degradation. As argued in f,
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previous section, though, even the more detailed philosophical arguments of this type
do not clearly explain why treating human body parts as commodities is degrading or
contrary to a person's dignity. Much depends on the notion of dignity being used. In
some explanations, the Kantian notion of a person's having dignity in virtue of her
capacity to be rational and moral is invoked. As indicated above, though, this notion
of dignity has broader implications than just that human body parts should not be

treated as commodities. So those who cite Kant in this context either have to adopt his

other prohibitions relating to a person's treatment of her body parts or, alternativel

justify rejecting those further prohibitions, whilst accepting those which support the
arguments. Alternatively a broader notion that all persons, and perhaps even some
human beings that are not or no longer considered to be persons (such as handicapped
infants or the comatosed), should be treated with dignity may be invoked, but then
there is no adequate explanation for how a person's dignity would be affronted, if her
body parts were treated as commodities, either by herself or someone else.

In chapter three I discussed, endorsed and expanded on Sharon Perley's argument that

a person may have a morally significant, specifically a dignitary, interest in part of
body removed for therapeutic reasons. Such interests arise from a person's continuing

to identify with an excised part of her body because it had previously been part of her

body. For this reason, she may want that part to be treated in a way that is consistent
with her values and beliefs. I argued further, in chapter four, that a person had a

similar interest in what happened to her body parts after her death. I have argued that

both these interests should be respected as part of protecting and promoting a person's
dignity—precisely the aim of those who argue against treating human body parts as
commodities.
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M y explanation of h o w the treatment of a person's body part relates to her dignity does

not necessarily preclude a person from selling an excised part of her body, or gaining
financially from their subsequent use. Similarly, my argument does not preclude the

possibility of a person's giving directives that her body parts be sold after her dea

For example, it would be perfectly consistent with an entrepreneur's goals, aspiration

and values to give directives that part of her body removed for therapeutic reasons or
that all or some of her body parts after death should be sold. So whilst it remains
unclear why and how treating a person's body part as a commodity would be an

affront to her dignity, the commodification objection, as it is currently stated, doe
undermine my argument.

ii. Limited Ownership of Body Parts

Suppose, though, a moral reason with sound supporting arguments were provided for
why human body parts should not be treated as commodities. This would not
necessarily preclude a person from owning them, since it is possible, and perhaps in
some cases desirable, for a person not to be permitted to sell something she owns. I
have argued there are important reasons for recognising a person owns her body part,

but none of these require that a person be permitted to sell her body parts. So, in o
to accommodate concerns of those who raise the commodification objection against my
proposal, the sense in which a person owned her body parts could be restricted,
namely, she would not be permitted to sell her body parts.

A person's owning an object in a limited sense means she would not have some of the
specific incidents of ownership in relation to that object. So, if a person owned an

object but for some reason was not permitted to sell it, she would not have the releva

property rights in that object to alienate it by selling it. As discussed in chapter f
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there is no single property right that a person has to have over an object in order to
own it. Rather, a rationale needs to be given why a person owns, and further what
particular property rights she has in, an object, such as the moral argument I have
given why a person should own her body parts.

So, if it were established that a person should not be permitted to sell her body part

this may be sufficient to take steps to prohibit such transactions. My proposal could,

however, still be adopted with the slight modification that the rights a person had in
relation to her body parts in virtue of owning them would preclude those rights a
person needs to have in an object before she is permitted to sell it. When a person

owns an object in a restricted sense, it is usually clear which rights a person does n
have in that object. This, however, may not be the case with a person's body parts.

Those who argue against human body parts being treated as commodities, and so
would object to my proposal, at the same time seek to promote the donation of body
parts for transplantation. Yet donating, giving away or indeed selling an object are

just different methods of alienation. Further, in some schemas of the various rights a
person could have in an object she owns, for example Honore's incidents of

ownership, it is the same right, or incident, that permits a person to alienate the o

in various ways. So if the sole restriction on a person's owning her body parts is she
should not be permitted to sell them, then she may only be restricted from exercising
particular property right in a particular way over her body parts.

My proposal that it should be recognised that a person owns her body parts can
accommodate the concerns of those who object to human body parts being treated as
commodities, namely, a person would own her body part in a restricted sense. The

particular restriction, though, would not be that a person was not permitted to exerc
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a particular incident (right) or ownership over her body parts, but rather that she is not

permitted to exercise a particular incident in a particular way. It is possible, then
person to own her body parts, so that her prerogatives in relation to them will be
recognised, but still be precluded from selling them. The question remains, though,
whether there has to be such a restriction on the sense in which a person owns her
body parts.

CONCLUSION

Usually, if a person owns something, she can sell it, although this is not always the

case. Nevertheless, it is this connection between owning and selling that provides th
basis for a moral objection that will probably be made against my argument that it
should be recognised that a person owns her body parts. It is difficult, though, to
identify what exactly is wrong with a person's selling her body parts. Even the more
detailed philosophical arguments for this position do not explain how selling human

body parts would contrary to a person dignity. Without such as explanation, objectin
to a person's owning her body parts because she could then sell them does not

constitute a substantial objection to my proposal. Should such an explanation be give
at some later time, however, such concerns could be accommodated by my proposal,
since a person could own her body parts in a sense which ensure recognition of her
various prerogatives over her body parts, whilst also avoiding the predicted
undesirable consequences of a potential market for human body parts. That is, a
person could own, but not sell, her body parts. Either way, my proposal remains
intact against the commodification objection.

CONCLUSION

In giving m y argument w h y a person should be recognised as owning her body parts,
I have only considered two specific medical uses of human body parts, though
perhaps the most common ones: experimentation and transplantation. The only other

way of treating human body parts I have discussed is destroying those parts that have
been removed for therapeutic reasons. Further, I have limited my discussion to very
specific sources of human body parts to be used for these purposes—the former using

body parts removed from a person's body for therapeutic reasons, and the latter using
parts from cadavers. Given that the underlying motivation for my argument is to
ensure recognition of a person's prerogatives to determine what happens to her body
parts, it may have broader implications.

Throughout this thesis I have discussed various aspects of the Moore case. The

circumstances surrounding, the legal rulings relating to, and subsequent debate abou
recommendations resulting from that case have provided a useful case study for

determining the nature of, and basis for, a person's claims in relation to an excise
of her body. Consider, though, a variation on the circumstances of that case. Whilst
person who had one or two of her body parts removed for therapeutic reasons may be
willing to consent to those parts being used for experimental purposes, she may also
want to know the details of the proposed experiment and what, if any, other ways her
excised body parts could be used.

If a person were concerned about what would happen to an object she owned when
deciding whether to relinquish it for a particular purpose, she might make some
enquires. For example, someone who was asked to donate a family heirloom to a
museum because it was historically significant may want to ensure the object was
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suitably preserved or displayed rather than just being left in a box and allowed to
deteriorate. Further, she may insist on some form of contract to ensure the object is
treated in accord with her wishes. Whilst the person would relinquish her rights to
that object, such a contract would give her some form of redress if subsequently the
object was not treated accordingly.

So if it were recognised a person owned her body parts, then her prerogative to
determine what happens to any part removed for therapeutic reasons would go beyond
requiring her consent to a proposed use for that part. If, for example, there were
competing claims from different researchers to use that part, then the person from
whose body the part has been removed (rather than research committees) could choose
between the different projects. In making that choice she may consider the worthiness

of the various research proposals (for example if it aimed to prevent a non-preventabl

childhood disease rather than a self-inflicted disease such as lung cancer), whether th
research was consistent with her beliefs and values, and whether any of the predicted
implications or consequences of the project reflected or were contrary to her beliefs.

Moreover, the legitimacy of that choice, as well as any request for further informatio
prior to making a choice, would be clarified if it was recognised that a person owned
her body parts.

In previous chapters, I discussed and tentatively endorsed the practice of designated
cadaver organ donation, that is where immediately prior to death a prospective donor
designates the recipient of one or more of her organs. I suggested that this practice
would allow a person greater flexibility if she chose to exercise her prerogative to
determine what happens to her body parts after her death, since she could not only

choose whether to make her body parts available for transplantation after her death bu
also choose the recipients.
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M o r e generally, allowing a person to put restrictions on using her body parts for

transplantation after her death, such as nominating the recipients or restricting whic
body parts could be used, would allow a person to better fulfil any interest she may
have concerning what happens to her body parts after her death. I argued previously
that there were certain similarities between a person giving directives as to how her
body parts should be treated after her death and a bequest she may make in, for

example, a will. A person is permitted to put restrictions on bequests, for example tha

a beneficiary has to obtain a certain age or fulfil certain requirements before receiv

the object of the bequest. So, if it was recognised that a person owned her body parts,
then not only would her directives concerning the use of her body parts for
transplantation after her death be more likely to adhered to, but so would any
restrictions that she chose to put one such bequests.

At the end of chapter two, I suggested the discrepancies between organ procurement

policies and what happen in practice are a result of uncertainty about the relationshi
between a person and her body parts. I have argued that a person may have a morally
significant interest in determining what happens to her body parts in certain
circumstances. Further, these interests, and the associated prerogatives a person has
in virtue of them, need to protected and promoted as part of respecting her autonomy
and dignity. I contend that the best way of achieving this is to recognise a person
owns her body parts. Whilst some of the reasons I have given in support of my
contention are pragmatic, I suggest this type of relationship between a person and her
body parts—that is, ownership—is both conceptual defensible and, for reasons given
above, morally desirable.
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